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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR FIRST SEMESTER AY 2005-2006 I. A. DEFINITIONS & PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS Definition Concerned with the procedural steps through which a criminal case passes, commencing with the initial investigation of a crime and concluding with the unconditional release of the offender. A network of rules, which governs the procedural administration of criminal justice, that is, laws and courts rules (Black’s Law Dictionary). Method prescribed by law for the apprehension and prosecution of persons accused of any criminal offense and for their punishment in case of conviction (Clark’s Criminal Procedure) Sources Philippine Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 110 to Rule 127) of the Rules of Court (took effect on January 1, 1964). The Rules were revised three more times. The latest took effect on December 01, 2000). 1987 Constitution under Article III (Bill of Rights) various acts passed by the legislature like BP Blg. 129 Presidential decrees Executive Orders Decisions of the Supreme Court a. Inquisitorial    1. 2. 3.  b. Accusatorial   B.       1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. C.   Criminal Law vs. Criminal Procedure Criminal Law Both relates to crimes  Substantive: it defines crimes,  treats of their nature and provides for the their punishment Declares what acts are punishable Systems of Criminal Procedures Systems   D. Criminal Procedure Both relates to crimes Remedial: provides for the method by which a person accused of a crime is arrested, tried and punished Provides how acts are punished. c. system Mixed   Prosecutions of crimes are wholly in the hands of prosecuting officers and the court. The procedure is characterized by SECRECY. Presence of accused before the magistrate is not a requirement thus, magistrate can proceed with inquiry and judgment even in the absence of the accused. Judgment does not become final until it has been ratified and confirmed by the court of last resort (US vs. Samio). During the Spanish period. Requires all crimes except private offenses (must be commenced by the complainant of the offended party) to be prosecuted by a public prosecutor Accused has a right to be heard personally or by counsel Public trial, right of accused against self-incrimination is guaranteed. Accused enjoys presumption of innocence; guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt There is a right to appeal Judgment does not require the imprimatur of the court of last resort before t may attain finality. There should be moral certainty of guilt to defeat the constitutional presumption of innocence (People vs. Egot). Contemplates of two contending parties before the court, which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial (Queto vs Catolico). Mix of the last two systems (ex. our law provides that preliminary examination must be conducted by a judge before he issues a warrant of arrest which is an aspect of inquisitorial system while accused has a right to be heard, which is an aspect of the accusatorial system) Definition Note: Courts proceeding in our Judicial Setup is accusatorial or adversarial and not inquisitorial in nature. But there are opinions that our country subscribes to the third system. 1 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 C. E. 1. 2. Construction of rule Rules will be liberally construed, enough to protect the substantial rights of the accused (section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court). Rules of Court should not be interpreted as to sacrifice the substantial rights of the litigants at the altar of technicalities to the consequent impairment of the sacred rules of justice (Alonzo vs. Villamor). JURISDICTION Definition Came from the Latin words “juris” and “dico” (I speak by the law) which means “the power or the capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine controversies” (People vs. Mariano) The right to put the wheels of justice in motion and to proceed to the final determination of a cause upon the pleading of evidence. the power and authority to hear and determine matters in controversy according to established rules of law and to carry the sentence or judgment of the court into execution (Morando vs. Rovira). Vested in the courts, not in the judges. This when a complaint is filed before one branch or judge (of the same court, ex. RTC) jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone. Trial may be had or proceeding may continue by and before another branch or judge. Distinguished from venue The particular country or geographical area, which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case; place of trial. Venue Deals with locality, the place where the suit may be had Procedural (Prescribes methods of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion) In civil cases, venue can be waived or be a subject of agreement. In criminal actions, venue cannot be waived or stipulated upon because it is an element of jurisdiction. When does jurisdiction attach Jurisdiction attaches when law has given a tribunal capacity to entertain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be charged or affected, and that such complaint has actually been preferred, and that such person or thing has been properly brought before the tribunal to answer the charge therein contained (Republic vs. Sunga). II. A. 1. Exercise of Jurisdiction The authority to decide a cast and not the decision therein is what makes up a jurisdiction. Where the jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction (de Veyra vs. Avila). D. 2. 3. A court may act, first, without jurisdiction (makes the judgment void); and second, having power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongly (decision is wrong and must be reversed upon error); or third, irregularly (must be corrected by motion). E. 1. 4. 2. 3. F. Source Jurisdiction must be conferred by: (1) Constitution (2) Law in force at the time of the institution of the action (People vs. Adolfo) Cannot be fixed by the will of the parties or diminished by the omission or act of said parties Apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in the legislature; may not be conferred on the court by the parties involved in the offense. B. Jurisdiction Treats the power of the court to decide the case on the merits Substantive (defines and regulates rights or duties which gives rise to a cause of action) Criminal Jurisdiction Definition: the power of the tribunal to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it (People vs. Mariano). 2. While a court has abstract jurisdiction to and decide criminal cases committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it cannot do so unless a complaint or information has been filed in court. 3. requisites (a) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of (JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER). (b) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (JURISDICTION OVER TERRIRTORY). (c) person charged with the offense must have been brought to its presence for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court. (JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED). 1. Vena V. Verga 2 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 NOTE: It is a general rule that jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties (UY vs. CA) G. Reason: The law considers pirates “hostes humani generis”. It is committed not against any particular state but against all mankind (People vs. Lol-Lo and Sarao) 2.3 Where the offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft or in any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip. The criminal actions may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such vehicle passed during such trip including the place of departure and arrival (Section 14, Rule 110). 2.4 Crime was committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage. Action may be tried in the proper court of the first power of entry or any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed subject to the generally accepted principles of international law. 2.5 When the Supreme Court, in the interest of truth and impartial justice, transfers the place of trial from one place to another. (Article Xiii, Section 5(4)) 2.6 In cases of written defamation (Act 4363) Criminal action will be filed in the CFI of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties reside. If one of the parties is a public officer who office in the city of Manila, the action shall be filed in the CFI of Manila or where he holds office. I. Jurisdiction over continuing crimes Note: For continuous crime to exist, there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of the penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent or purpose. This is means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are unite in one and the same intent leading to the perpetuation of the same criminal purpose (People vs. Zapata and Bondoc) GENERAL RULE: The accused in a continuing or transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction in which he is found (US vs. Cunanan). But the court where the case was first filed acquires jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of all other courts, provided it has custody of the accused or has first acquired jurisdiction over his person. Territorial Jurisdiction Determined by the allegations in the information as to the situs of the crime and this determines, in the first instance, whether said court has jurisdiction to try this case. GENERAL RULE: the offender must be prosecuted in the territory where the offense was committed. 2. Exceptions: 2.1 Where the offense was committed under the exceptional circumstance provided in Article 2 of the RPC (although committed outside Philippine jurisdiction, these crimes are triable in Philippine courts): 2.1.1 should the crime be committed while on Philippine ship or airship 2.1.2 should the crime consist of counterfeiting or forgery of any coin or currency note of the Philippine Island or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippines. 2.1.3 Should the accused be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these Island of the Obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number 2.1.4 While being public officers or employees, should commit and offense in the exercise of their functions 2.1.5 Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations 2.2 Cases of Piracy H. 1. Jurisdiction over person of the accused – acquired upon either his apprehension with or without a warrant or his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court (which may be effect by posting bail or filing a motion to quash.) But this may be waived. Criminal Jurisdiction: how determined Jurisdiction is determined by the fine and imprisonment prescribed by law or extent of the penalty which the law imposes together with other obligations on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information constitutive of the offense charged. Apportionment of Jurisdiction Extent of jurisdiction is ascertained by: 1.1 Power conferred by express or implied provision of a statute 1.2 Constitution (article VIII, Section 1 and 2): Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various court subject to the proviso that it may not deprive the SC of its jurisdiction over cases set forth in Article VIII section 5. J. K. 1. 2. Vena V. Verga Criminal Jurisdiction of courts 3 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts  Section 32 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980: except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and Sandiganbayan, these courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over (i) all violations of city and municipal ordinances committed within their respective jurisdiction (ii) offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine and other accessory penalties. Provided that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have original jurisdiction (iii) offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence.  Under PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249, MTC, MCTC, MeTC over government officials and employees where the penalty is not more than 6 years and officers charged do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Salary grade 27 and above) Note: Under RA 7691: fine is no longer a factor in determining jurisdiction. (b) Regional trial Courts  Vested the exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court tribunal or body with penalty higher than 6 years,  Court with general jurisdiction  Exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the first level courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction (c) Family Courts – created under the Family courts Act of 1997  Has exclusive jurisdiction over cases: (i) Criminal cases where one or more of the accuse is below 18 but not less than 9. (ii) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. (d) Court of Appeals (e) Sandiganbayan  Exclusive jurisdictions over all cases involving (i) Violations of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act, RA 1379 and Chapter II, section 2 of Title VII of the RPC where one or more principal accused are officials occupying positions in the government (national and Local officials with salary grade 27 or higher)  Appellate jurisdiction over accused whose position is lower than salary grade 27. (f) Supreme Court Vena V. Verga (a) I. L. CASES General Principles PEOPLE VS. MARIANO G.R. No L-40527 30 June 1976 Facts: Hermogenes Marioano, a Liason officer by then incumbent municipal mayor Nolasco of San Jose del Monte Bulacan, was authorized to receive from USAID for the use and benefit of the said municipality electric cables measuring 150 ft and 250 feet and a cable power measuring 525 ft. with a total value of $717.50. Instead of delivering the said materials to the mayor, he appropriated the same to his personal use to the prejudice of the municipality. The provincial Fiscal of Bulacan then filed an information for Estafa against the accused with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground contending that the court has no jurisdiction over him considering that the military commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter. The judge granted the motion, hence this appeal. Issue: W/N the civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offenses of Estafa of goods allegedly committed by a civilian. Decision: Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceeding, which fundamentally means the power or capacity given by the law to court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies. It is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. The jurisdiction of courts is derived from the constitution and statutes in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Under the Judiciary Act of 1949, courts of First Instance shall have jurisdiction over all crimes in which the penalty provided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos. The crime committed by Mariano is punished by imprisonment from 4 months to two years. This falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance. The rule is that the court which first take cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other applies only where both courts have concurrent jurisdiction over particular case charged. The situation does not involve two tribunal vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply this rule. As specifically stated in General order no 49, which redefined the jurisdiction of military tribunals, the military commission, is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of Estafa. 4 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 UNITED STATES VS. JUEVES G.R. No. 6992 30 August 1912 Facts: On several instances several men entered towns, all within the jurisdiction of Ambos Camarines (which at the date of the commencement of the action were already part of the province of Tayabas), robbing, kidnapping and killing several persons. They were charged with the crime of brigandage and their guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants’ counsel insists however that the court of Tayabas had no jurisdiction to try the accused for the reason that the territory where the acts complained of were committed belonged to the Province of Ambos Camarines at the time of the commission of the acts although it has been since transferred to the Province of Tayabas and that Section 3 of Act No 518 is invalid as opposed to the Philippine Bill. Issue: W/N a court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in a particular locality prior to the time such locality was included within the jurisdiction of such court Decision: the general rule is that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the (1) geographical limits of the territory over which it presides, and (2) the actions it is empowered to hear and decide. A court has inchoate right of jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its jurisdiction, which is perfected on the institution of the action. If however, it loses jurisdiction over a particular action because its territorial limits are restricted prior to the institution of the action, it also loses this inchoate right to jurisdiction in favor of the court to which the territory is transferred since it is unnecessary to prolong a court’s existence indefinitely after being legally abolished. The territory where the acts complained of in the case at bar were committed having been transferred to the Province of Tayabas prior to the institution of this action, the court of the that province where the units have been transferred shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. The assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is not a violation of the ex post facto clause. The decision was affirmed. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL G.R. No. 6287 01 December 1991 Facts: Plaintiff filed an action for condemnation of certain real estate lands in the CFI of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized Vena V. Verga by law to construct a railroad line from Paniqui to Tayug in the province of Tarlac. After filing the complaint. The plaintiff, pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation. On the 4 th of October, plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that a motion would be made to the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, because as determined by the plaintiff, the land sough to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint. Issue: W/N the CFI of Tarlac has jurisdiction over the case Decision: Section 55 and 56 of Act No 136 of the Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these island with respect to real estate stating that the jurisdiction of the CFI shall be of two kinds: Original and Appellate. It was the intention of the Philippine commission to give to the CFO the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. So far as jurisdiction over subject matter is concerned, the CFI of one province may, if there is no objection by any of the parties, take cognizance of an action in reference to real estate located in another province, Certain statues confer jurisdiction, others provide for the procedure by which that jurisdiction is made effective. The purpose of procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction to the court but to give it effectiveness. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. They establish a relation, not between the court and the subject matter, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. The Philippine Commission has in fullest phrase given the CFI unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Island by act no 136 and that jurisdiction ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an act equally express or so clearly inconsistent therewith as to amount of the same thing. Venue is not connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the parties consent thereto there is no legal reason why the CFI of Manila may not cognizance of and determine a controversy affecting the tile to or an interest in real estate situated in another province. With the consent of the defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff. Any one of the defendants who have lands lying in another province may also choose the venue. In such case, the action as to all the defendants not objecting would continue as to the objecting defendants. 5 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The plaintiff having brought the action must submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of the situation itself created and took possession of the land while the case is being litigated. It is estopped from alleging that the court has no jurisdiction over it. EMILIO REYES VS. DIAZ G.R. No. 48753 26 November 1941 Facts: The protestee is questioning whether the protestant’s certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. Such will eventually determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter. The parties are in agreement that if indeed the protestee filed his candidacy, then the court has jurisdiction over the case. Otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case. They are therefore not questioning whether the trial court has jurisdiction according to the law. Issue: W/N the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant, which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter protest. Decision: It has been held that the word “jurisdiction” as used in the contribution and in the statues means “jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. In order that the court may validly try and decide the case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances, it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court within the issues raised in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue is different from jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred by consent either express of implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded, it may be validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties, this cannot be done when jurisdiction over subject matter is involved. Jurisdiction over the issue is an exception of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Vena V. Verga The original question posed by the court was not answered. VELUNTA vs. CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY G.R. No. L-71855 20 January 1988 Facts: Petitioner, a member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban, was directing traffic at around 6PM in the intersection of Burgos-Tarcela-Lucente Streets in Tacloban City when he apprehended one Romeo Lozano, a motorized tricycle driver, for a traffic violation. An altercation ensued which resulted in the death of the latter. His widow filed an administrative complaint with the NAPOLCOM, which found petitioner guilty of less grave misconduct and suspended him for six months without pay. Pending the case, Ramon’s widow also filed another case for homicide at the Fiscal’s office in Tacloban. Finding prima facie evidence, the First Assistant City Fiscal recommended that the case be referred to the Tanodbayan which endorsed the filling of the homicide case. The said case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to PD 1850. The general court Martial was convened but petitioner assailed its jurisdiction over the case alleging that EO 1040 in relation to EO 1020 transferred jurisdiction over members of the PNP to the NAPOLCOM. Issue: W/N the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the case. Decision: Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice fore hearing and deciding cases. Courts in the Philippines have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statues and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective. It is expressly stated under EO 1012 that it is only the operation supervision and direction over all units of the Integrated National Police force stationed or assigned in the different cities and municipalities that was transferred from the Philippine Constabulary to the city or municipal government concerned. Likewise, EO 1040 transferred merely the exercise of administrative control over all units of the Integrated National Police throughout the country to the President. This is not the same as transferring of jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police officer. When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of the jurisdiction. It is a rule that once jurisdiction is 6 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 acquired, it remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law. It is not intended by the legislators to repeal PD 1850, thus, the court martial’s jurisdiction remains. UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 105965-70 09 August 1999 Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latter’s supervisor, on matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some of the accused after a comprehensive investigation. Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 which provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the person of the petitioner Decision: The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Thus, Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filing of the informations and as now prescribed by law. RA 8249, the latest amendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that such will have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the Philippines Army and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank. In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than “naval captains and all officers of higher rank”. It must be noted that both the NATURE of the OFFENSE and the POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE ACCUSED are conditions SINE QUA NON before Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, regular courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the person of the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law which states that “in case where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Vena V. Verga Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129. Consequently, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the offense charged since under Section 9 of RA 3019, the commission of any violation of said law shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than Six years and One month to FIFTEEN years. The indictment of the petitioner therefore cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC. Jurisdiction determined by the position M. SUBIDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. 122631 20 January 1997 Facts: Bayani Subido, then BID Commissioner and Rene Parina, then BID Special Agent conspired and caused the issuace of a warrant of arrest against James Maksimuk. The accused knew hat Maksimuk’s deportation order was not yet final and executory pending a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in the detention of the latter which caused him undue injury. A case for arbitrary detention was filed against the accused with the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners filed a motion to quash contending that in view of the effectivity of RA 7975, which is an act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of the accused. Said motion was denied, hence this petition. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case at bar Decision: The court dismissed the case. It is true that the crime committed no longer falls within the purview of RA 7975. However, RA 7975 only took effect one year after the commission of the crime charged. It must be remembered that for purposes of Section 4 of RA 1606 which provides that Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over cases committed by public officer and employees in relation to their office, the reckoning point is the time of the commission of the crime. Under PD 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over persons who at the time of the commission of the crime is occupying a position having a Salary Grade 27 or higher. It is true that Parina held a position with a salary grade of less than “27”. However, he is being prosecuted as co-conspirator of the principal accused who held a position higher that grade “27” thus, section 4 of PD 1606 which provides that “in cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the position to salary grade 27 or higher, RTC, MTC, METC or MCTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction” will apply. 7 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 It must be noted that before the enactment of RA 7975, what matters is not the kind of offense so long as it is alleged in the crime committed in relation to the office of the public official, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction try and hear the case. This has been cured by Section 4 of RA 7975 by limiting its jurisdiction only to persons (principal accused) having a salary grade of “27”. This, being a curative statute, may be given retroactive effect. Petition was denied. CUYCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No 137017-18 08 February 2000 Facts: the Graft Investigation Officer found probable cause against Ramon Cuyco for violation of Section 39 of RA 3019 as well as Section 3E of the same act. Two informations were recommended against Cuyco and the other respondents. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation and the prosecution filed he information with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction contending that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, thus RTC has jurisdiction over the case. The prosecution did not oppose such action. The Sandiganbayan however denied the motion, hence, this appeal. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Decision: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violation of Section 3a and e of RA 3019 unless committed by public officials and employees occupying position of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” and higher. Petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 thus, Sandiganbayan incurred serious error of jurisdiction entitling petitioner to the relief prayed. Petition was granted. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint. business and collect premiums in behalf of the corporation. She was required to make periodic reports and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private responded located in the City of Manila. An audit was conducted on petitioner’s account which showed a shortage of Php 300T. As a result, she was charged with Estafa before the RTC with respondent Hon. Polo. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which motion was denied by respondent Judge. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied. Petitioner contends that RTC in Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and the funds she allegedly misappropriated with collected in Cebu City. Issue: W/N the RTC in Manila has jurisdiction Decision: The general rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character cannot be questioned by certiorari and cannot be subject of appeal. However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial of the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. It is a general rule that averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. Section 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecution the action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place. The subject information charges the petitioner with Estafa committed during the period 1980 to June 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila. Clearly them. From the allegations of the information the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction. Besides, the crime of Estafa is a continuing crime, which may be prosecuted at the place where any of he essential elements of the crime took place. The petitioner clearly prejudiced private respondents in Manila and therefore, the crime was committed here. Petition was dismissed. US VS. GALLEJOS G.R. No. 12739 08 December 1917 8 N. BUAYA VS. POLO G.R. No. 75079 26 January 1989 Facts: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation who was authorized to transact insurance Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Facts: From November 1914 to October 1916 in the municipality of Cebu, the accused Mariano Gallejos and complainant’s wife Benita Antioquia had illicit relations and begot a child. The complainant filed a complaint against the two of the Justice of Peace of the Municipality of Cebu. Mariano was arrested but Benita remained at large. Mariano was arraigned and was found guilty of adultery. However, Mariano filed a motion to suspend the trial until his codefendant is arrested and brought to the court. The motion was denied. Record shows that the complaint included both defendants. Issue: W/N the court could proceed with the trial of Mariano even if Benita is not present. Decision: While the complaint for the crime of adultery must be presented against both of the culprits and by the offended person, yet the law permits separate trials for each. Not only is there no law requiring that they should be tried separately, but there is a positive provision of law permitting them, to be tried separately. Separate trials may be had: (1) when either of the parties request it; (b) when the government is satisfied that the man did not know that the woman was married; (c) when one of the parties has died before the time of the trial; and (d) when one of the parties escaped the jurisdiction of the court and has not been arrested. Moreover, the law clearly provides that in furtherance of justice, the court may grant either of the parties the right and opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. The question of jurisdiction of the court is always a question of importance; and if the evidence is necessary to prove the fact, as it is in all criminal cases, so far as the place of the commission of the crime is concerned, and the prosecution fails to prove that fact, in the interest of justice the court may always admit additional evidence. Sentence of lower court was affirmed. O. The Provincial Fiscal moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, which was denied, hence this appeal. Issue: W/N the court may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. Decision: The filing of a complaint or information in the Court initiated a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant of arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the court which has the option to grant or deny the same. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court because the determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. But to avoid similar situation, the court takes the view tat while Cespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed, still, any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case even if without objection of the accuse, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own vie on the matter. He is after all, in control of his prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by waiver Jurisdiction acquired for the person of the accused. P. REPUBLIC VS. SUNGA G.R. No. L-38634 20 June 1988 Facts: The complainant Jose Dadis filed a case for the attempted homicide against Ariston and Rafael Anadilla. While the case is pending, Jose Dadis filed an affidavit of desistance and was no longer interested in the prosecution of the case. Jose said that he had forgiven the accused and that his material witness could no longer be contracted the court then lifted the order of arrest, cancelled the bail bond and ordered the release of the accused. Vena V. Verga UNITED STATES VS. DE LA SANTA G.R. No. 3181 10 October 1907 Facts: The complainant Teofila Sevilla charges the defendant with the crime of seduction under a promise of marriage at the time when she was less than 21 years of age. The complaint was filed by her father when she was already 24 years old. The court contends that the alleged seduction could only be 9 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 instituted and maintained at her instance since she was already of legal age, otherwise the trial court shall have no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction over a complaint. Decision: as provided by the RPC, complainant can institute criminal action against the defendant in cases of seduction should it be proven that she is already of the majority age. Although the parents and guardians are mentioned disjunctively, still, the right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction is exclusively and successively reposed in these persons in the order in which they are named so that no one of them has authority to proceed if there is any other person previously mentioned therein with legal capacity to appear and institute action. Under the Civil code, a woman 23 years of age is already in the full possession of her civil rights, save only in certain exceptional cases expressly prescribed in the code. The right to appear and prosecute or defend an action in the court is not one of these exceptions and, indeed, it is inherent to the full exercise of civil rights. Under the provision of the RPC, jurisdiction over the crime of seduction is expressly denied the trial court unless such jurisdiction be conferred by one of certain persons specified in the law, in this case, by the offended person herself. This is important not only for the sufficiency of the complaint but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal and subject to the objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in court below or on appeal. Where the subject matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. Jurisdiction over subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority, which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. Judgment was reversed and the complaint was dismissed. Q. and continued his trip to Malolos. The difference in the fare is 1 peso and 22 cents. The ticket issued simulated that the tip was from Manila to Boacau and the charge only 18 cents, rendering the said amount to the company while appropriating the balance of the sum. The complaint was not able to precisely designate the place where the falsification was committed not where the appropriation occurred. Issue: W/N the court of Tarlac has jurisdiction to try the case Decision: The crime of Estafa was committed at the where his account was rendered and the stub of the false ticket was turned it. In this case, the stubs and false tickets were turned in Tarlac. The court in Tarlac therefore has jurisdiction since it is within this territory that the accused made use of the document alleged to be false and where the falsification was committed. The fact that the CFI took jurisdiction of the offense charged, because in the opinion of the court, the place of the commission of the crime was not clearly shown, is not an obstacle to the courts declaration itself to be without jurisdiction as soon as the lack of jurisdiction appeared from the proceedings subsequently had. Jurisdiction over criminal cases cannot be conferred by consent. The appeal was granted. R. Estopped by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction PEOPLE VS. REGULARIO G.R. No. 101451 23 March 23, 1993 Facts: Accused together with several others murdered on Menardo Garcia in Lucena. During arraignment, the appellants entered a plea of not guilty however, before the prosecution rested its case, Regalario and his accomplice Pabillar, changed their plea to guilty. After trial, all appellants were found guilty of the offense charged. Appellant’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on the 14th day of the 15-day period for appeal, which was denied, by the trial court. They then filed a notice of appeal, which was denied for having been filed out of time (10 days after the receipt of the first denial). Issue: W/N the court can still exercise jurisdiction over the case considering that the appeal was filed out of time. Decision: The trial court was correct in rejecting appellant’s notice of appeal since it was filed beyond the reglamentary period. However, as in People vs. Tamani, although the appeal of the accused was demonstrably filed out of 10 Jurisdiction not conferred by consent US VS. REYES G.R. No.472 28 April 1902 Facts: the complaint charges the defendant with the crime of Estafa and falsification and alleges the former, being an employee of the Manila Dagupan Railway issued a ticket to a passenger who was going from Manila to Caloocan Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 time, to obviate the miscarriage of justice, the court nevertheless reviewed the case and rendered judgment on the merits thereof in view of the fact that the filing of the appeal out of time was due to the inadvertence of the defense counsel. The same may also be granted in the present case adopting the principle of estoppel by laches to bar attack on jurisdiction. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY G.R. No. L-21450 15 April 1968 Facts: Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of Php 1T+ with legal interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and executory, the court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the RTC. Surety appealed in the CA, which was against denied. This time, the surety just asked for an extension in order for them to file the motion for reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it file a motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of RA 296 which is the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of t which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions were the value of the subject matter does not exceed Php 2,000.00 CFI therefore has no jurisdiction over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from the time the action was commence in the CFI. Issue: W/N the case should be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. Decision: After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law and as the lack of it affect the very authority of the curt to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstance of the present cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case. A party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a penalty. Adherence of Jurisdiction DELA CRUZ vs. MOYA G.R. L-65192 27 April 1988 Doctrine: Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up the end of the litigation. Facts: Rodolfo de la Cruz is a member of the Armed Force of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operation Section of the PC Company, together with other PC me, received a mission order to proceed to Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were engaged in illegal cockfighting which they complied with. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldiers on their way back to the headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffled, dela Cruz shot Cabilto. The petitioner was charged with homicide in the CFI. Claiming that the crime for which he was chaged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, petitioner filed a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried in a court martial. The motion was denied. Issue: W/M the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case at bar. Decision: One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are null and void. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in the force at the time of the commencement of action. The case was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General Order No 59, military tribunals created under general order No. 8, exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel of the AFP while in the performance of their duty provided that a certificate from the Secretary of National defense for the purpose of determining whether the offense was really committed while in the performance of a duty. This proviso does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor doe it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed. The fact that there was a mission order and that the victim was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order compels the court to declare that respondent court was without jurisdiction. 11 S. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Petition was granted. PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES G.R. No. 118013-14 11 October 11, 1995 Doctrine: Jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Sandiganbayan or the court as the case may be cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason RA 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of litigation. Facts: The Dumancas spouses complained with the police saying that a certain Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumngyao swindled them. The accused together with civilian agents arrested and abducted the swindling suspects and forced them to produce the money they got from the spouses. The two were found dead a few days after. Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC against members of the PNP and nine other civilians who confederated with each other for the purpose of extorting money through kidnapping the two victims. Petitioner contends that the crime was committed in the course of the performance of duties of the accused, thus, Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1606. Issue: W/N the RTC of Bacolod or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the PNP. Decision: At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was section 4 of PD No 1060 which provided that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction in all cases involving public officers and employees who committed felonies in relation to their office, which must be alleged in the complaint. An offense is considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office or if the office is the constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. It is a fundamental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the information in the court do not indicate that the victims were killed in the course of the investigation. What was alleged is that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or exhorting a sum of money, abducted, kidnapped, detained and killed the two victims. The allegation of “taking advantage of his position” incorporated in the information is not enough to bring the offenses within the definition of “offenses committed in relation to public office”. The Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violation of RA 3019 as amended, RA No. 1379 and the RPC. It Vena V. Verga retains only cases where the accused are national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. RA No 7975 cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan since jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or any other courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases as the informations were filed before the RTC. Assuming that the informations were filed with the said tribunal, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of RA 7975 that all criminal cases in which the trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. RTC was ordered to resume hearing the case. UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119000 28 July 1997 Facts: While Rosa Uy was helping her husband manage their lumber business, she and a friend, Consolacion agreed to form a partnership wherein the latter will contribute additional capital as industrial partner for the expansion of Rosa’s lumber business. Various sums amounting to Php 500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business, but no receipt was ever issued. The friendship of the two turned sour, thus, Consolacion demanded the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Consolaction filed a complaint for Estafa and for violation of BP 22. The Manila RTC acquitted the petitioner of Estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP Blg. 22. Petitioner contents that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under BP 22 and assuming arguendo that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal, she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction Issue: W/N the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing checks Law. Decision: Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. This it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside that of that limited territory. Jurisdiction of the court over a criminal case is determined by the 12 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the crimes of Estafa and violation of BP are two different offenses having different elements and necessarily, for the court to acquire jurisdiction, each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. The respondent court is wrong to conclude that inasmuch as the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violation of BP 22. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction. BP 22 on the other hand, as a continuing offense, may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committee. Petitioner also timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court As provided by jurisprudence, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over a subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court, may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. However, this rule has been qualified in the case of Tijan vs, Sibonghanoy wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court can be held to be barred by laches. This case however cannot be applied in the case at bar since the accused is not guilty of laches. RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. Exceptions to the General Rule of Adherence to Jurisdiction BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 316 SCRA 65 01 October 1999 Facts: BINAY CASE On Sept. 7, 1994, the office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan one information for violation of art.220 of RPC (illegal use of public funds) and 2 for violation of RA3019 (anti-graft), which were amended on Sept 15, 1994, Vena V. Verga against Jejomar Binay alleging that these were committed in 1997 during his incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. On June 13, 1995, after RA 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect (May 16, 1995), Binay filed a motion to refer his cases to the “proper court” for further proceedings, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan. As such he filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan before the Supreme Court. MAGSAYSAY CASE Mario Magsaysay is the mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas, all of his co-petitioners in this case are officials of the same municipality. On April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, V-mayor of the same municipality, charged petitioners with violation of RA3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa (also petitioner herein) of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. A resolution by Graft Investigation Officer Alarilla recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan. However, it was filed in the RTC of Batangas instead, peculiarly the information was signed by the same Alarilla. Subsequently, the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, batangas, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against the petitioners for the same violation. Thereafter another information alleging the same offense was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners moved to quash the information alleging that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. While the cases were pending, Congress enaceted RA8249, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of RA3019 and Art.220 of the RPC. Considering that: 1. At the alleged commission of the crimes, municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27 To support this contention, they presented certifications saying that the salary they received was below that of the salary received by a grade 27 officer. For Binay his salary was only P10, 793/month equivalent to Grade 22 and for Magsaysay P11, 828/month equivalent to Grade 25. They based this on RA6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989). Municipal Mayors are not included in the enumeration in Sec. 4a(1) of Pd1606 as amended by RA 7975. Petitioners invoke the rule in statcon: inclusion unius est exclusion alterius: what is not included in those enumerated is deemed exluded. 2. 13 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 3. Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan Decision: THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades. The Constitution states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to and the qualifications required of their positions, thus RA6758 provides that the Grade depends upon the nature of one’s position relative to another position. It is the person’s grade that determines the salary not the other way around. It is possible that a local gov’t official’s salary may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary also depends on the financial capability of his respective government unit. Nevertheless, it is the law, which fixes the official’s grade. RA 6758 instructs the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) to prepare an Index of Occupation Services listing the Salary Grades of Gov’t officials. Both the 1989 and 1997 version of said Index classifies municipal mayors under Grade 27, as such municipal mayors come within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Resort to Statcon is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous. The enumeration under section 4a(1) is not exclusive. Again statcon does not apply where the law is clear. MORE ON BINAY Under sec.7 of RA 7975: upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper court. The proper import of this section is laid down in Bengzon v. Inciong: The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the stature expressly provided that it is intended to operate to actions pending before its enactment. Where the statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive Vena V. Verga effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. To this effect, RA 7975 is retroactive. Effects of Section 7: 1. If trial of cases before the Sandigan has already begun as of the approval of RA7975, then RA 7975 does not apply. 2. If trial of cases before the Sandigan has NOT begun as of the approval of RA7975, then it applies. a. if by virtue of sec.4 of RA7975, the sandigan has jurisdiction over the case, then the case shall be referred to the sandigan. b. If by virtue of sec.4 of RA7975, the sandigan has no jurisdiction, then the case shall be referred to the regular courts. As the trial of Binay had not yet begun as of date of the approval of RA7975, the Sandigan retains jurisdiction over the case. MORE ON MAGSAYSAY Petitioners invoke the rule that jurisdiction of a court one it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent event, although of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. They claim that the filing of the info in the Sandigan was a subsequent even which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.This rule has no application here as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case in the first place. Furthermore, when the info was filed with the RTC RA7975 was already in effect, thus the need to be referred to the Sandigan. Petitioners invoke that respondents are estopped from filing an info with the Sandigan considering that they had already filed another info alleging the same facts before the RTC. While the court in certain cases has ruled that estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked, estoppel remains the exception and not the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law. Furthermore, the respondent in this case is the State and estoppel is not applied to the State. SANCHEZ and MANAGAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 313 SCRA 723 Facts: Petitioners are officers of the Phil. Army. Lt.Col. Lino Sanchez was Commanding Officer, 9th Post Engineer Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group (HHSG), while Major Vicente Managay was G-4, HHSG. On June 16, 1993, court martial proceedings were initiated against them and Gaudencio Romualdez based on a report stating that there was a prima facie case against them for violation of Art. 95 of the articles of war for causing the wrongful release of Php 5,995,47 for payment of repair of G10 office of the Phil. Army, equivalent to 88.55% completion of the work, when in fact only 25% of the work had been completed to the damage of the government. The judge advocate of the Phil. Army referred the findings to the 14 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, recommending the filing of info with the Sandiganbayan On April 8, 1994, Sanchez was arraigned before the Gen. Court Martial No.2 while Managay on July 1, 1994. They both pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile on April 18, 1994, an info was filed against them before the Sandigan for violation of RA 3019. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case before the Sandigan alleging that it has no jurisdiction over the case as the court martial had acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction and that the acts complained of before the court martial and the Sandigan are one and the same. Decision: Although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction at the time the charge was filed, it lost its jurisdiction upon the enactment of RA 7975 because he falls below the rank of full colonel and trial has not yet begun. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 301 SCRA 298 Facts: see subsequent Lacson digests Decision: The amendment in RA no 8249 that in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in the said RA 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper RTTC, MTC, MeTC, MTCT, as the case may be in pursuant to BP 129. The previous law vests jurisdiction in the RTC where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27. The term principal was deleted so that under the amendment, if an accomplice belongs to Salary grade 27, then jurisdiction is with the Sandiganbayan even if none of the principals belong to a lower salary grade. The amendment was applied retroactively. T. Facts: Rosauro Sabino, Francisco Primoso and Romualdo Ramos were arrested in Caloocan while Balbino Morales was arrested in Malabon, both municipalities are beyond the limits of the city of Manila. They were convicted in the CFI of Manila for the crime of Brigandage. Evidence, however, discloses that the offenses were committed in the Provinces of Bulacan and Rizal. Decision: When the record discloses that the crime as alleged in the complaint was not committed in the province wherein the trial was had, and the accused was not arrested in that province and defendant had not fled there from, the Court of First Instance of that Province has no jurisdiction to impose sentence. In such cases, of the court has reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed; the accused should be remanded to the court of proper jurisdiction for trial. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING vs. ISANI 242 SCRA 158 06 March 1995 Facts: In a complaint filed a few days after the effectivity of RA7691 (expanding the jurisdiction of municipal and metropolitan trial courts) with the Makati RTC, Lolita Encelan sought to recover from RCBC actual damages of $5,000 or P137,675. RCBC moved for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction on the ground that it is under the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) not the RTC, the principal demand prayed for not being in excess of P200,000. Respondent RTC judge Isnani, instead of dismissing the complaint, transferred the entire records of the case to the MTC. Decision: It has been held that where the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of ordering the transfer, the court should dismiss the case. REPUBLIC vs. ASUNCION 231 SCRA 211 Facts: Alexander Dionisio y Manio, member of the PNP, was assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, when he was dispatched to Dumalay Street to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionioso proceeded to the place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. While trial for homicide was already in progress in the RTC of QC, the case was dismissed for refilling with the Sandiganbayan on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case. The private prosecutor moved for dismissal citing the opinion of the Sec of the DOJ that crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts as provided in RA 6975 and the 15 Action of the Court when determined that is had no jurisdiction 1. 2. Under its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court, even the Court of Appeals may properly refer the case to the court of proper jurisdiction. Courts of the 1st and 2nd level are without authority to order the transfer. If the courts believe that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its jurisdiction is limited to simply dismissing the case. US VS. MORALES 6 Phil 403 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court as stated in the 1973 constitution and as the 1987 constitution provides that the present anti-graft court shall continue to function and exercise it jurisdiction. Decision: The Court sanctioned the transfer of cases from the RTC for lack of jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan is a regular court. While it is a special court, it is a regular court within the context of RA 6975 because “it is a court normally functioning with continuity within the jurisdiction vested on it” and that the term regular courts is used in Sec. 46 of RA 6975 to distinguish the said courts form courts-martial for it seeks to divest the latter of such jurisdiction and mandates its transfers to the former pursuant to the policy of the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian in character. The Sandiganbayan is a regular court as stated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction it is necessary that the offenses were committed by public officers in relation to their office. In here, there is no indication that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by Dionisio in the course of the latter’s mission. As such, the court directed the RTC of QC to conduct a preliminary hearing within 15 from receipt of decision, to determine if the crime was committed in relation to public office. If it be determined in the affirmative, the case shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan as if the same were originally fined with it. Otherwise, the RTC should proceed with the trial of the case and render judgment thereon. CUNANAN vs. ARCEO 242 SCRA 88 Facts: Accused, a PNP officer was on a mission at Candaba Pampanga. He went out of the police station after hearing a commotion and fired a warning shot, with the intention of restoring peace and order which was disturbed and broken by the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and alter between the victim and one Pfc. Basa. An information for murder was filed against the accused. Petitioner now contents that he committed the offense charged in relation to his public office. RTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged was done in the performance of petitioner’s official functions thus the judge dismissed the case. A month after, the decision was modified stating that the same must be transmitted with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: W/N the transfer was valid Decision: Petitioner contends that jurisdiction over the case was fixed in the RTC as the Asuncion ruling is inapplicable, since here trial had already ended and the case was submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling was promulgated. A transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late state will expose him to double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The RTC’s initial assumption of jurisdiction does not prevent it form subsequently declaring itself to be without jurisdiction as it was found out in the hearing that Cunanan had committed the offence while he was in the performance of his duties as policeman. He shot the victim in the course of trying to restore local public order which had been breached by a fistfight between the victim and 2 other individuals. The absence in the info of an allegation that Cunanan committed the offense charged in relation to his office is immaterial and easily remedied. As the case had already been forwarded to the Sandiganbayan, the said info may be amended at any time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, considering that such amendment would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charge, it would not prejudice Cunanan’s substantive rights. There is no double jeopardy as the RTC was without jurisdiction and the dismissal of the info by the RTC was not equivalent to acquittal, it simply reflected that the proceedings therein was terminated LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 128096 20 January 1999 Facts: Petitioner Lacson is assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of RA No. 8249 – an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Lacson was being held liable for the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng gang by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group. It was contended that it was a rub-out and not a shoot-out which took place on the night of May 18, 1995. The PNP officers were originally absolved from any liability because of the finding of the Blancaflor Commission that the incident was a legitimate police operation. However, after a review of Ombudsman Villa, the findings were modified thus Lacson and 11 others were charged with murder. All of the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan saying that the RTC should take cognizance of the case at bar since by virtue of RA 7975, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was only to cases were the principal accused is a public officer with salary Grade of “27”. It was contended that the highest principal accused in the amended information has the rank of Chief Inspector only, and none has the equivalent of SG 27. Vena V. Verga 16 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 While the motions for reconsideration were pending, RA 8249 was passed by the Congress, which expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of RA 7975. The new law now expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cover Lacson. The amended information mere alleges that the offense charged was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office. Decision: The court ordered the transfer of the cases from Sandiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction to the RTC which has exclusive jurisdiction over said cases. CUYCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. 137017-18 08 February 2000 Decision: The court ordered the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, but informed the Ombudsman that it may re-file the cases with the court of proper jurisdiction, the RTC of Zamboanga City. Concurring Decision (Davide): The case should be referred to the RTC instead of being dismissed. J. Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Cases Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction Decision: The CFI, Circuit Criminal Court and Juvenile and Domestic Relation’s Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under RA 7691. Provided that in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under 16 years of age. K. Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts. (Section 20, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by RA No. 7691)  Vested the exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court tribunal or body with penalty higher than 6 years.  Court with general jurisdiction  Exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the first level courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction L. MORALES vs. CA 283 SCRA 211 12 December 1997 Facts: Ernesto Morales y Cruz was charged in the RTC of Pasay with violation of Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act involving only 0.4587 grams of shabu, as such the imposable penalty would at most be only prision correctional (6mos.1day-6 yrs). Morales moved to dismiss in light of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case. This was denied, so he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. But the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the CA adjudges that only the Supreme court has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari questioning the jurisdiction of an inferior court. The Supreme court held that the CA had jurisdiction in that the certiorari was an original action and does not relate to the appellate jurisdiction of the CA. Under sec 9(1) of BP 129, the CA has concurrent original jurisdiction with the SC pursuant to the constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1948, to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus and quo warranto. These are original actions not modes of appeals. Vena V. Verga Criminal Jurisdiction of Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts 1. Section 32 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as Amended by Section 2 of RA 7691: except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and Sandiganbayan, these courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all violations of city and municipal ordinances committed within their respective jurisdiction offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine and other accessory penalties. Provided that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have original jurisdiction offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. Under PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249, MTC, MCTC, MeTC has jurisdiction over government officials and employees where the penalty is not more than 6 years and officers charged do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Salary grade 27 and above) Note: Under RA 7691: fine is no longer a factor in determining jurisdiction. 2. 3. Guidelines for the implementation of RA 7691 3.1 RTC no longer has original jurisdiction over offenses commute by public offices and employees in relation to their office where the offense is punishable by more than 4 years, 2 months up to 6 years. 3.2 Fine was already disregarded however, in cases where the only penalty is fine, the amount thereof shall be determined by the jurisdiction of the court in accordance with the original provisions of Section 32(2)of BP 129. 17 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 3.3 If Fine is more than Php 4,000, the RTC has jurisdiction including those commute by public officers where amount of fine does not exceed Six Thousand. M. Special Jurisdiction of Courts (Section 35, Bp 129) Note: In the absence of RTC judges, the MTC, MCTC and MeTC may hear and decide petitioner for writ of habeas corpus or application for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where absent RTC judge sits. N. Jurisdiction over PNP by Regular Courts (Article 46, RA 6974) 1. Criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts 2. Courts-martial appointed pursuant to PD 1850 shall continue to try PC-INO members who were already arraigned in pursuant to Commonwealth Act No 408 (Article of War) as amended by EO 178 or Manual for Courts-Martial 3. Criminal cases not yet arraigned when RA 6975 took effect will be transferred to the regular courts. (a) Regular Courts – civil courts (b) Courts Martial is not regular court (People vs. Asuncion) for they pertain to the executive department of the government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power. (c) Purpose of law: remove jurisdiction over PNP members from courts marital that transfer it within the Philippine Judicial System. Decision: Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically be lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex crime. A complex crime must be prosecuted integrally as it were, and not split into its component offenses and the latter made the subject of multiple information possible brought in different courts. P. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249 – An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending PD 1606). O. Jurisdiction Over Complex Crimes ALFREDO CUYOS y. TULOR vs. GARCIA G.R. No. L-46934 15 April 1988 Facts: Alfredo Cuyos was charged before the Municipal court of San Fernando, Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. He was a driver of a cargo truck which had collided with a Volkswagen in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of 1 person and physical injuries to 4 others. He pleaded guilty at his arraignment but before trial could commence he moved to remand the case to the RTC alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court. He alleged that since under the RPC the fine for his crime would correspond to 3x the amount of damages and as the estimated damages was Php 18,000, he would be fine to up to P54,000. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Municipal Courts only had jurisdiction over cases punishable by a fine not exceeding Php 6,000 and less than 6 years imprisonment. The Municipal judge denied the motion, hence this petition for Certiorari Vena V. Verga Exclusive Jurisdiction 1.1 Violations of RA 3019 (anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); Violations of 1379 (Act declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any property Found to have been unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceeding Therefore) and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII Book II of the RPC (Article 210: Direct Bribery; Article 211: Indirect Bribery and Article 212: Corruption of Public Officers), where one of the accused are officials occupying positions in the government whether in a permanent or interim capacity at the commission of the offense: 1.1.1. Officials of the executive branch occupying a salary grade of “27” and above as classified by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.  Phil army, air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank  PNP officials with position of Provincial director, senior superintendent and higher.  City, special and provincial Prosecutors  Presidents, Directors, trustees of GOCC’s and SCU. 1.1.2 Members of Congress and officials classified as Grade “2”. 1.1.3 Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the constitution 1.1.4 Members of the constitutional commissions 1.1.5 All other national and local offices with Salary Grade “27”. 1.2 Offenses and felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by public offices (salary grade of 27 and above). 1.3 Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to EO 1 (Creation of PCGG), 2 (Illgotten wealth of the Marcoses), 14 (Jurisdiction over cases involving Ill gotten wealth of the Marcoses) and 14-A (Amendment of EO 14) issued in 1986. 18 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 1.4 Private Individuals charged as co-principals, accomplice or accessories with the public officers or employees including those employed in GOCCs. prision correctional or imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of Php 6,000.00); it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to EO 1, 2, 14 and 14-A The PNP officers only has a Salary Grade of “18” therefore, Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case. (a) Jurisdiction over Public Officers 2. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction 3. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction 3.1 writs of mandamus, certiorari etc. arising from cases filed under EO 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, provided that the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES 249 SCRA 212 Doctrine: Sandiganyan’s jurisdiction would depend on the Salary Grade of the public officer involved provided that when a private individual is an accomplice, accessory or conspirator, the rule that “accessory follows principal” will be applied. Facts: The Dumancas spouses complained with the police saying that a certain Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumngyao swindled them. The accused together with civilian agents arrested and abducted the swindling suspects and forced them to produce the money they got from the spouses. The two were found dead a few days after. Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC against members of the PNP and nine other civilians who confederated with each other for the purpose of extorting money through kidnapping the two victims. Petitioner contends that the crime was committed in the course of the performance of duties of the accused, thus, Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1606. Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar Decision: At the time the informations were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan was section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861. The Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violation of RA No. 3019 as amended, RA 1379 and Chapter II Section 2, Title VII of the RPC. As consequences of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is only retained in cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection A and generally national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 9RA 6758). Its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty (that which is higher that Vena V. Verga SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU 227 SCRA 627 09 NOVEMBER 1993 Facts: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriated chareges against several persons including Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Lagauna, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Subsequently, the prosecutors filed with the RTC of Calamba 7 info against Sanchez and the other persons accused. However, to avoid miscarriage of justice the venue of the seven cases was transferred to Pasig, where they were raffled to Judge Harriet Demetriou. Sachez now contends that the proceedings conducted by the DOJ are null and void for want of jurisdiction, as such is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation of all cases involving Public Officers. The Court, however, held that as in the case of Aguinaldo v. Dumagas, this authority is not exclusive but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the DOJ may conduct the investigation. Sanchez also contends that the case should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as most of the accused are public officials. Decision: The court held that the crime of rape with homicide does not fall under paragraph 1 of PD1606 as amended by PD1861, which deals with the jurisdiction of the Sandigan in graft and corruption cases. Neither does it fall under paragraph 2 because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner’s office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the info that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner’s official function. Thus, the case is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan. 19 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Prior to the amendment of RA 7975, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for felonies other than violation of R.A. No 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC, embrace all other offenses provided, the offense was committed in relation to public office and the prescribed penalty is more than six years UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 321 SCRA 77 August 1999 Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latter’s supervisor, on matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some of the accused after a comprehensive investigation. Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850, which provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the person of the petitioner Decision: In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than “naval captains and all officers of higher rank”. It must be noted Under the present law, both THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE AND THE POSITIONS occupied by the accused are the CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, regular courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the person of the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law which states that “in case where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129. (b) Vena V. Verga PEOPLE VS. BARTOLOME 142 SCRA 464 Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted Rolando Bartolome y Perez, Senior Labor Regulation Officer and Chief of the Labor Regulations Section of the Ministry of Labor, and Elino Coronel y Santos, Labor Regulation Officer of the Ministry of Labor, of the crime of Falsification of Official Document where they made it appear in the Civil Service Personal Data Sheet of Bartolome that he had taken and passed the Career Service with a rating of 73.5% in Manila and that he was a 4th year AB student at FEU, when in truth, as both accused knew, Bartolome had not taken the said exam nor was he a 4th year AB student in FEU. Decision: The office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. The test is whether the offense cannot exist without the office. Falsification of an official document is not within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan unless committed in relation the public office of the public officer. The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the offense, thus, it cannot be brought under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Note: When is an offense said to have been committed in relation to office: General Rule: offense may be considered as committed in relation to accused’s office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined and punished in RPC ( People vs. Montilla). Exception: Where the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the respective offices of the accused and was perpetuated while they were in the performance, through irregular or improper, of their official functions and had no personal motive to commit the crime and would not have committed it had they not held their public office and merely obeyed the instruction of their superior office, the offense may be said to have been committed in relation to their office (the victim in this case was killed whiled under custodial investigation in a police substation, murder was charged) (People vs. Montejo). Offense deemed committed in relation to public office 20 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES 249 SCRA 212 Doctrine: It is a fundamental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the information in the court do not indicate that the victims were killed in the course of the investigation. What was alleged is that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or exhorting a sum of money, abducted, kidnapped, detained and killed the two victims. The allegation of “taking advantage of his position” incorporated in the information is not enough to bring the offenses within the definition of “offenses committed in relation to public office”. In the case of Montilla vs. Hilario (murder was committee outside office house and for personal or political motives), such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office CUNANAN VS. ARCEO 242 SCRA 88 01 March 1995 Facts: accused, a PNP officer was on a mission at Candaba Pampanga. He went out of the police station after hearing a commotion and fired a warning shot, with the intention of restoring peace and order which was disturbed and broken by the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and alter between the victim and one Pfc. Basa. An information for murder was filed against the accused. Petitioner now contents that he committed the offense charged in relation to his public office. RTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged was done in the performance of petitioner’s official functions thus the judge dismissed the case. A month after, the decision was modified stating that the same must be transmitted with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: W/N the modified decision is correct considering that the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC became apparent to the RTC only AFTER the trail and submission of the case decision. Decision: Under PD 1602 as amended by PD 1861, there are two requisites for offenses to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: (1) the offence must have been committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office and (b) the penalty prescribed for the offense must be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years of a fine of Php 6,000.00. Where the killing committed by a PNP officer was committed while in the course of trying to restore local public order, which had been breached by a Vena V. Verga fistfight between the victim and two other individuals, the killing was committed in relation to the accused’s public office. The transfer to Sandiganbayan was valid. LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 301 SCRA 298 Facts: Petitioner Lacson is assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of RA No. 8249 – an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Lacson was being held liable for the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng gang by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group. It was contended that it was a rub-out and not a shoot-out which took place on the night of May 18, 1995. The PNP officers were originally absolved from any liability because of the finding of the Blancaflor Commission that the incident was a legitimate police operation. However, after a review of Ombudsman Villa, the findings were modified thus Lacson and 11 others were charged with murder. All of the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan saying that the RTC should take cognizance of the case at bar since by virtue of RA 7975, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was only to cases were the principal accused is a public officer with salary Grade of “27”. It was contended that the highest principal accused in the amended information has the rank of Chief Inspector only, and none has the equivalent of SG 27. While the motions for reconsideration were pending, RA 8249 was passed by the Congress, which expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of RA 7975. The new law now expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cover Lacson. The amended information mere alleges that the offense charged was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office. Issue: W/N such an allegation is enough Decision: For jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers in relation to public office to fall within jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan – the intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the information. There must be specific factual averment of this relation. Mere allegation that the crime was committed in relation to public office is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is 21 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 the SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuser’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. Where the information alleged that principal accused committed the crime in relation to the public office, but no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officer, or does not indicate that the aid accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The offense charged in the subject criminal case is plain murder and therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan. PEOPLE VS. CAWILING G.R. NO. 117970 28 JULY 1998 Decision: In the absence of any allegations that the offense was committed in relation to the office of the accused or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the RTC not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case (c) Jurisdiction not determined by allegations which conveyed the impression that such is not necessary. Hence the action of the court to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the respondents in relation to his office was valid. Since it was proven that the act was done in relation to the accused’s office, the validity of the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan cannot be refuted. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is the allegations that shall control and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial. Note: The Asuncion case has not however departed from the rule that jurisdiction is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint . On the contrary, it stressed that the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however be alleged in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over the case The allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information. CUNANAN VS. ARCEO 242 SCRA 88 01 March 1995 Facts: The information for murder against Cunanan contained no averment that the offense charged was in relation to his public office, hence the court proceeded to trial and after both parties presented evidence, the court declared that the case must be refilled to the Sandiganbayan Issue: W/N the refilling was valid Decision: Jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter that is conferred by law. Wherever the two requisites [(1) the offence must have been committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office and (b) the penalty prescribed for the offense must be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years of a fine of Php 6,000.00.] are present, jurisdiction is vested upon the Sandiganbayan. This is true even though the information originally filed before the RTC did not aver that the accused public officer committed the offense charged in relation to his office. In the absence in the old information filed before the RTC of an allegation that petitioner Cunanan has committed the offense in relation to his office is IMMATERIAL insofar as determination of the locus of jurisdiction is concerned. DELOSO VS. DOMINGO 191 SCRA 545 Facts: Governor Deloso of Zambales went to pre-wedding celebration when his car was allegedly ambushed. He was able to escape and later on learned that 22 REPUBLIC VS. ASUNCION 231 SCRA 211 11 March 1994 Facts: Alexander Manio, a member of the PNP assigned to the central Police District Command in QC was dispatched by his commanding officer to Dumalay Street to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death Sgt. Romeo Sadang. An information for the crime of homicide was filed against him. Responded judge, in view of the decision in Deloso vs. Domingo, which says that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional, ordered the dismissal of the case and refilling with the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the Sandiganbayan and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the case. The original information did not disclose that the offense of homicide charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. Decision: The absence in an allegation that the crime was committed “in relation to his office” was due to the erroneous doctrine in Deloso vs. Domingo, Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 the ambushed were killed while his group suffered no casualties. Based however on the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, Delosos’s group was not ambushed but were the ones who ambushed the persons killed. Thus, the military servicemen of the Governor’s security force were charged with murder while the civilians were investigated by the Provincial Fiscal. The governor was charged with multiple murder. The governor now seeks to stop respondent Manuel Domingo, deputy Ombudsman of Luzon from conducting a preliminary investigation of the charge against him of multiple murder contending that the ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case for the acts were not connected with the performance of the governor’s duties. Issue: W/N the ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate the charge of multiple murder allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor. Decision: Yes. The constitution empowers the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any public official without any qualification that said act or omission must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 vests in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. A murder charged against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offense committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correctional. The murder charged against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. The law does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should the court distinguish. Note: The doctrine in this case which provides that the when the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, without stating the offense was committed in relation to the offender’s office is a MISTAKE. (d) Distinguished from Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over Public Officers AGUINALDO VS. DOMAGAS 227 SCRA 627 Decision: The Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and Prosecute Public Officers for any illegal act or omission is not exclusive but a shared concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. NATIVIDAD VS. FELIX G.R. No. 111616 04 February 04 1994 Doctrine: The Ombudsman’s primary power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former. But the authority is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies. However, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from ant investigative agency by the government. This is only directory. Facts: Mrs. Lourdes Aquino wrote a letter to the PNP requesting them to investigate the Municipal Mayor of Tarlac for the death of her husband Severino Aquino. The PNP then requested the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate the petitioner for the death of the victim. Petitioner wrote to the secretary of justice requesting the preliminary investigation be done in Manila, but this was denied. The petitioner then moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation contending that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the case because it was the Ombudsman and not the provincial prosecutor who has jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. Respondent judge denied the petition. Decision: In Deloso vs. Domingo, it was said that the Ombudsman has the power to conduct preliminary investigation on any illegal act or omission of any public official which is broad enough to encompass any crime committed by a public official. However, looking at the latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Section 4 of said law provided that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving: a) offenses or felonies by public officers and employees in relation to their office and b) penalty prescribed be higher than prison correctional or imprisonment for 6 years or fine of Php 6,000.00. In the case at bar, the second requirement was met but the first is wanting. Moreover, Deloso vs. Domingo has already been re-examined in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou which both provided that the authority of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the Government. Also, a careful reading of Section 15 of the Ombudsman act would give us an idea an idea that the 23 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Ombudsman’s investigatory powers are but directory in nature. was dismissed for lack of merit. (e) (f) The petition Certiorari Jurisdiction (conferred by R.A. 7975). Public Officer charged as accomplice of private individual Under Section 2 of EO No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the “funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In the exercise if its functions, the PCGG is co-equal body with the RTC and coequal bodies have no power to control the other. The RTC and the CA have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable EO and section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with the restrain or set-aside the orders and actions of the PCGG acting for and in behalf of said Commission. Petition was granted. PCGG VS. PEÑA G.R. NO. 77663 12 APRIL 1988 Facts: PCGG ordered the freezing of assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms named American International Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Properties of both companies were sequestered and placed under the custodia legis of PCGG. On 1987, the officer in charge of said corporations withdrew Php 4000,000.00 fro the Metropolitan Bank for the salaries of the employees. After some time, a case was instituted by the company’s Hong Kong investors against the Bank, PCGG and Commissioner Bautista who authorized Ms. Saludo (the OIC) to revoke authorizations that were previously issued to the Hong Kong investors. Respondent Judge issued ex-parte the questioned temporary restraining order enjoining the bank, from releasing any funds of the companies without the Signature of Yim Shing, one of the Hong Kong investors; The Commission filed this petition for dismissal of aforesaid decision since the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case at bar. Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioner PCGG and properties sequestered and placed in its cusotdia legis in the exercise of its powers under EO 1, 2, and 14. W/N courts can set aside order of the Commission. Decision: The courts have no jurisdiction over the PCGG as vested in the commission and holds that jurisdiction over all sequestration cases fall within 24 TOTAAN VS. FELIX G.R. No. 81847 07 August 1988 Decision: Section 4 of PD No. 1606 as amended by PD 1861 provides in part that in case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices, or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government owned or controlled corporations they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in ordinary courts. The rule is that “accessory follows the principal”. Thus, if the public officer or employee is mere accomplice and the private individual as principal, the former shall be tried jointly with the latter in the ordinary courts. The rationale is justified by the absence of a provision in PD 1606 directing that all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, without distinction, be tried by the Sandiganbayan, even if the criminal involvement of the public officer is minor or subordinate. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is not meant to be allencompassing or broad. (g) Exclusive Jurisdiction over PCGG cases OLAGUER vs. RTC G.R. No. 81385 21 February 1989 Facts: Petitioner Olaguer is questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in the case at bar. Sometime in 1977, Philippine Journalist Inc, publisher of several daily periodicals, obtained a loan from Development Bank of the Philippines. Due to some financial difficulty, PJI requested the restructuring of the Loan with DBP. PJI defaulted in its obligations, thus DBP was able to control 67% of the stocks and voting rights of the corporation, which enabled Olaguer and four others to sit in the board. Olaguer was elected president of the board and due to some illegal acts done by him, private respondents filed for injunction and damages in the RTC. Olaguer alleged that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since PJI was under the investigation of PCGG in connection with Marcos ill-gotten wealth. Issue W/N the PCGG has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Decision: There is no dispute that the PJI is under the sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil case 0035 was filed in the Sandiganbayan wherein PJI was listed as among the corporation involved the Marcos ill-gotten wealth. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court. The commission exercise quasi judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi judicial functions, the commission is a co-equal body with RTC and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.” The creation of the PCGG is mandated by the people. Proclamation Number 3 specifically gives priority to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies and to protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. The corporations, being subject of said sequestration proceedings comes within the jurisdiction of the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the judgments of the RTC in a sequestration related case, such as a judgment of the RTC for the enforcement of a foreign judgment involving property that has been lawfully sequestered. Petition was granted. The decision of the RTC was set aside. (i)  Jurisdiction over Military and PNP Republic Act. No. 7055 (An act Strengthening civilian supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law and PNP). (1) (h) Jurisdiction to Annul Judgments PCGG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 132738 23 FEBRUARY 2000 Facts: World Universal Trading and Investment Co (WUTIC) was registered in Panama but was not licensed to do business in the Philippines. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of WUTIC enforcing a foreign judgment and ordering another company, the Construction Development Corporation (CDC), which is a company duly organized in the Philippines and under the sequestration by the PCGG, to pay the former $2M. CDC filed with the trial court an appeal from the decision of the said decision. CA affirmed the decision. PCGG contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complain and enforce a foreign judgment considering the case involved a sequestered corporation. PCGG then filed with Sandiganbayan a petition to annul the RTC’s decision. Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition saying that it has no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the RTC since the case before the trial court was for enforcement of a foreign judgment and not for recover of illgotten wealth. Issue: W/N the decision of Sandiganbayan was correct. Decision: Pursuant to EO 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over all PCGG cases involving ill-gotten wealth whether civil or criminal, and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases. Vena V. Verga (2) Offenses defined under RPC, special laws, local government ordinance regardless of whether a civilian is co-accused, victim or offended parties shall be tried in proper civil court except if offense is service connected which shall be tried by court martial The president of the Philippine may order or direct at any time before arraignment that the proper civil court try such a crime. UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 312 SCRA 77 August 1999 Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latter’s supervisor, on matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some of the accused after a comprehensive investigation. Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850, which provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case. Issue: W/N Court Martial has jurisdiction over the case 25 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Decision: The law (RA 7055) does not include violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) even if the act is service connected. Violations of RA 3019 falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the RTC depending on the nature of the position of the offender and not the court martial. Q. Jurisdiction of Military Court IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N. ABADILLA G.R. No. 79173 09 June 1988 Facts: Abadilla was said to be one of the leaders of the unsuccessful mutiny by officers and enlisted men who seized and control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the GMA-7 and Fort Bonifacio for the purpose of toppling the existing government. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial and that charges be filed for violation of the Articles of War and the RPC. Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. Chief of staff Ramos issued general Orders No, 342 dropping herein petitioner form the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. Meanwhile a case for slight Physical injuries was filed against Abadilla with the Metropolitan Trial Court. When he was arrested, his wife and children filed for a petition for habeas corpus. The counsel of Abadilla now contends that in as much as Abadilla was arrested after he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared against him by the military authorities are null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Colonel. Issue: W/N the military courts have jurisdiction over Abadilla after he was dropper from the rolls. Decision: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts for the offenses he committed while still in the military service. The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military Vena V. Verga authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceeding against Colonel Abadilla. It is a well settled rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. (a) No jurisdiction over civilians OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION 150 SCRA 144 Facts: Petitioners, all civilians, were all arrested by military authorities and initially detained at Camp Crame and later on, Camp Bagong Diwa. They were charged with subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the Minister of National defense. On June 13 1980, the chief of staff created the Military commission no 34 to try the criminal cases filed against the petitioners. An amended charge was filed against petitioners stating that they tried to assassinate President Marcs, Enrile, attempted murder and proposal to commit rebellion among others. Petitioners now seek to enjoin the military tribunal from taking cognizance of their case contending that said commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. Issue: W/N the military commission has jurisdiction over the petitioners for crimes allegedly committed during martial law. Decision: the trial contemplated in the constitution is a trial by judicial process. Military tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. Even during martial law, a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioners, as long as civil courts are open and functioning. Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department and are merely instrumentalities of the executive power. This is provided by the legislature to the President to aid him in properly commanding the army, navy and enforcing discipline therein. The power and duty of interpreting laws reside within the Judiciary and not with the executive branch. ABADILLA VS. RAMOS G.R. No. 79173 01 December 1987 Facts: Abadilla was said to be one of the leaders of the unsuccessful mutiny by officers and enlisted men who seized and control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the GMA-7 and Fort Bonifacio for the purpose of toppling the existing government. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial and that charges be filed for violation of the Articles of War and the RPC. 26 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. Chief of staff Ramos issued general Orders No, 342 dropping herein petitioner form the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. Meanwhile a case for slight Physical injuries was filed against Abadilla with the Metropolitan Trial Court. When he was arrested, his wife and children filed for a petition for habeas corpus. The counsel of Abadilla now contends that in as much as Abadilla was arrested after he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared against him by the military authorities are null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Colonel. Issue: W/N the military courts have jurisdiction over Abadilla after he was dropper from the rolls. Decision: Any judgment rendered by military courts relating a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. However, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropper from the rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution of proceedings against him. As of that time, he was certainly subject to military law. TAN VS. BARRIOS 190 SCRA 18 OCTOBER 1990 Facts: On the basis of Proclamation No 1081, President Marcos authorized the AFP Chief of Stage to create tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them. In General order 21, the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction among others over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion. Later on, the jurisdiction was enlarged to include crimes defined under the RPC. The petitioners and twelve others were charged with murder through the use of unlicensed firearm. The military courts took cognizance of this case which acquitted the petitioners while convicting the other. On May 22, 1987, the court promulgated the Olaguer decision declaring that military commission and tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians. In 1988, the case was reopened for investigations by virtue of the courts’ decision in Cruz vs. Enrile. Without conducting investigation, Fiscal barrios filed two informations (illegal possession and murder) against the petitioners. Issue: W/N the fiscal has authority to re-file in the civil courts the criminal actions against petitioner tried and acquitted by the Military commission. Vena V. Verga Decision: The court’s pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military courts against civilian petitioners therein and ordering the refilling of informations against them in civil courts may not affect the right of persons who ere not parties in the case. Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still on going or not yet final when the decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the state. Only in particular cases were the convicted person or the state shows that there was a serious denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process. Petition was granted. (b) Jurisdiction acquired by reason of arrest does not apply to military proceedings IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N. ABADILLA G.R. No. 79173 09 June 1988 Issue: W/N jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by mere filing of charge or by commencement of an investigation but by arrest of the defendant. Decision: The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applied only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to proceeding under the military law. Thus, there is no merit to the contention that since Abadilla was already civilian when he was arrested, the military tribunal has no jurisdiction over him. II. Other matters 27 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 U. V. W. 1. 2. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, bail is not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation In applications for bail however, the Accused must be in custody of the law to be entitled to bail (Pico vs. Combong) Custody how acquired: By virtue of a warrant or warrantless arrest, or when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities (Dinapol vs. Baldado) Source The present rule covers all offenses except those that may be provided in the charter of cities and other special laws. Modes of instituting criminal action. 1. May be commenced by any person presenting to a court a complaint. Where complaint has been already presented, no other further pleading on the part of prosecutor is necessary 2. Commence by prosecutor by filing with the court an information (such information is the process which institutes the action and prosecution proceeds upon it as People’s pleading) 3. When preliminary investigation is required (Section 1, Rule 112), criminal action must be instituted by first filing the corresponding complaint with the proper officer for purposes of preliminary investigation. Note: Preliminary investigation is required. Except where the accused is under arrest (penalty for the offense must at least be for Four years, two months and one day, without regard to the fine). 4. Where offense falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC, MCTC (penalty is less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day), action may be instituted through a complaint or information filed directly with said courts or with the office of public prosecutor. Note: Exception: In manila and other chartered cities where action is ALWAYS commenced by a complaint filed in the officer of the prosecutor, unless the charter provided otherwise. Meaning of “Proper Officer” Refers to officers authorized to conduct the required to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation: 1. provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants 2. judges of the municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts 3. national and regional state prosecutors 4. other officers authorized by the courts. Note: Their authority to conduct PI shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper curt in their respective jurisdiction Interruption of prescriptive period 1. By filing the criminal action either by complaint or information for preliminary investigation or trial on the merit unless provided by special laws. 2. This true even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on merits. The mere filing of an application for bail is not sufficient (Santiago vs. Vasquez). The application for admission to bail of a person against whom a criminal action has been filed, but who is still at large is premature (Guillermo vs. Reyes). Y. Exceptions when mere filing of motion sufficient (Paderanga vs. CA) 1. House arrests 2. Hospital Arrests 3. Being confined to quarters or restricted in military camps F. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused by Arrest or Voluntary surrender is not a condition for court to Grant Affirmative Relief (dismissal of the case) (Allado vs. Diokno) X. RULE 110 Prosecution of Offenses I. PROVISIONS AND NOTES SECTION 1: Institution of criminal actions Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows: (a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 and Rule, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation. (b) For all other offenses by filing a complaint or information directly with the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, or the complaint with office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters. The institution of criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offenses charged unless otherwise provided in special laws. Vena V. Verga 28 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Reason: The mistake of the prosecutor in filing a compliant should not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses. Note: This rule does not apply to violations of municipal ordinances and special laws. Institution vs. Commencement Institution Commencement By filing of complaint with Upon filing of criminal the appropriate officer for action in court preliminary investigation 3. justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense still lies in the prosecuting officer. Note: If for any reason the fiscal failed to include the name of one or more criminals in the information, such persons are not relieved of penal liability nor escape penal liability just because it develops in the course of the trial that there were other guilty participants in the crime (People vs. Catli). Corollary rule: The exercise of judgment and discretion of prosecuting officer may not be controlled by mandamus (Gonzales vs. Serrano) for where the law demands that all persons who appear responsible for an offense shall be charged in the information, it also implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence exist are not to be included in the charge; and the determination of whether or not there is, as against any person, sufficient evidence of guilt to warrant his prosecution necessarily involves the exercise of discretion by the prosecuting officer. 4. Exceptions to the rule that fiscals cannot be compelled by mandamus (subject to judicial review in proper cases) Where from the evidence submitted and gathered by the prosecuting officer a person appearing responsible for the commission of an offense is not included in the information (de Castro vs. Castaneda) SECTION 2: The complaint or information The complaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved. Necessity of formal accusation This requirement cannot be waived because no criminal proceeding can be brought or instituted until a formal charge is openly made against the accused by complaint or information. B. Form 1. Accusation must be in writing Vox emissa volat; litera scripta manet (the spoken word flies; written letter remains). 2. Accusation must be in the name of the people. Irrespective of the mode by which the criminal proceeding is to be commenced, the action must be under the name of the People, whose peace in legal theory has been breached. (a) Rationale: To prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private individuals (Chua-Burce vs. CA). (b) However, a criminal action instituted in the name of the offended party or of a particular city, although erroneous, may not be quashed for the defect is merely in form (City of Manila vs. Rizal) which may be cured at any stage of the trial ( Ngo Yao Tit vs. Sheriff of Manila) Note: If there is a mistake in jurisdiction, the private complainant, who has interest in the civil aspect of the case) may question jurisdiction. In doing so, the action should not be in the name of the People but in his name (Bernando vs. CA). 3. Accusation must be against all persons responsible for the offense This is demanded by the sound public policy, which would deprive prosecuting officers to use their discretion in order to shield relatives and friends. However, the matter of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to A.  SECTION 3: Complaint defined Complaint is sworn written statement charging a person with an offense subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. A. Person authorized to file a complaint (exhaustive list) 1. The offended part (a) Definition: person against whom or against whose property the crime was committed. (b) Rationale: (1) in principle, the declaration of the criminal liability carries with it the declaration of the resulting civil obligation. (2) There are crimes which cannot be prosecuted other than at the formal instance of the person injured. (c) The right however, to file a criminal complaint is personal. It is abated upon complainants death and intransmissible to his heirs. 2. a peace officer Persons who are competent to file a criminal complaint (law enforcement, agents of NBI etc.) 3. a public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. 29 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Ex. Internal revenue agents, customs agents etc. B. Complaint may be filed with the court or the office of the fiscal. Unlike an information, a complaint need not necessarily be filed with the court and may therefore be laid before the City Fiscal for investigation. C. Lack of oath is not a fatal defect (j) (k) When acts of officer are without or in excess of authority To prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. II. Juridical person cannot be impleaded in the accusation In cases of corporation, the officer through whim the corporation acts, answers criminally for his acts. SECTION 4: Information defined An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. Complaint vs. Information Both are written accusation of the commission of a criminal offense. Difference: Complainant Information Signed by the offended party, any Signed by the fiscal or an authorized peace officer or other public officer prosecuting officer. charged with the enforcement of the law violated. Sworn to by the person signing it Need not e under oath since the prosecuting officer filling it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office. May be filed either with the fiscal’s Always filed with the court. office or the court Note: where the accused underwent preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 1(d) of PD 911, the certification must be under oath. An information not properly signed cannot be cured by silence or even express consent. C. Persons authorized to filed information 1. city or provincial prosecutor and their assistants 2. duly appointed special prosecutors 3. a lawyer appointed by the secretary of Justice (pursuant to Section 1696 of the Revised Administrative Code). D. Filing of complaint does not require mediation of prosecutor. Thus, lack of mediation of prosecuting attorney is not a ground for dismissal of complaint (Trinidad vs. Jarabe) E. When complaint is not required. 1. When the offense is one which cannot be prosecuted de oficio (must be brought at the instance of and upon complain expressly filed by the offended party – those enumerated in Title XI, Book II of RPC – adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction or acts of lasciviousness, including defamation). 2. when offense is private in nature 3. where it pertains those cases which need to be endorsed by specific public officers (ex. those concerning immigration that is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Immigration). Note: the right to commence criminal prosecution is confined to representatives of the government and persons injured; otherwise, it shall be dismissed. B. F. General rule: Criminal Prosecutions cannot be enjoined Public interest calls that writs of injunction or prohibition to restrain a criminal prosecution are generally not available Exceptions: when the writ is necessary: (a) For orderly administration of justice and to avoid multiplicity of suits (b) When there is a prejudicial question (c) To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights of the accused (d) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (e) When double jeopardy (f) Where court has no jurisdiction over the offense (g) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (h) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (i) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on the ground has been denied. Vena V. Verga SECTION 5: Who must prosecute criminal actions All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor, or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the prosecutor office or the Regional state Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the 30 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both are alive not, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, not, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended party denies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the state shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or guardians, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents, or guardians shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding paragraph. No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party. The prosecution for violation of special laws be governed by the provisions thereof. A. General rule: all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The right of the offended party to institute the criminal prosecution or the commission of a public offense ceases upon the filing of the complaint in court, the fiscal taking charge of the prosecution of the suit in the name of the People until the termination of the case. B. Motion to dismiss case in court should be addressed to the discretion of the trial court Vena V. Verga Rule: Where the information has already been filed in court, the court steps in and takes control of the case until the same is finally disposed of, so that the fiscal has no more control over it. Note: If court refuses to dismiss the case at the instance of the fiscal, the least the fiscal can do is continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his supervision and control. C. When prosecution may be controlled by a person other than the public prosecutor Private prosecutor, in case of heavy load, with authorization in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office of the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the prosecutor (may be withdrawn). Note: There is no need for public prosecutor to give his authorization unless the written authority requires it. The written authority must be clear especially when it covers plea bargaining, amendment of the information or the dismissal of the case. However, the private prosecutor: 1. Is not entitled to be served with copies of the pleadings as a matter of right since a notice of the court to the fiscal is a notice to the prosecutor (Sese vs. Montesa). Note however that failure to serve pleadings and orders upon government counsel renders the court orders issued upon such such petitions or motions of an accused as void. 2. Cannot make a stand inconsistent with the state. 3. Cannot appeal from an order dismissing the case on motion of the fiscal. 4. May not continue to take part in the proceeding after the death of the offended party since the latter is the principal and the private prosecutor, merely an agent. Exclusive right of the Solicitor General to handle criminal cases in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. It is only the Solicitor general that is authorized to bring and defend action in behalf of the People of Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before the Supreme Court or CA in cases concerning: 1. writs of error 2. petition for review 3. automatic appeal 4. special civil actions where the People of the Philippines D. Exception: cases elevated in the Supreme Court by way of petition for review against decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan, it is the Office of the 31 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Ombudsman through its Special Prosecutor, which shall represent the People of the Philippines. E.     Control of Prosecution and Control of Court Control by prosecution Control of Court once case is filed What case to file Whom to prosecute Manner of prosecution Right of prosecution to withdraw information before arraignment even without notice and hearing      Suspension of Arraignment Reinvestigation Prosecution by Fiscal Downgrading Offense or dropping of accused even before pea Dismissal Prosecution of a private crime (enumerated in Title XI, Book II of RPC and defamation) complexed with a public offense Where one of the component is a private crime and the other a public offense, the fiscal may initiate the proceeding de oficio. H. Rationale: Since one of the component offenses is a public crime, the latter should prevail, public interest being always paramount to private interest. Rules: 1. No crime of adultery and concubinage shall be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party. Offended spouse cannot instituted criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties and if he/she consented or pardoned the offenders. Note: bigamy is an offense against civil status, which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state. 2. Crime of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party, or her parents, grandparents or guardians (mandatory requirement). 3. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she was able to file the complaint and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardians, the state shall initiate the action in her behalf, pursuant to the doctrine of PARENS PATRIAE. 4. No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a private crime can be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint by the offended party. 5. Defamation which consists in the imputation of a public crime (ex. Prostitution) can be prosecuted de oficio. SECTION 6: Sufficiency of complaint or information A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; that approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. I. Purpose of the rule to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him 2. to notify the defendant of the criminal acts imputed to him so that he can duly prepare his defense Test of sufficiency Limitations on Control of Court Prosecution entitled to notice and hearing Court must always result of petition for review Prosecution’[s stand to maintain prosecution should be respected by the court 4. Ultimate test of court’s independence is where fiscal files a motion to dismiss or withdraw information 5. Court has authority to review Secretary’s recommendation and reject it if there is grave abuse of discretion. 6. To reject or grant motion to dismiss court must make own independent assessment of evidence 7. Judgment is void if there is no independent assessment and finding of grave abuse of discretion. G. Intervention of the aggrieved party (a matter of right) Rule: Aggrieved party may intervene because: 1. the declaration of the criminal liability carries with it the declaration of resulting civil obligation and 2. there are crimes which cannot be prosecuted other than at the formal instance of the person injured. Exception: 1. The accused pleaded guilty before the commencement of the trial 2. Offended party waives the right to the civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the terminal of the criminal action. 3. Offense is one of those, which do not necessarily produce civil liability. Corollary Rule: The aggrieved party is prevented from dictating to the fiscal as to the conduct of the case since government prosecution must always be under the control of the fiscal (he may not appeal an order of dismissal by the court entered upon motion of the fiscal since to permit him would be tantamount to giving said party a right to control the criminal proceeding -- Gonzales vs. CFI). F. 1. 2. 3. 1. B. Vena V. Verga 32 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The complaint or information must set out: 1. the names of the accused 2. the designation of the crime charged 3. the acts complained of as constituting the crime in ordinary and concise language 4. the offense committed within the jurisdiction of the court 5. the name of the offended party Two criteria in measuring sufficiency: 1. whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. 2. whether the records show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction (in case any proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense) F. It is the number of acts charged and not counts that is controlling. G. Defects in the complaint General Rule: any defect in the accusation other than lack of jurisdiction may be cured by good and sufficient evidence. Exception: Substantial defects cannot be cured by evidence for such would jeopardize the accused’s right to be informed of the true nature of the offense he is being charged with. SECTION 7: Name of the accused The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known. If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown. If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or appears in some other manner to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the complaint or information and record. A. Rationale To make a specific identification of the person to whom the commission of an offense is being imputed and to preclude the possibility of having a wrong person apprehended and brought to trial while in the meantime the real culprit goes scot free. SECTION 8 Designation of offenses The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstance. If there is no designation of the offense, defense shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. A. Rationale The accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation to give him opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly (People vs. Purisima). B. The designation of the offense is not mandatory The accusation is good so long as the facts are alleged and set out in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint is sufficient if it describes the offense in the language of the statue, if the statute contains all of the essential elements constituting the particular offense. There is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be mentioned in the information. General Rule: Mere deficiency in form (erroneous classification of an act, mistake in caption of indictment etc) is not fatal and may be cured at any stage because it is the facts alleged therein that determines the nature of the crime. SECTION 9: Cause of accusation The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. A. Rationale The constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 33 B. Error in name is not reversible as long as his identity is sufficiently established (People vs. Ramos). This defect is curable at any stage of the proceeding. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 B. Clarity of allegations required (no need to follow the language of the statute) 1. to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged 2. to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. C. A complaint or information is not defective simply because it contains irrelevant or evidentiary matters. SECTION 10: Place of commission of the offense The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification. A. Rationale This provision serves double purpose: 1. Sufficiency of allegation informs the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation and 2. Fixes the jurisdiction and venue. B. Allegation of specific place It is not required, save in certain instances, that the complaint or information state with particularity the place where the crime was committed. Requirement is satisfied when it was alleged that the offense occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court. Exceptions: The place need be averred: 1. when the place of the commission of the offense constitutes an essential element of the offense (ex. robbery in an inhabited house, public worship etc.) 2. where the offense charged is the doing of an unlicensed act and the exact location is essential to individuate the offense (ex. violation of a zoning ordinance) SECTION 11: Date of commission of the offense It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. A. General Rule When time is not an element of the offense, the precise time at which the offense is charged to have been committed is not material. However, this rule does not authorize the total omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation. Note: It is important that the act should be alleged as having been committed at some time before the filing of the complaint or information. B. Exception When time is a material ingredient of the offense charged, it becomes mandatory to allege the same with precision or particularity (ex. offense is infanticide – killing of a child less than three days old). 34 D. Every element must be alleged. 1. Matters of evidence as distinguished from the facts essential to the description of the offense need not be averred. All that is required is that the offense charged be set forth with particularity as will enable a person to prepare his defense. 2. Elements of the offense must be in the body of the information D. Allegations in complex crimes Allegations contained therein do not necessarily have to charge a complex crime as defined by law. It is sufficient that the information contains allegations, which state that one offense was a necessary means to commit the other (People vs. Alagao) otherwise, the complaint or information charges two crimes or offenses independent from one another (Parulan vs. Rodas). E. Defect in complaint or information An accused person cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. Where the information does not state all the essential facts and ingredients of the crime, the accusation cannot stand (Sugay vs. Pamaran). F. Negative allegations and Exceptions Rule: If a statute exempts certain persons, or classes of persons from liability, the complaint should show that the person charged does not belong to the class (U.S. vs. Pompeya). G. Defendant cannot be convicted of an offense graver than that alleged or an offense of which he has not been informed no matter how conclusive the evidence of guilt may be (People vs. Austria). H. Allegations of aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the complaint or information otherwise, they cannot be properly appreciated (People vs. Gano). Note: While circumstances which were not specifically alleged in the information may not aggravate the crime, insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned they may be considered to determine exemplary damages in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 SECTION 12: Name of the offended party The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. (a) In offense against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged. (b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. (c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified., without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. General Rule Name of the party should be alleged in the complaint especially in crimes against property where ownership must be alleged a matter essential to the description of the offense. This is also true in the case of defamation cases. SECTION 13: Duplicity of offenses A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. A. Definition Duplicity is the joinder of two or more distinct and separate offense in the same count of an indictment or information. A complaint or information is duplicitous if it charges two or more different offenses. B. General rule: Complaint or information must charge only one offense. C. Test of duplicity Test should not be depended upon the evidence presented at the trial but upon the facts alleged in the information. Exceptions: the right under this provision may be waived when accused fails to object to the multiplicity of crimes. Complex crimes (a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies) Special complex crimes Vena V. Verga Continuous crimes or delito continuado (a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single intent. Crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes Crimes of which another offense is an ingredient. SECTION 14: Amendment or substitution A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from one complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complainant or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial CASES LLENES VS. DICDICAN G.R. No. 122275 31 July 1996 Doctrine: The rule that filing of complaint with fiscal’s office interrupts the prescription of the offense charged also applies to cases filed with the Ombudsman for preliminary Investigation. Facts: On October 13, 1993, Vivian Ginete, then OIC of the Physical Education and School Sports Division of the regional Office of region VII in Cebu (DECS) filed a complaint for grave an doral defamation with the deputy Ombudsmand for the Visayas against Susan Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same office. 35 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The information was filed with the MTC on 28 March 1994 upon recommendation and approval of the investigation officer and the city prosecutor respectively. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense of grave oral defamation prescribed in 6 months and that since the information was filed 6 months and days after the alleged commission, the crime already prescribed. Private respondent contends that Rule 110 of the Rules of court provides that for offenses not subject to ther ile on summary procedure, the filing of the complaint in MTC or MTCT interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged. The motion to quash was denied by the MTC and said decision was affirmed by the RTC, hence this petition. Issue: W/N the filing of a criminal complaint with the Ombudsman interrupts the prescription period. Decision: Yes. In the case of People vs. Olarte, it was said that the filing of the complaint with the MTC even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. This decision was further broadened by the case of Francisco vs. CA where the court reiterated that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The constitution vests upon the ombudsman powers to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed against public officers or employees. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondent’s complaint against Llenes. The rationale of the Olarte and Francisco cases must then be applied to the present case. Since the complaint was filed on 12 October 1993, or barely 20 days from the commission of the crime charged, the filing of the information was very well within the six moth prescriptive period. The petition was dismissed. INGCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 122584 23 May 1997 Doctrine: The rule that filing of complaint with fiscal’s office interrupts the prescription of the offense charged also applies to cases filed with the Ombudsman for preliminary Investigation. Vena V. Verga Facts: PNB Vice President Domingo Ingco was charged on May 26, 1987 along with top officials of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation by the PNB before the Presidential Blue Ribbon Committee for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The matter was referred at once to the Ombudsman. In 1977 and 1978, Ingco allegedly conspired with officials of Cresta for the immediate grant of loans amounting to $13.4M for the purchase of cargo vessels under grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions prejudicial to the PNB (e.i, loan approval without project feasibility, notwithstanding the adverse comments of the credit department on this particular loan). An information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 21 July 1993. Petitioners moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this petition. Issue: W/N the offense already prescribed Decision: The prescription period for the offense allegedly committed by Ingco is ten years. Although more than ten years have elapsed from the time of the alleged commission of the offense on September 1977 and March 1978 to the date of the filing of the information on 21 July 1993, the prescriptive period has been effectively suspended by the filing of the complaint on 26 May 1987 with the Ombudsman. Applying the case of Olarte and Francisco, the complaint filed on 26 May 1987 before the Ombudsman is deemed to have tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the filing of the information on 21 July 1993 is within the ten-year prescriptive period. PEOPLE VS. REYES G.R. No. 74226-27 27 July 1989 Doctrine: Civil Law rules on prescription is applicable to criminal cases Facts: Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land in Lipa City. They were survived by their children, the accused Mizpah Reyes and the complaints Cristina Masikat, Julieta Vergara and Aurora Vda de Ebueza. On June 1983, complainant discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City that the said property was already transferred to Mizpah Reyes and that the signature of their parents in the sale was falsified. The NBI found that the said signatures were forged. Consequently, two informations for falsification of public document and for making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale were filed on 18 October 1984. The crime of falsification prescribes in 10 years and commences to run “from the day on 36 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents (Article 91, RPC). Before the arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription and non-compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement. The trial court granted the same which was later on affirmed by the CA, hence this appeal. Issue: W/N the offense already prescribed Decision: Where a notarial document recorded with the Registry of Deeds was sought to be annulled, the court, interpreting the phrase “from the time of discovery” found in the provisions of the civil code, ruled that in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place fro the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the rules is that REGISTRATION IS A NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD. The court will not hesitant to apply the rules of construction in civil cases in the interpretation of criminal statues of the factual and legal circumstances so warrant especially if it is favorable to the accused. In the case at bat, the deed of sale was registered on 26 May 1961. The criminal actions having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. There was no error in the decision of the CA. NGO YAO TIT AND CHIA ENG CHENG VS. SHERIFF OF MANILA G.R. No. 9619 and 9620 28 March 1914 Doctrine: A mere defect or error curable at any stage of the action does not deprive the court of the power to pronounce a valid judgment and impose a valid sentence. Facts: Before the court is an application for the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners were charged of visiting a house (A Chinese Club) where opium was smoked in violation of Section 3 of Ordinance No. 152. The accused alleged that there was no crime committed since there was no evidence that they lived in that place since they were employed by the club as clerk, cashier, collector and cook. They also contend that the case should have been in the name of the United States and not in the city of Manila. The action having been wrongly entitled, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter of the action, makings its decision void. Vena V. Verga Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction to try the case. Decision: It is not a jurisdictional defect and one which deprives the trial court of its authority to try, convict, and pass sentence, that a criminal action is brought in the name of the city of Manila instead of the United States. That fact constitutes a mere defect or error curable at any stage of the action does not deprive the court of the power to pronounce a valid judgment and impose a valid sentence. Offenses committed in the Philippines are crimes against the people of the Philippines. DEL ROSARIO VS. VDA DE MERCADO G.R. No L-25710 28 August 1969 Doctrine: A widow may be considered an offended arty within the meaning of the applicable rule of court entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her husband. Facts: Aquilino del Rosario, Jr and Aquilino Sr.. were confined on the municipal jail in La Union as of July 11, 1965 until the filing of a petition for habeas corpus. The former was detained based on a criminal complaint for murder filed by the widow. Del Rosario contends that the complaint is null since the widow was not authorized to file the same, she being merely the heir of the offended party and not the offended party herself. Consequently, his warrant of arrest is also void, hence his confinement should be declared as arbitrary and unlawful. The lower court sustained the writ, hence this petition. Issue: W/N a widow may be considered as an offended party Decision: A widow may be considered an offended arty within the meaning of the applicable rule of court entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her husband. The injury to the widow – loss of right and consortium and material support – should be sufficient to consider her an offended party within the meaning of the Rules of Court provision. A contrary holding is likely to be attended with deplorable consequences. PEOPLE VS. ARCILLA G.R. No. 116237 15 May 1996 Doctrine: The absence of a prosecutor cannot be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice. 37 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Facts: The accused Fe Arcilla y Corejo and victim Antonio Arcillal were married. Antonio developed an illicit affair with Lilia Lipio. During this amorous union, Antonio and Lilia had two children. When Fe learned of this infidelity, he went to Albay and looked for Antonio. A fight between them ensued which resulted in Fe stabbing Antonio with a fan knife which led to his death. The accused contends that she was merely protecting herself when she stabbed Antonio. Fe was charged with parricide before the RTC of Daraga, Albay which found her guilty. The court did not give credence to the testimony of the accused. Issue: W/N the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lilia Lipio despite the absence of a public prosecutor in the taking thereof Decision: The presence of a public prosecutor in th trial of crimnal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests at stae in the prosuction of crimes, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law. As the representative of the state, the public prosecutor has a right and duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the people in the trial of the accused. It ought to be self-evident that the right belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused. The absence of a prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if she cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar. Decision of the trial court was affirmed. SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU 227 SCRA 627 09 November 1993 Facts: See previous notes Decision: As a general rule, the prosecutor cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who, in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence exists. The possible exception to this rule is where there is unmistakable showing if a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precints of the executive. But in such a case, the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion. Vena V. Verga 297 SCRA 679 (1998) DIMATULAC VS. VILLON Facts: SPO3 Dimatulac was said to have spoken against Mayor Yabut thus, on November 3, 1995, the accused, led by the mayor went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of killing the victim. Riding a truck, they first went to the Municipal Hall and then to the house of Masantol’s mayor. Finally, they cruised to Dimatulac’s place. When they got there, some of the accused positioned themselves around the house while the leader of the pack, the mayor, stayed in the truck protected by the love of his bodyguard. Some of the accused went inside the house to ask Dimatulac to go down to apologize to the mayor. Enticed by the invitation, Dimatulac went down. But as he descended, he was shot by a certain Danny. His son Peter Paul was unsure who of the accused shot his father but he was sure it was someone from the party who went to their house. Before Dimatulac expired, he was able to point at the party of Yabut as the ones responsible. Judge David issued warrants of arrest for the accused after finding probable cause that a crime of murder has been committed. However, even before the accused was brought into the custody of the law, Pampanga Assistant Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. In a resolution dated January 1996, Flores found that the Yabuts and assailant Danny, excluding all the other accused, were in conspiracy for the offense of homicide, and not murder as concluded by Judge David. This finding was based on Flores’ conclusion that although there was treachery, the assailant did not consciously adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired the shot. He also recommended a bail of Php 20,000 for all the accused. An information for homicide was filed by Flores against the accused. Before the filing of the said information, Dimatulacs appealed the Flores’ resolution to the DOJ Secretary. Flores was given a copy of this appeal and yet he still filed the information. The Yabuts, contended that the pendency of the appeal to the DOJ Secretary was not a ground to defer arraignment, and that the Dimatulacs should have filed the motion to defer with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor or sought from the DOJ Secretary an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information in court. The prosecution also filed a petition with the CA to enjoin Judge Roura of the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment. Nevertheless, Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge Villon. Despite the fact that an appeal in the DOJ was on-going, Justice Villon proceeded with the arraignment where the accused pleaded not guilty saying that the Yabuts has a right to a speedy trial and that the petitioners did not obtain conformity of the prosecutor before they filed the motion to defer the proceedings considering that the case should but under the control of the 38 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 prosecution. Justice Secretary Guingona resolved the appeal in favor of the petitioners saying that the crime must be murder and not just homicide He basically said that the crime must be murder and not just homicide. With this development, the Dimatulacs through an ex-parte manifestation called the attention of the RTC to the DOJ ruling. The Yabut’s opposed this, saying that they would be placed in double jeopardy. Later, the DOJ Secretary set aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder as this was already rendered moot by the arraignment. RTC Judge Villon denied the motion to set aside arraignment. Hence, this petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. Issue: W/N the prosecutor was wrong in (1) opening a reinvestigation considering that even if the warrants of arrest were issued, the accused still were not brought under the custody and (2) filing the information for homicide despite knowledge of the appeal to the Secretary of Justice. W/N Judge Villon acted in excess of jurisdiction for denying the motions to set aside the arraignment considering that the pendency of the appeal in the DOJ. Decision: YES. The reinvestigation was uncalled for since the accused were never brought into the custody of the law, notwithstanding the warrants of arrest given by the MCTC. Although under the Rules of court (112) a prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge, this difference in opinion must be based on the evidence on record transmitted by the judge. It is also apparent that Flores is biased, favoring the Yabuts since he allowed them to submit counter affidavits without first demanding their surrender. The Php 20,000 bond is clearly inappropriate considering that the crime charged was murder. Moreover, despite knowledge of the appeal, Flores did not inform the RTC of the pending appeal in the DOJ thus, arraignment was not suspended. The public prosecutor was also wrong in saying that he will no longer allow the presence of the private prosecutors (lawyers of the offended party). Since the offended parties never waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they have the right to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 Rule 110 of the rules of Court. YES. Although Judge Villon was not bound to wait for the DOJ resolution, he should have noticed that the offense committed was murder and not homicide. The fact that he rushed the arraignment negates prudence on his party thus, he gravely abused his discretion. Vena V. Verga DOJ order 223 recognized the right of both the offended parties and ten accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations and reinvestigations. PEOPLE VS. PINEDA 20 SCRA 748 Facts: Teofilo and Valeriana were asleep when guns were fired in rapid successions from outside their house. Teofilo died instantly. After which, the accused went inside the house of the couple killing three of their minor children and wounding Valeriana. The accused Narbasa, Borres and Alindo were then indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte as principals in five cases (four for murder and one for frustrated murder). Narbasa and Alindo moved for the consolidation of the case into one since they said that the cast arose from the same incident, which was motivated by one single impulse. Such motion was granted by the judge stating that since the crime stemmed from series of continuing acts they should be treated as one crime. This decision was questioned by the city fiscal saying that since more than one gun was used and more than one shot was fired, killing more than one person. Issue: W/N there should be only one information, either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide W/N the decision of the judge should prevail considering that it clashed with that of the fiscal. Decision: The prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the offended party. Although there was an affidavit from the witnesses that the real intention of the accused was to commit robbery and that the acts consisting of murder were committed in pursuance to the original intent which would bring the crime within the purview of complex crimes as provided in Section 48, it is within the power of the fiscal to disregard such an affidavit. When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. This however, is not to discount the possibility of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. The info he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. A clash of views bet the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did or between 39 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal’s should normally prevail. This doctrine however, is subject to several exceptions, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. For orderly administration of justice; Prevent the use of strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; To avoid multiplicity of actions; and To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights prosecutor can be compelled by mandamus if he abuses his discretion and refuse include co-accused against whom there appears to be at least prima facie evidence. This, however, is available only if petitioner shows that all remedies have been exhausted, such as motion filed with the trial court for the indictment of person(s) excluded by the prosecutor. It does not appear that such a motion was filed by appellants The Court agree that there was no conspiracy as there is no evidence that Blademir and Ronilo had earlier come to an agreement to kill the victims. “From bantay-bayan, they turned into bantay-salakay in an incomprehensible rampage that needlessly wasted 2 innocent lives. Was it the liquor in their brain that urged them to kill, or was it simple, inexplicable wickedness? The answer lies in the dark recesses of their minds, and of their prison cells” Decision of Trial Court affirmed. PEOPLE V. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256 (1996) Facts: Romulo Bunye II hailed “stainless” tricycle to drive him to Molina St.. Unknown to him, two men who were waiting outside his house and hailed another tricycle to follow him. Bunye then alighted at the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa and crossed the street. Shortly after, the other tricycle arrived and stopped in front of “stainless” tricycle carrying Bunye. One of the men jumped out the tricycle and shot Bunye at the back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, two more shots were fired, one from the assailant and another from the other accused, all directed at Bunye’s head. The incident was witnessed by the two tricycle drivers who executed a sworn affidavit and another passenger. The accused Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando “Boy” Hular, and Manuel Laureaga were all arrested. The first two were identified by the tricycle drivers in the police line-up. Regala executed affidavits admitting participation in the slaying of Bunye however, claimed that a certain Hular paid him Php 30,000 to kill the victimthat they had been hired by Hular to kill the victim.However, Regala and Hular who both claims being tortured recanted their earlier admission of the crime. PEOPLE VS. DEVARAS 228 SCRA 482 (1993) Digest by: Tim David FACTS: A pedicab driver and his passenger were attacked without provocation by two men who hacked them to death and later threw their bodies over the bridge with the help of another. They were subsequently accused of murder alleging that they committed the offense in conspiracy and with treachery and abuse of superior strength. The principal witness, Raul Animos, claimed that at about 7:00 in the evening, the appellants were drinking tuba with him and thereafter joined him in his duty as bantay-bayan. While making the rounds at Daguitan bridge, they saw a zigzagging pedicab approach. When it was halfway the bridge, Blademir who was then carrying a bolo suddenly attacked the driver. At the same time, Ronilo attacked the passenger with his bolo. Pablo did not participate in the slaying but later helped in throwing the bodies over the bridge. Raul himself was ordered to help and, although initially hesitated, had to comply because he was threatened with death. The abandoned pedicab was reported, curiously enough, to the 3 accused who went to see the barangay captain. Upon noticing the blood on the back of Raul’s shirt, brgy. chairman notified the police. Blademir and Ronilo were sentenced reclusion perpetua while Pablo was convicted as an accessory. Note: Did not identify the assignment of errors. Those in ( ) are most probably the errors raised COURT: 1. (The offense should be homicide only without the attendance of treachery) Evidence clearly shows Bladimer and Ronilo suddenly attacked their unarmed victims with bolos, thereby insuring commission without risks to themselves 2. (Raul Animos should likewise have been charged) The determination of the person to be prosecuted on the basis of evidence rests primarily with the prosecutor. As an exception, the Vena V. Verga 40 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Hular and Larureaga were acquitted for lack of evidence against them. Nazareno and Regala however, were found guilty. Issue: W/N the arrest without warrant was illegal. W/N the non-inclusion of the supplier of the guns would nullify the proceeding. Decision: NO. Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntary submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused . Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. NO. The manner by which prosecutions of a case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non-inclusion of other guilty parties is irrelevant to the case against the accused. Judgment of RTC which found Nazareno and Regala Guilty was affirmed DONIO-TEVES vs. VAMENTA JR. 133 SCRA 616 (1984) Facts: Petitioner Milagros Donio Teves questions the criminal proceeding initiated against her by her husband for the crime of Adultery. The complaint was filed by Julian Teves, the petitioner’s husband stating that on the months of My 1980 to December, his wife has been having sexual intercourse with a certain Manuel Moreno. Milagros filed a motion to quash on the contention that the court has no jurisdiction over her case since there was an absence of a valid complaint. Issue: W/N there was an invalid complaint. Decision: NO. adultery, being a private offense, cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offenses spouse who cannot institute the criminal prosecution without including both the guilty spouses, if they are both alive, not in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse. The complaint filed by the offended spouse was the one necessary to start the required preliminary investigation by the fiscal’s office. Vena V. Verga The complaint was also sufficient for it stated the name of the defendants; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed which is in absolute compliance with Section 5, Rule 110. Petition was dismissed. PEOPLE VS. BULAONG G.R. No. 37386, 106 SCRA 344 (July 31, 1981) One afternoon, Delena Segapo, 14, and her sister, Nena, 8 (both Bilaans), left their house at Barrio Landan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, to perform an errand for their father. After walking, they boarded a passenger jeepney and arrived in the public market of General Santos City at 6pm. They were going to collect an account from Tamigo. But, Claudio Bulaong, a 35-year-old married man with five children, pointed his gun at the two sisters and forcibly took them to the New Bay View Hotel in the city where Bulaong raped Delena 8 times at the sight of her sister and with death threats. The sisters knew him since he administered his family lands in Barrio Landan where many Bilaans resided The following day, they went to his parents' bungalow in Barrio Landan which was then unoccupied. They were locked in a room guarded by Fonso Laurecio, a houseboy armed with a gun. Bulaong raped Delena in that place. Meanwhile, Nena was able to escape through the ceiling. She told her parents what happened who was accompanied by Rudy Ante, a barrio councilor, to accompany him to Bulaong's house. They were able to retrieve Delena who was found to be raped by an examination of the city health officer. A complaint for forcible abduction with rape, signed was filed in the city court against Bulaong. The judge Bulaong and Laurecio surrendered voluntarily and investigation. The city fiscal filed in the Court of First for forcible abduction with rape against Bulaong and pleaded not guilty. by Delena and Dalama, interrogated the sisters. waived the preliminary Instance an information Laurecio where the two Claudio Bulaong was convicted of eight complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. Alfonso Laurecio was convicted as an accomplice. Both were sentenced to pay indemnities to Delena Segapo. Bulaong alleged in his appeal that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the information was fatally defective for the information should have been signed by the girl and not by her father. Issue: W/N Bulaong committed 8 counts of forcible abduction with rape. 41 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 W/N the information was defective Decision: Bulaong who abducted the victim and had sexual intercourse with her for several days is not guilty of separate offenses but of a continuing offense of abduction with rape. In this case, the complaint for abduction with rape against Bulaong was filed in the city court by the offended girl and her father. That complaint was sworn to before the city judge which was the basis of the preliminary examination. The judge examined the witnesses under oath. The examination was reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. On the basis of that examination, a warrant of arrest was issued. The accused waived in writing the second stage of the preliminary investigation. In such a case, the fiscal is not called upon to conduct another preliminary investigation. He could file an information on the basis of the preliminary investigation conducted by the inferior court because the prosecution of the offense is under his direction and control. He could not have certified that he held a preliminary investigation because the preliminary examination was actually conducted by the city court and the second stage of the preliminary investigation was waived by the accused. In cases involving crimes against chastity, the prosecution may be conducted by the fiscal on the basis of the complaint filed in the inferior court. There is no need to file an information. Thus, the Rules of Court does not require that the offended girl in a crime against chastity should sign the information filed by the fiscal. PEOPLE VS. TAÑADA 166 SCRA 361 (1988) Digest by: Don Dieta Facts: An information was filed charging one Romulo Postrero of rape in the CFI of Cebu. A sworn letter-complaint for rape filed by Victoria Capillan was attached to the said information. Capillan alleged that Romulo Postrero induced her to consume a bottle of seven-up that caused her to feel drowsy and weak and that Potrero then brought her to Queen Hotel where Postrero raped her. However, accused’s motion to dismiss the information was granted by the judge on the ground that the court did not acquired jurisdiction over the offense charged since the information filed by the judge is not a complaint signed by the offended party as required by Article 344 of RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the rules of Court. Vena V. Verga Issue: W/N the letter-complaint filed by the offended party is a valid complaint as required by Article 344 of RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the rules of Court. Held: It was a valid complaint. The Supreme Court held that the rule of “complaint-filed-in-court” enunciated in the case of People vs. Santos was already modified by Valdepeñas vs. People which held that the provisions of Art. 344 of RPC do not determine or confer the jurisdiction of the courts over offenses enumerated therein since the same is already governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948. The required complaint is only a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. The letter-complaint filed by the offended party contained all the elements of a valid complaint required by Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Thus the said letter-complaint is a valid complained as required by Article 344 of RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the rules of Court. PEOPLE vs. DIMAPILIS 300 SCRA 282 (1998) Facts: Sharon Degala, 11 years old alleged in her complaint affidavit that sometime in September, 1994, February 1996 and May 1996, the exact dates already unknown to her, she was forced by the common law spouse of her mother, using a knife, to undress. Thereafter, she was raped by the said man on five different occasions while her mother was gambling. She told her mother about the incidents but here mother merely dismissed them as “lambing”. She then went to her grandmother who took her to the NBI for medico-legal examination. It was found that indeed, she was raped on several times. It was the contention of the petitioner that informations filed against him were defective for failing to allege the specific dates of commission of the three cunts of rape. Issue: W/N the informations were defective. Decision: Section 11 of Rule 110 provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when the time is material ingredient of the offense. In the case at bar, the time of commission is not a material ingredient of the offense. The dates provided in the information already suffice if the acts complained of area led to have taken place “as near to the actual date at which the offenses are committed as the information will permit.” 42 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The decision was affirmed with modifications since the fact the accused is the common law spouse of the mother, which should have qualified the offense was not alleged in the complaint. PEOPLE VS. NARVAES 59 Phil. 738 (1934) Facts: Petitioner and victim had a heated altercation when the later told the former that he should be ashamed of himself for still threshing palay despite the fact that all others were already plowing the land. The accused said that he was embarrassed by said statement of the victim. A fight ensued with the petitioner stabbing the victim with a penknife. It was the contention of the petitioner that the information and the trial proceeded against him was void for he was Pedro Naravaes, and not Primo Narvaes as stated in the complaint. Issue: W/N the mistake in name is fatal. Decision: In the at bar, the mistake in the name was not fatal since the only difference relates to the name of the father (Pedro’s name was Lucio while Primo’s father was Leoncio). This, according to the court has no consequence to the case at bar. Furthermore, when the appellant was arraigned under the name of Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he entered the plea of not guilty under such name. Thus, it is already too late to question the discrepancy in the name. Petition was dismissed. US VS. PANLILIO No. 9876, 28 Phil 608 (Dec 8, 1914) On or about 2 Feb 1913, all of the carabaos of Adriano Panlilio were ordered quarantined in a corral in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga by a duly authorized agent of the Dept of Agriculture after having been exposed to rinderpest, a dangerous and contagious disease. On said date, Panlilio, who being authorized and the quarantine still in effect, ordered said carabaos taken from the corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them in the hacienda. An information was filed charging Panlilio of violation of sec 6 Act No 1760. it was amended but it failed to specify the particular law violated. The accused alleged that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of said law. ISSUES: WON Panlilio committed a violation of Act 1760. WON Panliklio counld be convicted of violation of Art 581(2) RPC even if it was not alleged in the information. Vena V. Verga HELD: the acts committed by Panlilio is not violative of the Act 1760 or any provisions thereof. There was neither importation nor transfer of the said carabaos. The law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with its sections, nor is it phrased as a [penal statute. Nowhere in the law states that it is prohibited or unlawful to violate the orders of the Bureau of Agri nor is there any punishment provided for violation of such orders. The acts of Panlilio is a violation of Atr 581 par 2 of the RPC. The fact that the information charged a violation of Act 1760 does not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of the RPC. It is not a violation of his right to be informed of the charges against him because the allegations required under Act 1760 include those required under Art 581. The accused could have defended himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of Art 581. PEOPLE VS. AMBRAY GR 127177, 303 SCRA 697 (Feb 25, 1999) Melanie Hernandez, an 11 year old, is the daughter of Vinia Hernandez, the common law spouse of the accused Romeo Ambray. They, including Melanie’s half brother Robin and 3 other children, rented a single room with one bed with the children sleeping on the floor. Her mother leaves the house before dawn everyday and goes to the Pasig market. One day at around 2am, she woke up when the accused carried her to the bed. She tried to shout but her mouth was quickly covered. The accused then sexually abused her. She fell asleep still feeling the pain. When she woke up, she left to pick up the laundry from her grandmother’s place. Unable to locate her mother to reveal her ordeal, she went to her Aunt Vilma Perez who accompanied her to the police, They went to their house where Melanie pointed to Ambray as her rapist. The medico-legal examination revealed that she had lacerations in her vagina but with no trace of sperm cells. Ambray denied the allegations alleging that he could not have raped her because the slightest movement could awaken his other children and that it was just false charges because Vilma wanted to end their common law relationship because he is a gambler. Others also testified that Melanie tells her ordeal to others while laughing, The TC found Ambray guilty of rape with a penalty of death. ISSUES: WON the testimony of the complainant is credible and the defense not credible WON the statutory rape was proved beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: The testimony of the victim was a truthful account of what transpired during the incident. It is impossible for her to concoct such a story since she allowed her private parts to be examined and publicly expose her sexual 43 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 abuse. The denial of the accused is unsubstantiated and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of Melanie. Rape is no respecter of time and place. It is not impossible for the members of the family to be in deep slumber when the assault was being committed. However, the penalty should have been reclusion perpetua. The special qualifying circumstance that the accused is the common law spouse of the victim’s mother was not alleged in the information. Such failure is fatal and bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death. qualifying circumstances must be pleaded. PEOPLE VS. JAVIER GR 126096, 311 SCRA 122 (July 26, 1999) Julia Ratunil, a minor of 16 years of age, was held and pulled by his father, Amado Sandrias Javier, by means of force, into the conjugal room while her mother was out doing laundry work. She was boxed and hit in the stomach which resulted in her being unconscious after she refused and shouted for help. The accused then raped her. When she woke up, she had no panties and she felt pain in her private parts. The incident took place at around 1pm at Zone 5 Baikingan, CDO. It maws again repeated twice in Nov and Dec 1994. When she can no longer bear the pain, she confessed to her grandmother and with mother, they reported the matter to the police and filed 3 separate complaints of rape against the accused. The examination of the NBI revealed that she was raped and pregnant. Meanwhile, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and was sentenced accordingly. The accused pleaded not guilty and alleged that he was working as a mason during those times and that the damages were engineered by his mother-in-law who despises him for being a drunkard and that Julia was an errant daughter who at age 14, started attending dances and acquired sweethearts. The RTC found him guilty of rape and qualified seduction and sentenced him to death and an indeterminate sentence of prision correcional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Accused appealed. ISSUES: WON the alibis of the accused can hold. WON he was found guilty and sentenced accordingly. HELD: The alibis of the accused cannot hold. It is highly inconceivable that complainant would impute a crime so serious as rapeee against her own father. She cannot be faulted for her delay in reporting the rape and it does not undermine the charges where it is grounded on the death threats of the accused. Further, the place where he supposedly was is merely 200 meters from his house, a distance which could be covered by a 5min walk. For alibis to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. In rape Vena V. Verga committed by a father against her daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information. Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. Lastly, the victim is 16 years old which qualifies rape. However, the prosecution failed to present her birth certificate. In this case, age is vital and essential and should be proved. Hence, the accused is liable only of simple rape with a penalty of reclusion perpetua. AGBAYANI VS. SAYO No. L-47880, 89 SCRA 699 (Apr 30, 1979) Conrado Mahinan was the manager of the Cagayan branch of the GSIS in Cauayan, Isabela. Wilson Agbayani, Carmel Bautista, Pablo PAscula and Renato Dugay were his subordinates. The affidavits of Pascual and Bautista were signed at Cauayan, the latter’s letter asking for Mahinan’s dismissal. Agbayani’s unusual incident report was subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary with evidence to support malversation and falsification against Mahinan. The documents depicted Mahinan as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift ofGSIS funds, invetereate gambler, chronic falsifier and an unreformed ex-convict. Mahinan then field a complaint for written defamation against his subordinates with the fiscal at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. Two days later, he was terminated by the Board of Trustees of GSIS but was reinstated on appeal to the CSC. The provincial fiscal filed an information for libel against the four in the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya. The 4 accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the said court has no jurisdiction over the case because MAhinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan when the alleged libel was committed and that the fiscal of N. V. had no authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to file the information. The court denied it on the ground that he was not a public officer since the insurance business of GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. Hence, his residence in Bayambang, N. V. would be the criterion for determining the venue. ISSUES: WON Mahinan is a public officer. WON the CFI of N. V. has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch unquestionably a public officer. manager, he is The proper venue of Mahinan’s criminal action for written defamation is the CFI of Isabela since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a PO stationed at Cauayan and the alleged libel was committed when he was in the public service. The preliminary investigation should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of 44 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Isabela or municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the CFI of the same province. It could have also been filed in the CFI of the province or in the city court where the libel was printed and first published. The information is defective or deficient because it does not show that the CFI of N. V. where it was filed has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation. SANTIAGO VS. GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 109266, 228 SCRA 214 (Dec. 2, 1993) Petitioner was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, when she allegedly favored "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the Criminal Case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena which the SC granted and directed to reset the arraignment pending resolution of the inhibition of Garchitorena and the bill of particulars. The SB denied the motion for disqualification. The SB admitted the 32 informations and the arraignment was set. Hence, the filing of the instant petition. ISSUE: WON petitioner’s case is a continuous crime warranting the filing of a single information and not 32 separate informations. HELD: We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continuous crime." For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. Vena V. Verga The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Hence, the said informations should be consolidated. CRESPO VS. MOGUL No L-53373, 151 SCRA 462 (June 30, 1987) Asst Fiscal Proceso de Gala, with the approval of the provincial fiscal, filed an information for estafa against Mario Crespo in the circuit criminal court of Lucena City. The accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review with the Sec of Justice. The judge denied it but deferred the arraignment. Upon petition, the CA restrained the judge from proceeding with the arraignment until the DOJ has resolved the petition for review. The Justice Undersecretary directed the fiscal to move for the dismissal of the information for insufficiency of evidence but the judge denied it. The CA issued a TRO but later lifted it. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON the TC may refuse to grant the motion to dismiss and proceed with the trial of the case despite a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon order of the Sec of Justice. HELD: Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must be secured if the fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Justice Secretary whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the court, the court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. In this regard, the fiscal should continue to appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his discretion and control. PEOPLE VS. PANLILIO GR 113519-20 255 SCRA 503 (Mar 29, 1996) At about 11:40am, Leah Marie Jordan, a 10 year old student, was waiting for her younger sister outside of St. Jude School in Malinta, Valenzuela. Then, Danilo Panlilio approached her and inquired of a certain Aling Rosa. She replied that she did not know her. Danilo then suddenly poked a knife, concealed inside a hat, at the right side of the neck and handed her a cigarette pack with a note and ordered her to give it to Aling Rosa. Then, they walked, with the knife still at her neck. They boarded a jeepney where he forcibly took her earrings. They were the only passengers on board. Upon reaching Navotas, 45 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 they alighted and he dragged her to a vacant lot where he let her chose between rape and death. She then struggled and ran. She saw policemen and shouted for help. Danilo ran but the police caught up with him and both were brought to the Navotas police station. Her parents arrived and brought her to the Valenzuela police station where they filed a complaint against the accused. The accused alleged that the RTC of Valenzuela where the case was being heard has no jurisdiction over the case since the robbery was not perpetrated in Navotas. ISSUE: WON the Valenzuela RTC has jurisdiction. HELD: Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, aircraft or in any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court any municipality where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival. In the case at bar, it would seem that the prosecution failed to establish the precise place where the highway robbery was supposedly committed other than Navotas. Hence, the Valenzuela RTC had no jurisdiction over the offense. Leah Marie did not know the place/s where their vehicle passed, the exact place where they boarded the jeep and the exact place where Panlilio took her earrings. Panlilio was however correctly found guilty of kidnapping. PEOPLE VS. YABUT 76 SCRA 624 Digest by: Bong Malibiran KEYWORDS: Yabut Transit Line; Freeway Tires Supply; Malolos Bulacan/Caloocan BRIEF: Respondent issued a check in Malolos, Bulacan, drawn against Merchants Banking Corporation in Caloocan City where it was dishonored for lack of funds. Continuing offense. FACTS: (CHARACTERS: Cecilia Que Yabut, Treasurer of Yabut Transit Line; Geminiano Yabut,Jr., President of Yabut Transit Line  Respondent; Alician P. Andan, owner and operator of Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station  Complainant; 1970s, Decision Promulgated April 29, 1977) • Sometime February 1975, Cecilia Yabut and husband Geminiano Yabut, Jr., treasurer and president of Yabut Transit Line respectively, issued checks in favor of Freeway Tires Supply, drawn against Merchants Banking Corporation. o The amounts of the checks were P6,568.94 and P37,206.00 as payments for “articles and merchandise delivered to and received by accussed” (2 informations) Vena V. Verga • • • Both Yabut Transit Line and Freeway Tires Supply were doing business in Bulacan, while the bank was located in Caloocan city. The checks bounced because of insufficient funds, hence, the accused were charged with estafa. (B.P. Blg. 22 Bouncing Checks Law took effect only on April 18,1979) Respondents filed a motion “to quash the information on two grounds: (1) the facts recited do not constitute an offense because the checks were issued in payment of pre-existing obligation; and (2) the venue was improperly laid” because the information was filed in Bulacan, but the damage was done in Caloocan City. RELEVANT ISSUE: W/N the information was filed at the proper venue (Bulacan)? COURT RULING: Yes. RATIO: (PONENTE: MARTIN, J.) “Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315¶2(d) of the RPC may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic element of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the even of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court1 provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offence was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.’ x x x The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us appears to be transitory and continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. SECONDARY ISSUE: “Ad interim, We hold that the facts charged in the information against private respondents, contrary to their claim, constitute estafa x x x. In considering a motion to quash based on the ground ‘that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,’ the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are.” PEREZ VS. HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC. GR 126210, 327 SCRA 588 (Mar 9, 2000) 1 Now Section 15(a) of Rule 110. 46 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns Hagonoy Money Shop employing Cristina Perez as OIC, Cashier and Teller, Alberto Fabian as bookkeeper, Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as solicitors/field managers. The Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the money shop. It found anomalies in more or less 28 saving accounts consisting of withdrawals amounting to Php 879,7270.08, which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers but not in the passbooks. The signatures in the slips were forged. Respondent then filed an affidavit –complaint for estafa against the said employees and 2 outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. Finding prima facie evidence, the Acting provincial prosecutor filed the corresponding information with the Malolos RTC. The charges against Jordan and Mangahas were dismissed. Upon appeal to the DOJ, the Sec of Justice ordered the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against Perez for insufficiency of evidence. The judge granted the motion to dismiss on the basis of the secretary’s recommendation and that private respondent had no legal personality to question the said dismissal. ISSUES: WON the judge correctly dismissed the charges against Perez. WON private respondent has personality to question the said dismissal. HELD: the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he granted the motion to dismiss the criminal charges against Perez on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Justice Secretary. The judge did not make an independent evaluation /assessment of the merits of the case. His reliance on the recommendation of the Secretary was an abdication of the court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. Private respondent, as private complainant, has legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against Perez. Respondent retains the right to bring a special civil action in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. It follows that it could move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the charges against Perez. RULE 111 CASES REPUBLIC VS. CA 403 SCRA 403 (2003) Facts: Private Respondent Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) was awarded one of the dredging contract by DPWH worth Php 195M to be completed within a year. NIC filed a complaint against the Republic through the DPWH maintaining that they accomplished 95% of the work and yet DPWH has paid Vena V. Verga them only 79% of the total amount due to them. In its answer, DPWH contends that NIC is not entitled to the amount claimed since according to the fact-finding committee of the former, the contract between them and the latter was void. It was said that NIC started the work even before the contract was awarded to them. It was clear therefore that the contract was awarded without public bidding and through connivance with some DPWH officials. DPWH later on filed a case at the Office of the Tanod Bayan (Estafa through falsification of public documents)and a case in the Malabon RTC to recover the sum already paid to the NIC. In addition, petitioner Republic then filed, also before the Malabon trial court a motion to consolidate the civil case (filed by NIC) and the case in the Sandiganbayan arguing that the civil case for collection and the criminal cases arose from the same incidents and involve the same facts. The CA ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over collection of sum of money since the latter not involving recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Hence this appeal. Issue: W/N the CA erred in not ordering the consolidation of the Civil case filed with the RTC and the criminal case that was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Decision: No. Consolidation is a matter of discretion of the court. It becomes a matter of right only when the cases sought to be consolidated involve similar question of fact and law provided certain requirements are met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, etc. Such consolidation cannot be ordered in this case since: 1) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the collection case and 2) the Rules of court do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a 3 rd party complaint in a criminal case. An essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have jurisdiction over all the cases consolidated before it. Since Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over collection case, the same cannot be consolidated with the criminal cases even if these cases involve similar question of fact and law. A counter claim in a criminal case must be litigated separately to avoid complication and confusion in the resolution of the criminal cases. This is the rationale of Section 1 Rule 111. This same rationale applies to NIC’s collection case against the petitioner and DPWH. NIC’s case must be litigated separately to avoid confusion in resolving the criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan. FRANCO VS. IAC GR 71137, 178 SCRA 331 (Oct 5, 1989) Facts: At around 730pm, Macario Yuro, driver of Franco bus, swerved to the left to avoid a truck with a trailer parked along the cemented pavement of 47 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Macarthur Highway in Capas, Tarlac, and collided with an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by Magdaleno Lugue. The mini bus was a total wreck while the Franco bus was also damaged but not as severe. The two drivers died instantly along with two other passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay. The registered owner of the mini bus, wife of victim Chuay and wife of driver Lugue filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence before the CFI of Angeles City against Mr and Mrs Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company. The defendants alleged that they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all of their employees which however was rejected by the trial court when it held that the act of the Franco bus driver is a case of criminal negligence resulting in a civil obligation. On appeal, the IAC found Yuro guilty of reckless or criminal imprudence resulting in the subsidiary liability of the owners. The IAC increased the award of damages. ISSUES: W/N Franco, as Employer, is liable for the acts dome by his driver. W/N the IAC may increase the damages in favor of respondent Chuay and Lugue who did not appeal the said decision. HELD: Under Art 103 RPC, before the employer’s liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee’s criminal negligence on delict and the corresponding liability therefore are proved. In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the driver who is primarily liable died. Petitioner’s subsidiary liability cannot stand since it is merely secondary to the employee’s primary liability. However, under Art 2176 and 2180, NCC, petitioner’s liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds employer primarily liable for tortuous acts of its employees subject to the defense of the exercise of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. In the case at bar, appellants were not able to establish the said defense. Hence, petitioners are liable for the said damages pursuant to their primary liability under the NCC. The IAC erred in increasing the amount of damages in favor of Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed. YONAHA VS. CA GR 112346, 255 SCRA 397 (Mar 29, 1996) Facts: At about 11:45am in Lapu-Lapu City, the accused Elmer Ouano is driving a Toyota Tamaraw registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products when he unlawfully maneuvered his vehicle in a reckless manner, bumping Hector Cañete which resulted to the victim’s reqath due to multiple severe traumatic. The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award but the accused was unable to pay for it. Respondents Vena V. Verga then filed a motion for subsidiary execution with neither notice of hearing nor notice to the petitioner. The trial court issued the writ and the sheriff went to petitioner’s residence to enforce it but petitioner filed a motion to recall the writ for lack of prior notice and the employer’s liability had yet to be established. ISSUE: W/N the subsidiary liability could be enforced against the petitioner. HELD: It is a measure of due process to the employer that a hearing be set to prove the subsidiary liability of the petitioner. The employer must be given his full day in court. The employer must be afforded due process by holding a hearing to determine his liability on the basis of the conditions required by law, namely: (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of agency; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he may committee; and (d) that said employee is insolvent. All of these were not afforded to the petitioner. The orders of the CA should be set aside and the case remanded for further trial. NAGUIAT VS. IAC G.R. No. 73836, 164 SCRA 505 (August 18, 1988) Facts: Timog Silangan Development Corporation is engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision lots in Timog Park in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin as its President. Petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, 4 lots from TSDC, Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26 of Timog Park, each with 300 square meters with a price of P60.00 per square meter. Petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00 which is 10% of the total price of P72,000.00. The Contract to Sell between them stipulated a two-year period within which to pay. Naguiat fully paid the price of Lot 16, after which, the title was issued. He again paid the balance of the 3 other lots. Then, petitioner demanded that the titles thereof be issued but TSDC refused on the ground that the balance was not yet fully paid and non-compliance with the stipulations in the contract that constructions on the lots be finished within 6 months and that petitioner failed to make constructions as to other lots. Petitioner was not entitled to the 10% rebate (since he was not able to finish building within 6 months), hence, the previous payments did not amount to full payment. 48 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Petitioner then filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, with the RTC of Angeles City, praying for the delivery of the TCTs and damages. He also filed with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against respondent Lazatin, for violation of PD No. 957, Section 25, which states that the owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot upon full payment. Thereafter, information was filed against Lazatin. Petitioner filed a motion to consolidate the Civil Case and Criminal Case, which the court granted. However, the CA reversed the decision on the consolidation issue, ISSUE: W/N the cases may be consolidated. HELD: Civil Actions that may be consolidated under Section 3(a) of Rule 111 is one for civil liability arising from the criminal offense or of ex-delicto and not ex contracto or one that is base on a contract to sell. In the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu and not one for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is inapplicable. But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation of a criminal action with a civil action arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court (actions involving a common question of law or fact – court may order a joint hearing). In the case at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost identical. The evidence would virtually be the same. Hence, petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case which will be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice. Case may be consolidated not y virtue of the provision of Section 3, Rule 111 but y virtue of Section 1, Rule 31. BUNAG VS. CA G.R. No. 101749, 211 SCRA 440 (July 10, 1992) Facts: One afternoon Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo, his 26 years old sweetheart, to a motel where he deflowered her as his companion held her Vena V. Verga feet. Later Bunag jr brought her to his grandmother’s house in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days. Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida filed their respective applications for a marriage license but the former withdrew the same. Bunag jr left her and never returned. He also promised to marry her but did not fulfill it. A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by Zenaida Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr. praying for damages. Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability. Respondent appealed decision absolving Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in the case. Bunag, Jr. field this appeal alleging that court failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the criminal case carries with it extinction of the civil case. HELD: A person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act results in damage or injury to another, and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. VILLEGAS VS. CA G.R. No. 82562, 271 SCRA 148 (April 11, 1997) Facts: Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza filed a libel suit against Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who publicly imputed to him acts in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act in a public statement, a radio-TV interview and a public statement prior to his appearance before the Senate Committee on Public Works. The Committee observed that the allegations in the complaint were based on the uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be highly questionable. 49 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 After the investigation, Raquiza was cleared of all charges by the Committee. Then, an information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then CFI of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the US where he stayed until his death. Nevertheless, trial proceeded on absentia. The court dismissed the criminal aspect of the case and ordered that Raquiza be paid damages by the heirs of Villegas. The CA affirmed the lower court. Hence, this appeal by Villegas’ heirs. ISSUE: W/N the death of Villegas before final judgment extinguished his civil liability. HELD: The survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. Corollarily, his claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation. In the case, the source of Villegas' civil liability is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code thus, civil liability may still be enforced (Bayotas Doctrine). The Bayotas doctrine makes enforcement of a deceased accused’s civil liability dependent on two factors: that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to section 1 of rule 111. In the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. Hence, the court should have dismissed both actions against Villegas which dismissal will not, however, bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his claim for damages against the executor or administrator of the former's estate, notwithstanding the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil separate civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 252 SCRA 641 (1996) Facts: Teofilo Gelacio, then vice mayor of San Francisco Agusan del Sur filed a complaint against Paredes, then provincial governor and Mansueto Honrada for alleged conspiracy in making it appear by falsifying public documents that arraignment has been held in a case involving Paredes when in fact, no arraignment was done. An information was filed by the Sandiganbayan against the Paredes and his accomplice. An administrative case for falsification was also filed with the trial court by Gelacio against Mansueto, the clerk of court who made the certifications. The second case was dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence. But the Graft Investigation found probable cause to proceed against the defendants. Paredes now contends that the case in the Sandiganbayan should also be dismissed invoking the ruling in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez that only the regular courts has the power to oversee court personnel’s compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative action against them for their failure to do so. Issue: W/N the case in the Sandiganbayan should also be dismissed since the administrative case was also dismissed. Decision: It has been held that one thing is administrative, quite another is the criminal liability. The determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. The dismissal of the administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. RULE 112 CASES RULE 112 CASES PANGANDAMAN VS. CASAR No. L-71782, 159 SCRA 599 (Apr 14, 1988) Facts: On 27 July 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, leaving at least five persons dead and two wounded. The next day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, representing the widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident and the filing of the affidavits. The Provincial Fiscal indorsed it to the respondent Judge. However, no case was presented until 10 August 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan. The judge examined personally all 3 witnesses reducing to writing the questions witnesses and answers. Thereafter, the Judge approved the complaint and issued the corresponding 50 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners and 50 John Does. Atty. Batuampar filed an ex-parte MR to recall the warrant and to conduct a thorough PI on the ground that the judge’s initial investigation was hasty and with no searching questions, which the judge denied. Petitioners alleged that the judge could not have determined probable cause against the 64 accused since the MTC is open only from 8am to 1pm. They further alleged that the judge disregarded the fiscal who had taken cognizance of the case and about to conduct its own PI and that the warrant violates the constitution requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. Hence the present petition. Issue: W/N the judge had the power to issue warrant of arrest without completing the PI. Decision: In PI, a judge of an inferior court must observe the proceeding prescribed in Sec 3, Rule 112, 1985 Rules of Court. Pi consists of two phases. The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase. This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counteraffidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action. Such procedure must be followed before the filing of the complaint in the RTC. Otherwise, there is a denial of due process. In the case, no information has yet been filed with the RTC. There is no pretense that the PI has been completed and the judge does not intend to undertake the 2 nd phase. In this situation, it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the procedure. Completion of the entire procedure of the PI is not required before a warrant of arrest may be issued. The rule authorizes the MTC to order such arrest even before the completion of the PI if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists. Hence, the warrants were validly issued. WEBB VS. DE LEON GR 12134, 247 SCRA 652 (Aug 23, 1995) Facts: On 19 June 1994, the NBI filed a letter-complaint with the DOJ charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano and six others of the crime of rape with homicide. The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst. Chief Prosecutor Jovencio Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation on the killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela Vizconde, her mother Estrellita and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in BF Homes, Parañaque. In the PI, the NBI submitted sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, 2 of the Vizconde maids, a security guard, and a car engineer. An autopsy report was also submitted confirming the presence of spermatozoa on Carmela. Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Hubert filed a motion for production of evidences and documents with the DOJ which was granted and the NBI reproduced it. However, the original statement of Alfaro was lost but they were able to get a copy from Atty Mercader, Jr. Hubert failed to get a copy of the FBI report. Hubert claimed that he was in the US at the time of the crime which was corroborated by evidences and testimonies. The same was done by other accused. The DOJ found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for rape with homicide against the petitioners with the Parañaque RTC which was eventually presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued the arrest warrants. The accused voluntarily surrendered, but in their present petition, they contend that the judge abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a PI before issuing the warrant. ISSUE: W/N the judge should conduct its own PI before issuing a warrant of arrest. W/N there is probable cause for the crime of rape with homicide. W/N the warrant has been properly issued. HELD: The investigating fiscal finds probable cause to hold respondent for trial. He shall prepare the resolution and the information. In determining probable cause, facts and circumstances are weighed without resorting to technical rules of evidences, but rather based on common sense. Probable cause are the facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and was committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidences of guilt. In the case, the DOJ panel did not abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. It correctly adjudged that enough evidences had been adduced to establish cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary since PI is not part of trial. 51 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. The DOJ‘s report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue such warrants. They do not conduct a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidences. The fiscal need not call the wirnesses for clarificatory questioning if the evidence on hand already yields probable cause. The fact that it took respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ panel does not mean that they made no personal evaluation of the evidences of the case. DRILON VS. CA AND DR. AGUILA GR 115825, 258 SCRA 280 (July 5, 1996) Facts: Godofredo Añonuevo was shot in the back by Manolo Ramos and was then brought to a hospital for treatment of head injuries. Later, he was again shot and treated after being confronted by Marcia Reyes regarding his revelation of her indebtedness secret. After which, he was taken to a poultry farm in Conception where was shot and subsequently brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital where Dr. Aguila (which was said to be an accomplice) refused to treat him. Añonuevo gave 3 statements to narrate the whole crime. His counsel then requested petitioner DOJ Secretary Drilon to order the transfer of the PI from Batangas to the office of the State Prosecutor at the DOJ which was granted. State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu conducted a PI and found a prima facie case for Kidnapping with frustrated murder against Ramos, Agapito Reyes, Marca Reyes, Egay Perez, Ariel Hubilla, Dr Aguilar and Adoracion Moraleja. An information was then filed with the Batangas City RTC. Subsequebtly, a petition for review and reinvestigation was denied by DOJ USEC and DOJ Secretary. The case was reassigned and re-raffled to the Manila RTC. Dr. Aguila sought prohibition with TRO and preliminary injunction to set aside the resolution of Lugtu with the CA which was granted. Unaware that the raffle had already been conducted, the accused filed a motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest and to defer the raffle with the Manila RTC. Not knowing of the said motion, the Manila RTC issued the order of arrest. The CA enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the case. CA likewise excluded Dr Aguilar from the information having found no probable cause against him. ISSUE: W/N the criminal prosecution can be restrained upon the claim of accused Dr. Aguila that there is no prima facie case against him. HELD: the purpose of the PI is to establish PC, which implies probability of guilt and requires more that bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. PC should be determined in a summary but scrupulous Vena V. Verga manner to prevent material damage to the constitutional rights of the accused and guarantees of freedom and fair play. Courts should give credence, in the absence of clear showing of arbitrariness, to the finding and determination of PC by the prosecutors in the PI, who are vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of said function. Hence, the state prosecutor did not abuse its discretion in finding PC against Dr Aguilar. The court directed his inclusion in the information and the continuance of the case. GO VS. CA GR 101837, 206 SCRA 138 (Feb. 11, 1992) Facts: Rolito Go’s car nearly collided with the car of Eldon Maguan when the latter entered a one-way street in San Juan, MM. Go went to Maguan and shot him, and then he left. A security guard saw the plate number of Go’s car which the police verified that it was registered to Elsa And Go. The police also retrieved an empty shell and a round of live ammunition for a 9mm pistol. The police also obtained a facsimile of Go’s credit card which it used in a bakeshop before the incident and a positive verification by the security guard. The police conducted a manhunt. Go surrendered and was positively identified by the witnesses. A complaint for frustrated homicide was then filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Go executed a waiver of Art 125 of the RPC to avail of a PI be Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio. Maguan died before the information could be filed. The prosecutor filed instead an information for murder with the RTC, wherein the prosecutor certified that there was no PI since Go did not waive Art 125. Counsel for petitioner then filed an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper PI alleging that no PI was conducted and the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Go’s petition for bail was approved and his release was ordered. The prosecutor filed a motion for leave to conduct PI and to suspend proceedings in the court which was granted. However, the judge recalled the bail, PI, and immediate release and set aside the case for arraignment. Petitioner was admitted at the Rizal Provincial Jail. Petitioner was arraigned and hearings were conducted. Go then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA which was issued. The CA also denied the deferment of the arraignment and his other motions. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest was lawful. W/N petitioner effectively waived his right to PI. DECISION: Go’s arrest took place 6 days after the shooting. The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements of eyewitnesses. It is clear that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner. Since he had not been arrested, he was also not entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the PI. The prosecutor should have conducted the PI upon the filing of the complaint 52 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 for frustrated homicide by the police since he should have been accorded with such right without any conditions. The court held that petitioner did not waive his right to PI. Such right is a substantive right. To deny him of such right would deprive him of his right to due process. PI is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the case, Go insisted on his right to PI before his arraignment. He even asked for bail in one motion. Hence, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of PI. CRESPO VS. MOGUL No L-53373, 151 SCRA 462 (June 30, 1987) Facts: Asst Fiscal Proceso de Gala, with the approval of the provincial fiscal, filed an information for estafa against Mario Crespo in the circuit criminal court of Lucena City. The accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review with the Sec of Justice. The judge denied it but deferred the arraignment. Upon petition, the CA restrained the judge from proceeding with the arraignment until the DOJ has resolved the petition for review. The Justice Undersecretary directed the fiscal to move for the dismissal of the information for insufficiency of evidence but the judge denied it. The CA issued a TRO but later lifted it. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the TC may refuse to grant the motion to dismiss and proceed with the trial of the case despite a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon order of the Sec of Justice. HELD: Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must be secured if the fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Justice Secretary whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the court, the court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. In this regard, the fiscal should continue to appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his discretion and control. CRUZ, JR. VS. PEOPLE GR 110436, 233 SCRA 439 (June 27, 1994) Facts: GSIS filed 2 separate complaints against Roman Cruz, Jr., then President and General-Manager of GSIS and President of the Manila Hotel, for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. The first was filed with the Office of the Vena V. Verga Special Prosecutor for violation of RA 3019 while the second was filed with the PCGG which was later endorsed to the Ombudsman. PCGG filed an information with the Sandiganbayan after conducting a preliminary investigation. The OSP likewise filed information for estafa through falsification of public documents with the Sandiganbayan. The OSP earlier denied the motion to dismiss by petitioner. Sandiganbayan consolidated the two cases but remanded the same to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted counter-affidavits and documents. The prosecutor recommended the withdrawal of the information but the Ombudsman ordered the prosecution to proceed. Petitioner filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and for the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N the Ombudsman should dismiss the information on the recommendation of the prosecutor. W/N the records of the preliminary investigation should be reproduced. Held: It is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter’s report and recommendation as the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. The Ombudsman does not conduct another investigation but merely determines the propriety and correctness of the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor that is, whether or not probable cause exist. Hence, the courts should not interfere in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s discretionary power. The fact that the information filed by the ombudsman consists only of two paragraphs is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness on his part, absent a clear showing that he abused his discretion. The court is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted duing the preliminary investigation. The lim case wherein it was held that if a judge relies entirely on the certification of the prosecutor , he or se has not personally determined probable cause, is not applicable in the case at bar. It is sufficient that the judge evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutin in determining probable cause. There is no reason to deny the reproduction of the records of the preliminary investigation since there was good cause on the part of the accused for the reason that he may prepare for his defense. DOLALAS vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 118808, 265 SCRA 819 (December 24, 1996) Facts: Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn K. Obido and Wilberto B. Carriedo — Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Clerk II, respectively of MCTC of Kabasalan, Zamboanga del Sur, were administratively charged by respondent 53 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for "miscarriage of justice, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and for failure to prosecute Criminal Case no. 5881 for an unreasonable length of time in the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The letter-complaint was due to a criminal case of alarms and scandals filed against respondent by a police officer. Respondent alleged that after submitting his counter-affidavit with the court, there has been no preconference, arraignment or pre-trial held or conducted by the judge. He further alleged that it was maliciously filed by P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with petitioner judge in order to discourage the former from instituting a criminal complaint against said police officer's men for abuse of authority and police brutality with physical injury. The case was delayed due to the failure to prosecute within a reasonable time. The Graft Investigation Officer I of the Ombudsman directed petitioners to comment and denied the latter’s motion for reconsideration. Hence the petition before this Court. Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over petitioners for purposes of investigation and prosecution. Decision: This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with having violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules of Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated of the 1987 Constitution to assume under section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Hence, the ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case at bar. ACOP VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GR 120422, 248 SCRA 566 (Sep 27, 1995) Facts: On 18 May 1995, 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng were killed in a shootout by the NCR Command, Traffic Management Command, PACC, CPDC and Criminal Investigation Command. Later, SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command exposed that there was no shootout. Then, the relatives of the slain suspects accused the policemen of Vena V. Verga murder and asked the CHR to conduct an investigation. The Ombudsman directed petitioner Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Casaclang to monitor the investigations by the CHR, Senate and PNP. Casaclang requested documents relative to the shootout from these bodies and agencies. SPO2 Corazon de la Cruz testified and corroborated the statements of de los Reyes. He then created a panel of investigators which recommended the conduct of a preliminary investigation after being furnished with documents and transcripts of the Senate’s proceedings and the “After Operations Report” from PNP. He ordered petitioners to submit counter-affidavits and evidences but the latter neither complied nor moved for reconsideration. Instead, they questioned the preliminary investigation without the required preliminary evaluation in their respective petitions with the SC, which ordered both parties to comment. However, Acting Ombudsman Villa ordered petitioner to file their counteraffidavits, which caused petitioner to cite him in contempt. Villa likewise took the petition from Casaclang who suspended the same pending resolution of the petition by the SC. Hence, this petition. Issue: WN the Ombudsman of the OSP has jurisdiction over the complaint. W/N the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs may conduct PI. Decision: Petitioners, who are PNP officers, are civilian personnel of the government. The Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs is not prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. The Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs. Hence, there is no irregularity attending the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the case to Casaclang who in turn created a panel of investigators. Casaclang did not set the case for PI without the preliminary evaluation required. In the case, Casaclang issued the questioned order after the panel of investigators submitted its evaluation report. The conduct of such evaluation involves the exercise of discretion which has not been abused in the case. Through RA 6770, the OSP was made an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman. The ombudsman was granted with the power to investigate public officers and employees over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The OSP is also authorized to conduct PI over criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under the supervision and control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman. OCAMPO, IV vs. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 225 SCRA 725 (August 30, 1993) 54 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Facts: Governor Mariano Ocampo III and his son, petitioner Mariano Ocampo IV, were charged with violation of Sec. 3 (h) of Republic Act. No. 3019 in two (2) separate informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. Mariano Ocampo III, then Tarlac Governor and President-Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI), connived with Ocampo IV in loaning P5,476,031.00 and P7,000,000.00 out of the National Aid for Local Government Funds (NALGF) of Tarlac to the IMCOR, now the New Territory Manufacturing, Inc., a private corporation where Ocampo IV is an incorporator and stockholder, under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the government the same being interest-free, without collateral, and without, a definite date of repayment. Ocampo IV filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reinvestigation which was granted. After the reinvestigation, Special Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano, Sr. and Rodolfo F. Reynoso of the OSP found that Ocampo IV did not connive with his father, Gov. Ocampo III. The special prosecutors then recommended that the informations against them be dismissed and withdrawn. However, the Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the Ombudsman abused its discretion in proceeding with the case despite the recommendation of dismissal by the special prosecutor. Decision: Criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or, a writ of prohibition, except in some instances. Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation of the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form. The petition failed to show a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, whose act of disapproving the recommendation of the special prosecutors to dismiss the informations filed is not whimsical or capricious. Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or arbitrariness. He disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutors because he sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict both accused. It should however be reiterated that, while it is the Ombudsman who has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed without approval of the said court. Vena V. Verga RODRIGUEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 61355, 120 SCRA 659 (Feb 18, 1983) Facts: On 24 Jan 1964, Maximo Rodriguez was the provincial fiscal of Misamis Oriental when he was designated as Ex-officio Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental and CDO City upon the register of the former Register of Deeds. Later, respondent Digno Roa filed an affidavit complaint before the fiscal of CDO charging Rodriguez of estafa, falsification and usurpation of public functions. A subpoena was issued to petitioner who submitted his counter-affidavit. State Prosecutor Lilia Lopez, who assisted the fiscal conducted a PI. Two months later, he resigned from the service. Then, Lopez found probable cause against petitioner with Isidro Udang and Josefa Ebora Pacardo. Before her resolution could be approved by the DOJ, the office of the Tanodbayan was created to which the entire records of the case were transferred. The Tanodbayan prosecutor Francisco Rabanes set the case for PI but later dismissed the case for lack of PC by just considering the records and counter-affidavit submitted by petitioner. The Tanodbayan legal officer however recommended the setting aside of the resolution and the filing of an information for violation of RA 3019. A team of special prosecutors conducted the PI upon the recommendation of the Tanodbayan prosecution and investigation office. The subpoena was served upon petitioner’s wife since the former was in Catarman Northern Samar hospital attending to his sick mother and proceeding directly to Manila for an appearance before the CA. The PI was conducted in the presence of petitioner’s law partner and son, Rufus Rodriguez, but petitioner denied them as his representative since he was unaware of such PI. Consequently, an information for violation of RA 3019 was filed before the SB. Petitioner’s motion to quash was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N PD 1606 creating the Tanodbayan is an ex-post facto law. W/N the PI was properly conducted. the the the the the Decision: The Sandiganbayan is a national court stationed in Manila the fact that an accused is placed to defraying greater expenses because the SB holds courts in Manila only does not work PD 1606 which created it an ex post facto law. It is not disputed that a subpoena was sent to petitioner as received by his wife and that he was represented by his law partner and son who actively participated in the proceedings. Even if he denied their representation, it appears that petitioner had submitted a memorandum to the Tanodbayan and had ventilated his arguments at a hearing before the latter. Thus, petitioner had ample opportunity to be heard and was in fact heard. Further, PD 911 authorizes the holding of an ex parte PI. If respondent does not appear, the PI may proceed without him. Hence, the PI was properly conducted. 55 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 RULE 113 ARREST Section 1. Definition of arrest. – Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. What is arrest? Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that hey may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense Sec. 2. Arrest; how made. – An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Note: No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. How is an arrest made? Arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest Sec. 3. Duty of arresting officer. – It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. What does it mean when jurisprudence says that the officer, in making the arrest, must “stand his ground”? It means that the officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect the arrest What is the duty of the arresting officer who arrests a person? He must deliver the person immediately to the nearest jail or police station Sec. 4. Execution of warrant. – The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reason therefore. Within what period must a warrant of arrest be served? There is no time period. A warrant of arrest is valid until the arrest is effected or until it is lifted. The head of the officer to whom the warrant was delivered must cause it to be executed within 10 days from its receipt and the officer to whom it is assigned for execution must make a report to the judge who issued it within 10 days from the expiration of the period. If he fails to execute it, he should state the reasons therefore Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. When is an arrest without warrant lawful? A peace officer or private person may arrest without warrant: 1. when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense 2. when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause based on personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it 3. when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another Note: the phrase “just been committed” is used to hinder the abuse of law enforcers Personal Knowledge: 1. facts based on information 2. facts based on Reasonable Grounds of Suspicion Rule 3. of the death of victim and facts indicating that accused was the assailant 56 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 NOTE: 1. Sec 5(a) – in flagrante delicto • Knowledge must be at the time of, not after, arrest • Personal knowledge is required 2. Sec 5(b) – hot pursuit arrest • Elements 2.1 Offense have been committed 2.2 Offense has just been committed 2.3 Probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that persons to be arrested committed it 2.3.1 Personal knowledge of facts based on information allowed 2.3.2 Personal knowledge of facts based on reasonable grounds of suspicion rule is not the rule Buy Bust operation • It is a form of entrapment which has been repeatedly accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. The violator is court in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime • “objective test”  demands that the detail so the purported transaction must clearly and adequately shown: the initial contact between the poser-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise of payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale • buy-bust must be continuous i. buy bust operation and search rejected for NOT being continuous Sec. 6. Time of making arrest. – An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. – When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. – When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. Duty of the arresting officer to inform the accused of: • • • • • the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and any statement he might make could be used against him right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means arresting officer must see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested or by any person on his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf Right of counsel may be waived but the waiver shall NOT be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel RA 7438 adds o The accused must be informed in a language he understands • • People vs. Mahinay – updating the Miranda case 1. Stating rights must be made in a language known and understood by accused 2. Right to be assisted by a lawyer 3. If indigent, a lawyer will be provided 4. Right to remain silent 5. Informed that no custodial investigation in any manner may be conducted without presence of accused’s counsel 6. At any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means with his lawyer, any immediate family member, medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel 7. Right to waive rights; in writing, voluntary, knowingly and intelligently 57 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. • With the presence of counsel (this right was made effective on April 26, 1983) May indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned – interrogation must cease Waiver of right does not bar accused from invoking it at any time Name if the arresting officer Charge and reason for arrest Inadmissible evidence It is only the solicited confession that would be inadmissible. Warrrantless search/arrest are valid and admissible Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. – Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. QUESTION A police officer was chasing a person who had just committed an offense. The person went inside a house, so the police officer followed. Inside the house, the police officer saw drugs lying around. Can he confiscate the drugs? Can he use them as evidence? Yes. The plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because there was a prior valid intrusion, the police officer inadvertently discovered the evidence, he had a right to be there, and the evidence was immediately apparent What if the officer merely peaks through the window of the house and sees the drugs – can he confiscate then> can he use them as evidence? He can confiscate them without prejudice to his liability for violation of domicile. He cannot use them as evidence because the seizure cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine, there being no previous valid intrusion When should an arrest be made? It can be made on any day at any time of the day and night Can an officer arrest a person against whom a warrant has been issued even if he does not have the warrant with him? Yes, but after the arrest, if the person arrested requires, it must be shown to him as soon as practicable. Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person. – When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the case of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance. – An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. Sec. 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. – An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. – Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. – If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. Vena V. Verga RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE Section 1. Search warrant defined. – A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. SEARCH WARRANT VS. WARRANT OF ARREST SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT OF ARREST 58 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The applicant must show: 1. that the items sought are in fact sizeable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity; and 2. that the items will be found in the place to be searched. The judge must conduct a personal, searching examination of the applicant and his witnesses The applicant must show: 1. probable cause that an offense has been committed; and 2. that the person to be arrested committed it The judge need not conduct a personal examination of the applicant and his witnesses. He may rely on the affidavits of the witnesses and the recommendation of the prosecutor. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Where should the application for search warrant be filed? As a general rule, it should be filed with the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the crime was committed. But for compelling reasons, it can be filed with the court within whose judicial region the offense was committed or where the warrant is to be served. But, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application for a search warrant can only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Subject Of A Search Warrant: Personal Property, Which Is: 1. subject of the offense, 2. stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or 3. used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. Requisites for issuing a search warrant 1. There must be probable cause 2. Which must be determined personally by the judge 3. upon personal examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of probing and searching questions and answers on facts personally known to them 4. the probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense 59 What is a search warrant? It is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. Why are the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant more stringent than the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest? The violation of the right to privacy produces a humiliating effect which cannot be rectified anymore. This is why there is no other justification for a search, except a warrant. On the other hand, in a warrant of arrest, the person to be arrested can always post bail to prevent the deprivation of liberty. Note: A search Constitution warrant requires strict compliance with the Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. – An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 5. particularly describing the place to be searched and the items to be seized 6. the sworn statements together with the affidavits of the witnesses must be attached to the record. • • When is the affidavit or testimony of the witness said to be based on personal knowledge? The test is whether perjury could be charged against the witness. Is it necessary that the person named in the search warrant be the owner of the things to be seized? No. Ownership is of no consequence. What is relevant is that the property is connected to an offense. What are the requisites of the personal examination that the judge must conduct before issuing the search warrant? The judge must: 1. examine the witnesses personally; 2. under oath; 3. and reduced to writing in the form of probing and searching questions and answers. What is the meaning of probable cause? Probable cause for a search is such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. What is the meaning of personal knowledge? Probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or witnesses he may produce and not based on mere heresay. What is the meaning of probing and searching questions and answers? The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, not merely answerable by yes or no. Can you issue the warrant by claiming that the priest saw it? No. because personal knowledge refers to personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable. • the abode is sacred 1. once transgressed, cannot restore the transgressed right violating rule on searches and seizures is actionable under the Civil Code because a man’s house is his castle 2. personal knowledge is required so he can be liable for perjury there must be a hearing to determine probable cause 1. not merely Yes or No answers 2. cannot be base d merely on reliable information • search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant What is a “scatter shot warrant”? It is a warrant of arrest that is issued for more than one offense. It is void, since the law requires that a warrant of arrest should only be issued in connection with one specific offense. A warrant was issued for the seizure of drugs connected with “violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law.” Is the warrant valid? The warrant is valid. Although there are many ways of violating the Dangerous Drugs Law, it is not a scatter shot warrant since it is in connection with only one penal law. Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. – If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Note: the 2 witnesses rule applies if there is no other occupant of the home 60 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Sec. 9. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. General Rule: time of making the search is at the day time Exceptions: 1. if there are emergencies 2. property is on the person or place to be searched Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant. – A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void. Note: unlike a warrant of arrest, which is valid until served but the officer must make a report after 10 days Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized. – The officer seizing the property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. inventory must be signed by 2 witnesses a peace officer cannot ask the accused to sign if there are no 2 witnesses because that would violate the right against self-incrimination him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court. property will be in custodia legis items in the search warrant will be the only items to be seized except: if malum prohibitum particular description of: to avoid abuses place to be searched things to be seized if there’s an error in the warrant, they should go to the court to have it corrected 5. Anything not included in the warrant cannot be seized EXCEPT if it is mala prohibita, in which case, the seizure can be justified under the plain view doctrine. Even if the object was related to the crime, but it is not mentioned in the warrant nor is it mala prohibita, it still cannot be seized. 6. person need not be named; may be named John Doe as long as described with particularity or with descriptio personae 1. 2. • 3. • • 4. QUESTIONS What should the police officer or court do to things seized illegally? Anything seized illegally must be returned to the owner unless it is mala prohibita. In this case, it should be kept in custodia legis. When should the search warrant be executed? If possible, it should be executed during the daytime. But in certain cases, such as when the things to be seized are mobile or are in the person of the accused, it can be served during nighttime. For how long is the search warrant valid? It is valid for 10 days, after which the peace officer should make a return to the judge who issued it. If the peace officer does not make a return, the judge should summon him and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return was made, the judge should determine if the peace officer issued a receipt to the occupant of the premises from which the things were taken. seized. 61 1. 2. Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. – (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 If the warrant was executed even before the expiration of the ten-day period, can the peace officer use the warrant again before it expires? No. If the purpose for which it was issued has already been carried out, the warrant cannot be used anymore. The exception is if the search was not finished within one day, the warrant can still be used the next day, provided that it is still within the 10-day period. Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Warrantless Searches and Seizures: 1. incidental to lawful arrest • • • • if detected through smell, not case of plain view but probable cause (decided case) if detected by canines - as if police themselves have smelled it if police chases a person, accidentally hits a jar, where drugs pour out – not plain view if mall – private place, you waive your right against unreasonable searches and seizures Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. – A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. I. 1. 2. 3. SUMMARY The Constitution does not prohibit all kinds of searches and seizures. It only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A search and seizure is unreasonable if it is made without a warrant, or the warrant was invalidly issued. A search and seizure without a warrant is still reasonable if conducted under the following circumstances: a. Incident to a lawful arrest i. It must be made AFTER the arrest. The objective is to make sure that the life of the peace officer will not be endangered. ii. It must be contemporaneous with the arrest in both time and place. b. Search of moving vehicles c. Consent searches i. Only the person whose right may be violated can give the consent; it is a personal right. ii. The requisites are: 1. The person has knowledge of his right against the search; 2. He freely gives his consent in spite of such knowledge. d. Objects in plain view 62 • • search must be contemporaneous and within immediate vicinity/control of the person arrested 2. consented search conditions: a. right exists b. person making the consent knows that he has the right c. in spite of knowledge of the right, he voluntarily and intelligently gives consent 3. search of moving vehicles • search must be cursory i.e., don’t make a thorough search; just to have a look not to open trunks 4. customs 5. checkpoints 6. RA requiring inspections or body checks in airports 7. stop-and-frisk 8. emergency 9. enforcement of health and sanitary laws or ordinances Plain View Doctrine 1. 2. 3. valid intrusion item must be visible – seen without any further search; e.g. in a transparent bag inadvertent discovery e.g. police chasing a person, sees a box, takes a peak and sees drugs • can be seized because malum prohibitum but cannot be introduced as evidence because not in plain view Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 e. f. g. Requisites: 1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion, and the officer must have had a right to be at the place searched at the time of the search; 2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered; 3. The evidence must be immediately apparent; 4. There was no need for further search. Customs searches Stop and Frisk/ Exigent circumstances Emergency i. unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. Although it is true that Anselmo is a notorious criminal, but such does not constitute any justification for killing the man when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact asleep. GALANG vs. CA 324 SCRA 139 (2000) CASES: PEOPLE VS. OANIS AND GALANTA 74 Phil. 256 22 July 1943 Facts: Captain Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan received from Mayor Guido a telegram stating that a certain Anselmo Balagtas, an escaped convict, was living with a ertain Irene in Cabantauan. Monsod immediately ordered the arrest of Balagtas, dead or alive, should he offer resistance or aggression. The accused Chief of Police Oanis and the constabulary soldier Galanta were sent out to arrest Balagtas. The accused arrived at the house of Irene who was supposedly the paramour of Balagtas. When they were there, they saw a certain person who resembled Balagtas in all his bodily appearance sleeping on a bamboo bed but facing the other direction. The accused, without going around the house, started firing at the man. They found out later on that the man was not really Balagtas. They tried to invoke the justifying circumstance of having acted in fulfillment of a duty. In support of their theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact, the two relied on the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong were a cook accidentally wounded a friend who was playing a trick on the latter. Issue: W/N the two accused should be held liable. Decision: Yes. Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonable necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be affected otherwise. No unnecessary or Vena V. Verga Facts: The victim, Carlos Oro, coming from his birthday celebration, went home drunk. At around 8:00 in the evening, he figured in an altercation with one Jojo Marcelo. The altercation reached the appellant who together with a policeman proceeded to the place. Upon seeing Carlos, appellant drew his gun and pointed it at the victim. The victim said that he will not fight back. Thereafter, appellant grab the right arm of Carlos and forced him to kneel on the ground with his right hand behind his back still being held by the appellant. It was in that position that appellant pumped 2 bullets into Carlos’ which caused his death. Appellant claims self defense. Issue: W/N the appellant should be held guilty as charged. Decision: Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to [rove the guilt of the accused. However, if the accused admits killing the victim and pleads selfdefense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such claim. Galang was unsuccessful in proving his claim because the physical evidence supports otherwise. Granting form the sale of argument that unlawful aggression was attendant at the initial stage, the same ceased when Carlos dropped his gun. The threat to appellant’s life is no longer attendant. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine-qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There can be no self-defense complete or incomplete unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. Policemen are bound by their duty to protect life, liberty and property. As their position gives them great deal of advantage. A police officer is not justified in using unnecessary force in enforcing arrest or in treating with wanton violence 63 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be affect otherwise. UNITED STATES VS. MOJICA 42 SCRA 784 (1922) Facts: Artemio Mojica is a policeman in the city of Manila. On the evening of December 13 1920, a constabulary soldier and a woman were arrested inside the Walled City by the police, which caused considerable irritation among constabulary troops stationed at Santa Lucia Barracks. The constabulary soldiers, Armed with rifles and bayonet, convinced that Mojica was with the men who arrested their fellow soldier, threatened the appellant with death if he will not produce the arrested soldier and woman. The arrival of the patrol wagon saved Mojica. The following day, the constabulary men returned. Mojica, after calling for reinforcement, ran into a restaurant to avoid altercation with the soldiers. When the reinforcement arrived. He re-appeared. However, the victim and his two other companions resisted arrest. The deceased Macasinag struck the appellant with his club. When he was about to stab Mojica, the latter drew a shot inflicting a wound from which Macasinag died a few days later. The appellant contends that it was self defense. Issue: W/N the appellant should be held liable for the death of Macasinag. Decision: No. The appellant killed the victim in self-defense. The revised penal code provides that anyone who acts in self-defense of his person shall be exempt from criminal liability. Provided that the following circumstances concur: 1. Unlawful aggression 2. Reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it. 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There was unlawful aggression on Macasinag’s part. A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must STAND HIS GROUND and cannot, like private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. It was the deceased who attacked the appellant. He had the best reason to believe that his life was in imminent danger. It may be argued that the appellant should have used his club instead but a policeman’s club is not very effective weapon against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair an equal struggle. UMIL vs. RAMOS G.R. No. 81567 09 July 1990 Facts: These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court. In Umil v. Ramos, the CAPCOM received information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for gunshot would at the St. Agnes Hospital. Upon verification, it was found out that the wounded person is Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation Squad, responsible for the killing of 2 capcom soldiers the day before. As such Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, where he was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who killed the 2 Capcom soldiers. The arrest without warrant was assailed in that Dural was not arrested while in the act of shooting, nor just after the commission of the offense. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. In Roque v. De villa, Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA who had surrendered, confessed that the house occupied by Renato Constantino was being used as a safehouse of National United Front Commission of the CPPNPA, as such the house was put on military surveillance and a subsequent search warrant was issued. Firearms, ammunition, radio and other communication equipment were seized. Constantino then admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committed of the NUFC. On the evening of the same day, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Constantino. When accosted, he admitted that he is a regular member of the CPP-NPA and was to deliver letters to the other members of the group. Found in Buenaobra’s possession was a piece of paper containing a jumbled phone number of Florida Roque, Sister of Amelia Roque alias Ka Nelia, at 69 Geronimo St, Caloocan. Acting on the leads provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, military agents went to the place the next day. After seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, they conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the brgy. Capt. Of the place. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, subversive documents, as well as live ammunitions. Amelia admitted ownership of the articles. Their arrests without warrants were justified in that as members of the NUFC-CPP, they committed subversion, which being a continuing offense, they were arrested while committing an offense. In Anonuevo V. Ramos, Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived of the house of Renato Constantino, which was still under surveillance by the military. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agent found them to be loaded guns, for which the two did not possess license to carry. They were later identified as Ka Ted and Ka Totoy of the CPP, by their comrades who had already surrendered to the military. Their arrest 64 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 without warrant is also justified because they were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions in their person why they were apprehended. In Ocaya V, Aguirre, police officers, armed with a search warrant were searching a house believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPPNPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition were found in the car of Ocaya and so they were brought to the police headquarters. Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest without warrant is justified, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when arrested. In Espiritu v. Lim, Petitioner, who is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators nationwide, claims that at about 5 am of 23 Nov. 1998, while he was sleeping in his home, he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant, none was presented. The respondents claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant since when arrested he had in fact just committed a crime in that in the afternoon of 22 Nov, 1998, during a press conference at the National Press club he urged drivers and operators to go on a nationwide strike, which is tantamount to inciting to sedition. Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him, but he gave them the slip. Police finally caught up with him on 23 November and thus, he was invited after which an information was filed against him. In Nazareno v. Station Commander, in the morning of December 4, 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near Mendiola. One of the suspects was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, REgala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companion. As such, police officers, without warrant, picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters. As held in People v. Ancheta, the obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein. Issue: W/N the arrest without warrant is legal. Decision: Yes. In all these petitions, the record shows that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrest without a warrant were clearly justified. Vena V. Verga UMIL vs. RAMOS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 03 October 1991 Facts: The petitioners seek a reconsideration of the court’s decision upholding the validity of the warrantless arrest of the suspected NPA members. Decision: The court stressed that mere suspicion that one is a NPA member is not a valid ground for the arrest without warrant. However, the court found no merit to the motion for reconsideration. It was stressed that the writ of habeas corpus being applied for by the petitioners exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve the persons from unlawful restraint. However, there is no unlawful arrest in this case. Again, as a general rule, no peace officer has the power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest except in those cases expressly authorize by law specifically by Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of court which provide that: A peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the case of Rolando Dural, Dural was committing an offense when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of a new people’s army, an outlawed organization, where membership is penalized and for subversion, which like rebellion is a continuing offense. Dural did not cease to be a subversive simply because he was at the time of the arrest confined in St. Agnes. Nor can it be said that Dural’s arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP-NPA. His arrest was based on a probable cause as supported by actual facts. Dural’s arrest falls under paragraph B of Rule which requires 2 conditions for valid arrest without warrant: 1) that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense and 2) that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts such as in this case: 1) the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural, 2) a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound and 3) "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious 65 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.. complied with in the UMIL case. These requisites were MALACAT vs. CA G.R. No 123595 12 December 1997 DOCTRINE: There can be no valid flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the police officer that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. The search was neither within the allowable scope of a stop of frisk for such is limited to protective search of outer clothing for weapons. While in a stop and frisk, probable cause is not required, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions. Facts: Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Pandar was charged with violating Section 3 of PD No. 1866 which codified laws on illegal/unlawful acquisition and disposition of ammunition and explosives. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented police officers as witnesses. Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer and Josefino Serapio, the investigating officer testified that on 27 August 1990 at about 6:30 PM, in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol wit three other police officers, all in uniform, along Quezon Boulevard, in Quiapo near the Mercury Drug store in Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim looking men posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard. It was said that the men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu positioned themselves and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. When the police approached one group, they all ran in different directions. As policemen gave chase, Yu caught and apprehended the petitioner. Yu found fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner’s “front waist line”. Yu’s companion apprehended one Abdul Casan from whom a caliber revolver was recovered. Yu added that he conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in Plaza Miranda. Yu also recognized the petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise in Plaza Miranda, he say petitioner and two others detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petition and his companions. He also admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Blvd. When he saw them on 27 August. It was the contention of them petitioner that he merely went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air when policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The police searched petitioner and two other men but found nothing in their possession. Trial court ruled that the warrantless search was akin to a stop and frisk where a warrant and seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an 66 As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. Dural was also promptly placed under the judicial custody. In the case of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple and Vicky Ocaya their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found with unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught inflagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantino and the other by Benito Tiarnzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location mid the names of Renato Constantino and Benito Tiamzon as residents. Also, there were several circumstances which confirmed the belief of the military agents: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantino, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities. As in the case of Nazareno, the court held that the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. Petition was denied. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 arrest and whose purpose is either to maintain status quo while police seeks to obtain more information. Issue: W/N there was a valid search. Decision: NO. There are serious doubts surrounding the story of the police officer. For one, the grenade that was supposedly found in Malacat’s possession was not identified in court. Second, if indeed the petitioner had a grenade with him and that two days earlier he was in a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and fellow officers chased but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his companions were in uniform, and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was unnatural that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. The search was invalid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that arrest without warrant is lawful if a police officer or private person, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (in flagrante delicto) (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (hot pursuit arrest) (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped. Valid warrantless searches are limited to: 1) customs searches; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view: 4) consent searches; 5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest and 6) stop and frisk. The trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk. It was noted that the trial court confused the concept of stop and frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In the latter, a precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. In this instance, the law requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before search can be made. In the present case, there can be no valid flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. The search was neither within the allowable scope of a stop of frisk for such is limited to protective search of outer clothing for weapons. While in a stop and frisk, probable cause is not required, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions. Vena V. Verga In the case at bar, stop and frisk was invalid for: 1) there are doubts as to Yu’s claim that the petitioner was member of the group which attempted to bomb plaza Miranda, 2) there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonable elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving fast which is hardly recognizable considering that it was already 6:30PM, and 3) there were no bulges to even indicate the hidden weapon inside the front waistline. The challenged decision was set aside. PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE G.R. No. 87059 22 June 1992 Facts: Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless search. On August 8, 1987, the western police district received a call from an informer that there were two suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was then dispatched. The officers observed two men looking from side to side, one of whom was holding his abdomen. The police approached them and identified themselves, the two men tried to run away but to no avail. They were then searched and on Mengote a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with 6 live bullets was found. They were turned over to the police headquarters. It was found that the gun was owned by a certain Rigoberto Danganan who identified the gun as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery of his house in Malabon. Accused assails the admissibility of the revolver in evidence because of its warrantless seizure. Solicitor General contends that Mengote’s acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed. Issue: W/N the search and seizure as well as the arrest was lawful. Decision: The requirements for a warrantless arrest were not satisfied in this instance. At the time of the arrest, Mengote was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence for what offense could have been committed by such unsinister acts. Mengote was arrested at 11:30 AM and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows nor was any clandestine about his being on the street at that busy hour. Moreover, In the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the 67 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. This case is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicions other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. Par. 5(b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed. The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed an offense. All they had was hearsay information from the phone caller. As the arrest was illegal, the search incidental to it is likewise illegal and the item seized is not admissible in evidence. As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. As in the case of Burgos, it was reiterated that the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefore. Such personal knowledge is lacing in the case at bar. The arrest and the search being unlawful, the pistol cannot be admitted as evidence. Decision was reversed. PEOPLE vs. BURGOS 144 SCRA 1 (1986) DOCTRINE: Arrest without warrant is lawful when persons who have committed, are actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense in presence of arresting officer. In such cases, there can be no illegal detention. Rule allowing arrest without warrant is strictly construed. On the other hand, the usual cause of arbitrary detention is arrest without warrant. Facts: Ruben Burgos appeals to the court to reverse the ruling of the Lower court finding him guilty of illegal possession of firearms. Evidence shows that by virtue of intelligent information obtained by the constabulary stationed in Digos Davao, Burgos was arrested and his house searched without warrant for being an NPA member and committing subversive acts. Vena V. Verga Issue: W/N the arrest and the search were valid. Decision: No. The trial court justified the warrantless arrest saying that at the time of the arrest, the accused is committing a crime and therefore, the search was also valid as being incidental to a lawful arrest. However, the Supreme Court held that the police had no personal knowledge of the fact that indeed Burgos was committing a crime when he was arrested. Whatever knowledge they possessed was merely furnished by the informant. At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was plowing his field and was not even in possession of any forearm or subversive document. There is also no compelling reason for the police not to apply for a warrant of arrest or a search warrant. Under Section 6(a0 of Rule 112, the officer arresting a person who ahs just committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. Considering that the firearm and the subversive documents were found in violation of the right of Burgos, they cannot be admitted in court. Conviction of the lower court was reversed. PEOPLE vs. AMINNUDIN 163 SCRA 402 (1988) Facts: Accused appellant claims that his business was selling watches. He was arrested on June 25, 1984 shortly after disembarking from MV Wilcon 9. Based on the testimony of the police, they received a reliable tip two days before of a drug operation allegedly headed by the accused. He was already identified by name and the police knew exactly the date of his arrival. When Aminnudin descended from the plank, he was immediately arrested after an informer had pointed to him. His bag was found to contain three kilos of marijuana leaves. Issue: W/N the arrest was valid. Decision: No. There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the contention of the government, the appellant was not caught in flagrante delicto nor was a crime about o be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless search under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. There was expedience to support the authorities’ contention. They had at least 2 days to procure the warrant. The authorities knew exactly the name of the accused and the date of his arrival thus it would have been easy for them to persuade the judge that probable cause existed. Yet they did nothing. The present case cannot be categorized as a buy bust operation either since the culprit was not caught red handed. The accused was not committing any 68 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 crime when he was arrested. It was the authorities that determined probable cause in this case and not the judge. Mere information or tip is not enough. Accused was acquitted. PEOPLE vs. YUMANG 222 SCRA 119 (1993) Facts: On February 25, 1990, an informer reported to Kalookan Police that accused appellant Gilberto Yumang was selling marijuana along Buklod ng Nayon st. in Kalookan. They immediately planned a buy bust operation. When the team headed to the place, Garcia, approached Yuman and asked to buy marijuana cigarettes. Yuman handed him three sticks and unfolded them exposing the marijuana leaves inside. Garcia immediately arrested Yumang. The three sticks were marked by Garcia with his initials and submitted for examination. Issue: W/N there was a valid search. Decision: A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. The idea to commit the crime originates from the accused and nobody induces him to commit the offense. The buy bust operation was formed to test the veracity of the tip. Having caught the culprit red-handed, the peace officers are authorized to apprehend the accused. It ahs not been shown that the officers had ulterior motive that prompted them to verify the false claim. The decision finding the appellant guilty was affirmed. HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO G.R. L-82544 28 June 1988 Facts: Andrew Harvey and John Sherman are both American nationals while Adriaan Van Den Elshout is a Dutch citizen. They were residing in Pagsanjan, Laguna where they were apprehended by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. On March 07 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of the Immigration Act and the Revised Administrative Code. Seized during their arrests were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against them and warrants of arrest were subsequently issued. Petitioners contend that the arrests, searches and seizures were unlawful as the CID agents did not have valid warrants. Issue: W/N the arrest, search and seizure were invalid. Vena V. Verga Decision: No. The arrests of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for 3 months during which their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of articles, which were then seized as incident to a lawful arrest, and thus, admissible in evidence. Records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988. A hearing was conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. That petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman naked. Under those circumstances, the agents had reasonable ground to believe that petitioners had committed pedophilia defined as psychosexual pervasion involving children. Further, the issuance of warrants of arrests by the CID commissioner, did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should be deported. They were issued for violation of the immigration act and before that deportation proceedings had already been commenced against them. Arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a judge, does not extend to this case for probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. Petition was dismissed. RULE 114 BAIL I. Provisions and Notes Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. 69 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 A. Definition of Bail Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required. B. 1. 2. 3. 4. Forms of Bail corporate surety property bond cash deposit recognizance Recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before a court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial. transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. A. Bail as a matter of right C. • • Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. – All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions: (a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it; (b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of these Rules; (c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and (d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment. The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. – No person under detention by legal process shall be released or Vena V. Verga MTC: bail is a matter of right before or after conviction, regardless of the offense. RTC: bail is a matter of right before conviction, except for offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life sentence and the evidence of guilt is strong, in which case it is discretionary. After conviction, bail is a matter of discretion regardless of the offense. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court as long as the original record of the case has not been transmitted to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application should be addressed and resolved by the appellate court. Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court conviction the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be 70 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accuse, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment greater than 6 years, the prosecution may move for denial or cancellation of the bail of the accused, with notice to the accused, upon showing of the following circumstances: He is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion. Art. 14(9) RPC A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. 2 A person, after having convicted by final judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same 3 The offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty 4 The offender has already served out sentence for prior offenses. 2. The he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification. That he committed the offense while on probation, parole or conditional pardon That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 1. 5. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. Section 6. Capital offense defined. – A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the state of the criminal prosecution. Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. A. When is bail hearing required Bail hearing is mandatory when bail is a matter of discretion. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. Even if the prosecution is absent or refuses to present evidence, the court cannot grant bail without conducting a hearing. The court must first be convinced that the evidence does not warrant the denial of bail. Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. – The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors: (a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstance of the offense; (c) Penalty for the offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and health of the accused; (f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; 71 3. 4. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 (i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Excessive bail shall not be required. Section 10. Corporate surety. – Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. Section 11. Property bond, how posted. – A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Registry of Deeds if the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided therefore, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned. Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and detention. Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. – qualifications of sureties in a property bond shall be as follows: The Section 13. Justification of sureties. – Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the judge that he possesses the qualification prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. Section 15. Recognizance. – Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. – No bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide. When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines; (b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of undertaking; (c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded. In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution. Vena V. Verga Section. 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be 72 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, of if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal. Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. – In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. Section 19. Release on bail. – The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule. When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed. Section. 20. Increase or reduction of bail. – After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody. Vena V. Verga Section 21. Forfeiture of bail. – When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must: (a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his nonproduction; and (b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. Section 22. Cancellation of bail. – Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. Section 23. Arrest of accused surrendering the accused, the written authority endorsed on cause him to be arrested by a suitable age and discretion. out on bail. – For the purpose of bondsmen may arrest him or, upon a certified copy of the undertaking, police officer or any other person of An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. – No bail shall be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused 73 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. Section 25. Court supervision of detainees. – The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees. In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in their respective municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction therein. A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court Administrator which shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for more than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the cause for detention, and other pertinent information. Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. The order should contain a summary of the evidence presented and the reason for the denial, otherwise it shall be void. This is in order to safeguard the constitutional right to presumption of innocence and also because there is a need for clear grounds before a person can be denied of his liberty. Remedy of the court when there is possibility that a person will jump bail: 1. Increase the amount of bail 2. Require periodic reports of the accused to court 3. Warn him that the trial may proceed in absentia Duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed: 1. 2. 3. 4. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing or require him to submit his recommendation Conduct a hearing Decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. If evidence of guilt is strong, the petition should be denied. Guidelines in setting the amount of bail: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Financial ability of the accused Nature and circumstances of the offense Penalty for the offense Character and reputation of the accused Age and health of the accused Weight of evidence against the accused Probability of the accused appearing at the trial Forfeiture of other bail The fact that he was a fugitive from the law when arrested Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail Where should bail be filed: It may be filed with the court where the case is pending. In the absence of the judge thereof, bail may be filed with any RTC or MTC judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with and RTC of said place, or if no judge is available, with any MTC judge therein. But where bail is a matter of discretion or where the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, bail may only be filed in the court where the case is pending. 74 QUESTIONS: What is required of the judge who denies an application for bail? Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Any person in custody who is not yet charged may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. Remedy of the accused if he is denied bail: He should file a special civil action in the CA, not the SC within 60 days. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Nature and circumstance of the offense Penalty for the offense Character and reputation of the accused Age and health of the accused Weight of evidence against him Probability of his appearance in trail Forfeiture of their bonds by him If the accused is a fugitive from justice when arrested Pendency of other cases where he is also under bail. II. Connection to Constitutional Law Provisions and Cases SULE vs. BITENG In hearings for bail, what should be considered is the prima facie evidence and not the penalty. In capital offenses, bail would be granted only if the evidence of guilt were not strong. PADERANGA vs. CA One who is under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered to the jurisdiction of the court has a constitutional right to bail CHIN vs. GUSTILO Even if bail is a matter of right, there is still a need to give notice to the fiscal for him to attend the hearing for bail. B. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT SECTION 13: ALL PERSON, EXCCEPT THOSE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG SHALL BEFORE CONVICTION BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT SURETIES OR RELEASED ON RECOGNIZANCE AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED WVWN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED. EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED. A. RIGHT TO BAIL LAVIDES vs. CA Bail should be given before arraignment. Arraignment should not be made a condition to bail. PEOPLE vs. GAKO JR. Judge did not hold hearing, merely based his decision to grant bail from a medical certificate 9 months old. Bail is a matter of right with respect to persons charged with penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, when evidence is strong. Before a bail is granted, a hearing must be conducted in order to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong or not. YAP vs. CA Imposing bail in excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Setting the bail in the amount of the civil liability is excessive. FACTORS TO CONSIDERED IN SETTING THE AMOUNT OF BAIL (MAGSUCANG vs. BALGOS) 1. Financial ability of the accused PEOPLE vs. JUDGE DONATO Accused charged with rebellion. Compromise agreement is a valid waiver to the right to bail PEOPLE vs. MAPALAO An accused who escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waives any right to seek relief from the Court. C. EXCESSIVE BAIL DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE Vena V. Verga 75 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. A bail of one million is clearly excessive. CHU vs. DOLALOS Circular No. 8 which provides that bail should be set at Php 1000 for every year taking into consideration the maximum penalty for the offense is instructive not only to fiscals and their assistants but to the members of the bench as well. D. PERSONS NOT ENTITLED TO BAIL COMENDADOR vs. de VILLA A soldier under court martial does not enjoy the right to bail because of the different disciplinary structure of the military as well as their capability of causing havoc and chaos. PEOPLE vs. NITCHA If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial courts and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a matter of discretion on the part of the court. Bail must not be granted to accused during the pendency of his appeal because his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. GOVERNMENT OF US vs. PURGANAN Right to bail is not applicable in extradition proceedings. Constitutional bail is available only in criminal proceedings. Extradition, being sui generis and not a criminal proceeding, the accused therefore has no inherent right to bail. The following are exceptions to this rule: (1) applicant is not flight risk (2) there exists a special humanitarian reason. III. Case SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 443 Facts: Petitioner Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees an the legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime 2000, petitioner received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Php 200M through Chavit Singson. Petitioner received he donation worth the Foundation’s Vena V. Verga account. In 2000, Chavit Singson publicly accused President Estrada and his family members and friends of engaging in several illegal activities which triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the petitioner, Joseph Estrada and his son. On April 4, 2001, Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan Informations against the former president, one of which, for plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the accused including the petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. On 25 April 2001, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused. Arraignment was set on 27 January 2001. In the meantime, petitioner filed with Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for bail, which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. Petitioner’s co-accused Jinggoy Estrada filed a motion alleging that he was entitle to bail as a matter of right. During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner’s Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27 schedule. However, Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard BEFORE petitioner’s arraignment on 27 June. On June 1, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearing on the petitioner for bail considering that under Section 8, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence adduced during the hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The people further stress the it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he filed a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty, then there would be no need for him to file said petition. It is also the contention of the people that it is only during arraignment that the accused is informed of the precise charge against him. He must then be arraign first prior to bail hearings to prevent him from late on assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge considering that under section 8 of Rule 114, evidence presented during bail hearings are reproduce in the trial. Arraignment before bail hearings also diminished the possibility of accused’s flight since trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned. However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner filed with the information a motion to quash the amended information on the 76 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 grounds that as against him, the amended information does not allege a combination of series of over or criminal acts constitutive of plunder. According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the amended information was antithetical to his petition for bail. Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus. Issues: (a) (b) (c) (d) Decision: (a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the issue of whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in the petitioner’s case moot. Nonetheless, the court held that arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, this pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of liberty even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The case of Lavides must be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash. Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he had to choose between filing a motion to quash and thus delay his petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion to quash so that he can be arraign at once ad therefore be released on bail. Such would undermine the constitutional right of the accused. When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to Vena V. Verga death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail. (b) Court dins no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for the release of the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complain filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These tow relied have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic. (c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearing might be converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that joint hearings will save the court form having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the sate, including the prosecution but also that of the petitioner and the witnesses. In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is early to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further such evidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the case at bar, the case against former President Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail, the proceeding assumes completely different dimension. The proceeding will no longer be summary since the proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioner’s bail will be prejudicial to the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn 77 W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted. W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail. W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is mandatory W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus. Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 again committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail with the trial of the case against former president. (d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is charged with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under Section 8 of rule 114, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing must be conducted where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted ny the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid. However, there is no basis fir the issuance of the writ in the case at bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the same applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest. Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. B. Exceptions to the constitutional presumption of innocence: • Presumptions – If there is a reasonable connection between the fact presumed and the fact ultimately proven from such fact a. When an accountable public officer fails to account for funds or property that should be in his custody, he is presumed to be guilty of malversation; b. Persons in possession of recently stolen goods are presumed guilty of the offense in connection with the goods. • Self-Defense – One who invokes self-defense is presumed guilty. The burden of proving the elements of self-defense (unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent or repel it; lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the one defending himself) belongs to the accused. C. Definition of reverse trial Usually, the prosecution first presents its evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. But a reverse trial happens if the accused admits the killing but claims self-defense. He must first establish the elements of self-defense in order to overturn the presumption that he was guilty of the offense. (b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. (c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel. A. Requisites of a valid trial in absentia RULE 115 RIGHTS OF ACCUSED Codal Provision and Notes Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. A. Definition of right of presumption of innocence: The right means that the presumption must be overcome by evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt means that there is moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused. Conviction should be based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The significance of this is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Vena V. Verga I. 78 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 1. 2. 3. The accused has already been arraigned; He has been duly notified of the trial His failure to appear at the trial is unjustifiable. For practical reasons: The accused is likely to commit perjury if he were compelled to testify against himself. Persons who may invoke the right against self-incrimination, and time when they an invoke the right. 1. 2. An ordinary witness may invoke the right, but he may only do so as each incriminating question is asked. The accused himself may invoke the right, and unlike the ordinary witness, he may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. But, once the accused waives his right and chooses to testify in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined on matters covered in his direct examination. He cannot refuse to answer questions during cross-examination by claiming that the answer that he will give could incriminate him for the crime with which he was charged. However, if the question during cross-examination relates to a crime different from that with which he was charged, he can still invoke the right and refuse to answer. Note: It would depend whether or not an accused or witness can invoke the right against self-incrimination if he is asked about past criminality. If he can still be prosecuted for it, questions about past criminal liability are still covered by the protection of the right against self-incrimination. But if he cannot be prosecuted for it anymore, he cannot invoke the right. Rights of the accused in the matter of testifying or producing evidence Before the case is filed in Court but after he has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate free will the right to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected After the case is filed in court to refuse to be a witness not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal 79 • Right to be present at the trial be waived except in the following situations, where the presence of the accused at the trial is required: 1. 2. 3. Arraignment; During promulgation of judgment, except if it is for a light offense; When the presence of the accused at the trial is necessary for purposes of identification, unless he admits beforehand that he is the same person charged. (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to crossexamination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. Note: A testimony of a witness who testifies on his own behalf but refuses to be subjected to cross-examination will not be given weight. It will not have probative value because the prosecution was not given a chance to test the credibility of the testimony through cross-examination. (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. Scope of the right against self-incrimination The right against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion only and the compulsion to produce incriminating documents, papers, and chattels. It does not cover the compulsion to produce real or physical evidence using the body of the accused. Exception to the right against self-incrimination The right cannot be invoked when the State has the right to inspect documents under its police power, such as documents of corporations. Rationale for protecting the right against self-incrimination For humanitarian reasons: To prevent the State, with all its coercive powers, from extracting testimony that may convict the accused. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 to testify in his own behalf subject to cross-examination by the prosecution while testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate his for some crime other than that for which he is being prosecuted. Immunity statutes The immunity statutes are classified into two: 1. Use immunity statutes -- prohibits the use of a witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. (Therefore, the witness can still be prosecuted, but the compelled testimony cannot be used against him.) 2. Transactional immunity statutes -grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. (The witness cannot be prosecuted at all.) Examples are state witnesses and those who furnish information about violations of the Internal Revenue Code, even if they themselves offered bribes to the public official. Effect of the refusal of the accused to refuse to testify in his behalf As a general rule, the silence of the accused should not prejudice him. However, in the following cases, an unfavorable inference is drawn from the failure of the accused to testify: 1. 2. If the prosecution has already established a prima facie case, the accused must present proof to overturn the evidence of the prosecution. If the defense of the accused is alibi and he does not testify, the inference is that the alibi is not believable. Definition of right of confrontation It means that the accused can only be tried using those witnesses that meet him face to face at the trial who give testimony in his presence, with the opportunity to cross-examine them. Reasons for the right 1. 2. To allow the court to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying. To give the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in order to test their recollection and credibility. Note: the right of confrontation can be waived either expressly or impliedly. It is waived impliedly when an accused waives his right to be present at the trial. The right of confrontation may also be waived by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right to cross-examine. When the party was given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone, he is deemed to have waived the right. C. Effect when testimony of a witness who dies or becomes unavailable If the other party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness before he died or became unavailable, the testimony may be used as evidence. However, if the other party did not even have the opportunity to crossexamine before the subsequent death or unavailability of the witness, the testimony will have no probative value. (An opportunity to cross-examine is all that is necessary in order to allow the use of the testimony of the witness. There need not be an actual cross-examination, as long as there was an opportunity to do so.) (g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. A. Definition of right to compulsory process It is the right of the accused to have a subpoena and/or a subpoena duces tecum issued in his behalf in order to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of other evidence. Note: if a witness refuses to testify and his testimony is required, the court should order the witness to give bail or even order his arrest, if necessary. Failure to obey a subpoena amounts to contempt of court. 80 Note: DNA testing is not covered by the right against self-incrimination (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 B. Available only if: (1) (2) (3) (4) witness is really material he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtained the attendance of said witness The witness will be available at the time desired No similar evidence could be obtained • The right to speedy trial is violated when there are unjustified postponements of the trial, and a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried for no justifiable reason. right to a public trial means that anyone interested in observing the manner that a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. The trial should be public in order to prevent abuses that may be committed by the court to the prejudice of the defendant. Moreover, the accused is entitled to the moral support of his friends and relatives. The court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the evidence to be presented may be offensive to decency or public morals, or in rape cases, where the purpose of some persons in attending is merely to ogle at the parties. There is no violation of the right to a public trial if trial is held in the chambers of the judge since the public is not excluded from attending the trial. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegations and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. • Note: Trial in absentia is only allowed after arraignment, accused duly notified of the trial and absence is unjustified • (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. A. Definition of the right to speedy trial The right means that the trial should be conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexations, capricious, and oppressive delays. C. Speedy Trial Act and Circular 38-98 • • According to the Speedy Trial Act and Circular 38-98, arraignment and pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty should be held within 30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction of the person of the accused. In no case shall the entire period exceed 180 days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court Administrator. D. Remedy of an accused whose right to speedy trial is violated (i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. Note: • 1. 2. 3. 4. Note: File a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. (For purposes of double jeopardy, this has the same effect as an acquittal.) This must be done prior to trial, or else, it is deemed a waiver of the right to dismiss. File for mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information. If he is restrained of his liberty, file for habeas corpus. Ask for the trial of the case. • • The right to appeal is a statutory right and not a fundamental one, except in the case of the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court granted by the Constitution. Anyone who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules. it can be waived expressly or impliedly. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. II. Constitutional Law Notes • The limitation is that the State should not be deprived of its day in court. The right of the State/the prosecution to due process should be respected. Rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions 1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt; 81 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment; To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to crossexamination on matters covered by direct examination; To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself; To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial; To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf; To have a speedy, impartial, and public trial; To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. Right to counsel during custodial investigation and the right to counsel during the trial Right to counsel during custodial investigation The right to counsel can only be waived in writing AND with the assistance of counsel. The counsel required in custodial investigation is competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own (the suspect’s) choice. The requirement is stricter during custodial investigation because of danger that confessions will be extracted against the will of the defendant Right to counsel during the trial The right to counsel means the right to effective counsel. Two aspects of due process: 1. 2. Substantive due process – this refers to the intrinsic validity of the law Procedural due process – one that hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial and based on the evidence presented therein. There is no need for trial-type proceedings in order to satisfy due process. What is important is that there was an opportunity to be heard. Notice and hearing are the minimum requirements of due process. Trial is in public thus, the danger does not exist. During trial the purpose of counsel is not so much to protect him from being forced to confess but to defend the accused • • • Right to counsel afforded during trial because it is embraced in the right to be heard. The right to counsel may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. However, it can also be waived. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to counsel when he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court and proceeds with his defense. But in US v. Escalante and People v. Nang Kay, the Court held that defendant cannot raise the question of his right to have an attorney for first time on appeal. If the question is not raised in the trial court, prosecution may go to trial. The question will not be considered in appellate court for the first time when the accused fails to raise it in lower court. the the the the the Requirements of procedural due process (in general): 1. 2. 3. 4. There must be an impartial and competent court with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceeding; The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. Requirements of procedural due process (in criminal cases) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The accused must have been heard by a court of competent jurisdiction; He must have been proceeded against under orderly processes of the law; He may be punished only after inquiry and investigation; There must be notice to the accused; The accused must be given an opportunity to be heard; Judgment must be rendered within the authority of a constitutional law. • • The duty to appoint counsel-do-oficio is mandatory only up to arraignment. As a rule, the mistake of counsel binds the client. Therefore, the client cannot question a decision on the ground that counsel was an idiot. However, an exception to this is if counsel misrepresents himself as a lawyer, and he turns out to be a fake lawyer. In this case, the accused is entitled to a new trial because his right to be represented by a member of the bar was violated. He was thus denied of his right to counsel and to due process. 82 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 • The right of choice must be reasonably exercised. The accused cannot insist on counsel that he cannot afford, one who is not a member of the bar, or one who declines for a valid reason, such as conflict of interest. Also, the right of the accused to choose counsel is subject to the right of the state to due process and to speedy and adequate justice. The accused can defend himself in person only if the court is convinced that he can properly protect his rights even without the assistance of counsel. Cases SIQUOIN VS. PEOPLE 171 SCRA 223 (1989) filed a petition for change of venue with the SC, however, on the date set for the hearing of the petitioner’s urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear. Even the counsel of the petitioner admitted that he lost contact with his client when the latter went abroad. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented in the prosecution. PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA 276 SCRA 166 (1997) Facts: The victim Masangkay, Romeo Ortega, and several others were in a drinking spree when Masangkay excused himself in order to answer the call of nature. Benjamin Ortega followed him. Thereafter, the witnesses heard shouts of help coming from Masangkay. One of the witnesses, Quitlong testified that when he reached the scene of the crime, he saw Benjamin, profusely stabbing Masangkay. Several others went to fetch Benjamin’s father. Romeo Ortega went to the scene in order to pacify his brother. Quitlong further testified that he saw Ortega, Masangkay and their brother in law Garcia lift the victim and throw his body inside a well. The three then threw heavy stones at the body to prevent it for resurfacing. The defendants however contend that Masangkay was the first one who attacked Ortega and that the latter was merely defending himself against the former. Garcia on the other hand contends that Masangkay was already dead when he assisted Ortega, hence, he should only be liable as an accessory. Issue: W/N Ortega is guilty of mere homicide. W/N Garcia should be acquitted. • III. Facts: Isabela Mayor Manuel Siquoin was charged with falsification of public document for signing a false document appointing Jesusa Carreon to the position of clerk in the office of he Municipal Secretary and stating that such position exists and with available funds when in fact, there was no such position nor available funds allocated from the budget. Carreon filed the complaint when she did not receive her salaries for several months. The trial court found the petitioner guilty of falsification of public documents, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, this appeal. It was the contention of the accused that he was deprived of due process when the trial proceeded in hi absence despite a pending petition for change of venue which he filed with the Supreme Court. Issue: W/N there was deprivation of due process. Decision: Petitioner was afforded with due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case already. It is a basic postulate in aw that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only published after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. There was no denial of due process when an accused was afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. It is true that he Vena V. Verga Decision: Ortega should be liable for homicide only and not murder. The court noted that the victim Masangkay six-footer while Ortega was only five feet and five inches tall. The accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the testimony or circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength, hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide. With regards Garcia, it is true that Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI showed that tie victim at the time he was thrown to the well, a still alive, and that he died of drowning as evidenced by the muddy particles in the stomach and air tract of the victim. The drowning was the direct, natural, and logical consequence of 83 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 the felony that Appellant Garcia had intended to commit. However, in spite of the evidence showing that appellant Garcia would be held liable as principal in the crime of homicide. There are two obstacles barring his conviction, even as an accessory. The information accused appellant Garcia of attacking, assaulting and stabbing repeatedly with appointed weapon on the different parts of the body of Masangkay. The prosecution’s evidence shows that Garcia has nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetuated by Ortega, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. He shall have the right to be informed and cause of the accusation again him, to have a speedy trial, impartial, to meet witness face to face. Also, Garcia can enjoy the exemption provided for in Article 19 and 20 of the civil code being the brother in law of the principal Ortega. Thus, he must be acquitted. BORJA VS MENDOZA 77 SCRA 422 (1977) Facts: Manuel Borja was accused of slight physical injuries. The city court of Cebu proceeded the trial in absentia due to his failure to appear in the hearing and Borja without being arraigned. The court found him guilty. The CFI affirmed it without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum. Petitioner contended that the failure to arraign him violates his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him and his right to be heard and counsel. The Solicitor-General agreed that the procedural defect would render void the city court decision. Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process. Decision: Arraignment is an indispensable means for bringing the accused into court and informing him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The accused should also be given the right to be heard by himself and counsel. After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. Further, the absence of arraignment can be invoked at anytime in Vena V. Verga view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. In the case, petitioner was denied due process. He was not informed of the accusation against him via an arraignment. The case is remanded for trial with the observance of due process starting with an arraignment. MARCOS VS. RUIZ 213 SCRA 177 (1992) Facts: After the preliminary investigation, the Acting Asst City Fiscal Lopena filed two informations with the Bohol RTC against Bienvenido Marcos for violating BP 22 when he delivered to Fulgencio Oculam two checks in the amount of P3,000 each in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry taken by petitioner’s wife Anacleta Marcos knowing that he did not have sufficient funds. Petitioner posted a surety bond for his temporary liberty. The arraignment was reset due to the withdrawal of petitioner’s lawyer. However, petitioner settled his obligation with the offended party who executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of the desistance. Two cases were filed. In one of the cases, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared in the hearing, but the court received a telegram from petitioner’s wife that petitioner was indisposed. The arraignment was then rescheduled without any objections. In the arraignment, petitioner together with his counsel pleaded not guilty they were notified in open court of the trial of the case. But, both did not appear during the trial. The court then forfeited the bond of petitioner, accepted the evidence of the prosecution and submitted the case for decision. Thereafter, the court received a motion from petitioner via registered mail for the resetting of the case. The counsel alleged that they believed that the hearing would not proceed due to the desistance of the offended party and the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal Lopena. Both motion as well as the Motion for Reconsideration were denied. Both motions did not contain a notice of hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal. A notice of promulgation of sentence was then sent to the parties in the two cases. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N petitioner was denied the right to confront the witnesses of the prosecution and to be heard. W/N the judge erred in forfeiting the bond. Decision: The judge abused his discretion when he ordered the forfeiture of the bond despite the absence of the accused. Due notice should be given to the bondsman to produce the accused before the court but there is no showing that such was complied with. 84 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The accused is required to personally enter his plea. In the case, this did not happen. Hence, there was no valid arraignment in one of the criminal cases. The motion for resetting was a mere scrap of paper because it did not contain a notice of hearing to the Prosecution which is a violation of Section 5, rule 115 of the Rules of Court. Without such notice, it is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and should not have been received by the clerk. The judge abused his discretion when he considered one of the criminal case because there was no valid arraignment. He thus disregarded Sec 2c of Rule 114 and Sec 1c of Rule 115, which merely consider the accused’s nonappearance during the trial -- in this case, April 8-- as a waiver if his right to be present for trial and not for the succeeding trial dates. The absence of the accused without notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present on that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. GIMENEZ vs. NAZARENO 160 SCRA 1 (1988) Facts: Private respondent Teodoro de la Vega and 5 others were charged with the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973, all the accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty. Following the arraignment. The respondent Nazareno set the hearing of the case the following month. But before the scheduled date of hearing, de la Vega escaped detention and failed to appear in court. The fiscals filed a motion to continue hearing the case and de la Vega be tried in absentia. The lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but gave the respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. The lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. Petitioners filed a Motion for reconsideration questioning the above-mentioned decision, hence this petitioner. It was the contention of the respondent court that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega was lost when he escaped and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over is person is reacquired. Vena V. Verga Issue: W/N the court lost its jurisdiction when the prisoner escaped from detention. Decision: The lowered acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accusedprivate respondent when he appeared during the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused respondent did in this case. Jurisdiction, once acquired is no lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of law. A valid trial in absentia has the following requisite: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and hi failure to do so is unjustified. The respondent was validly arraigned and he escaped. The lower court therefore correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of the private respondent. But it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon termination of the trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the one who escaped to finally decide to appear. The contention of the judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him I untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Therefore, no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By the failure of the accused to appear, he waived his rights to cross examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Such rights are personal right but may be waived. There was valid trial in absentia in this case. The judge should have proceeded with the decision. SAYSON vs. PEOPLE 166 SCRA 680 (1988) Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document. Sayson, who was known as “Fiscal Perez” was 85 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 introduced to Anselmo Aguiling, secretary of Ernesto Rufino of Mever Films. He then presented a Bank of America check in the amount of $2,250.00 payable to the order of Atty. Perez to be exchanged for Pesos. Mever Films readily prepared a checking the amount of Php 14,850.00. Sayson then went to Banco Filipino where he opened an account, using the check given by Mever as deposit. The check (dollar) turned out to be one of the drafts surreptitiously taken from a shipment to Bank of America. Mever ordered to stop payment and Sayson was charged with Estafa. Appellant raised the issue of due process alleging denial of his right to be heard and to present evidences. It turned out that after arraignment and the prosecution was able to present evidence, the defense postponed the case several times. At the hearing on December 09, 1974, when the defense was scheduled to present evidences, only the petitioner appeared. He said that his counsel had another case in a different court. In the morning of the said day the lawyer of Sayson sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation of the hearing because he was sick. The court denied the motion for postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision without petitioner’s evidence. The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty as charged contending that the petitioner waived his right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence. Issue: W/N there was a waiver on the part of the appellant. Decision: No. While the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant, such right is not except form the rule on waiver as log as the waiver is not contrary to law. In the case at bar, there was a valid waiver. First of all, the petitioner’s motion was not seasonably filed as the three-day notice required by the rules of court was not complied with. Moreover, it was not accompanied by an affidavit nor a medical certificate to support the allege illness of counsel contrary to Rule 22, Section 5 of the rules of court which mandates that postponement on the ground of illness may be granted if it appears upon affidavit that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable. The conflicting stories advanced by the petitioner and his counsel only indicate the lack of good cause for the postponement. Two circumstances that should be taken into account in granting a motion for postponement: the reasonableness of the postponement and the merits of the case of the movant. Both circumstances were not presented by the petitioner thus, there can be no abuse of discretion on the part of the court. Vena V. Verga Moreover, petitioner’ plea that it was incumbent upon the trial court to appoint a counsel de officio for him is utterly without merit. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de officio is mandatory only at the time of the arraignment. This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense, he appears by himself alone and the absence of the counsel is inexcusable. The petitioner’s failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the time of the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponement and warning that failure to do so would be deemed a waiver of his right to present his evidence and the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA 242 SCRA 565 (1995) Facts: Maqueda was one of the accused in the slaying of Horace William Barker, a World Bank consultant and battery of his wife, Teresita. The spouses were living at Tuba Benguet. In the morning of 27 August 1991, Richard Severino, the spouses’ former houseboy, entered the house of the spouses and tried to strangle one of the maids. The commotion woke up Teresita. When she went down and saw Severino and another unknown person, the former house boy beat her up. According to the two househelps, they heard William begging the two accused to stop beating his wife. When the two had courage to go out from their hiding room, they asked for help. When they returned to the house with the authorities, they saw the dead body of William. The authorities rushed Teresita to the hospital where she was comatose for two days. Authorities concluded that the main motive of the accused was to rob the victims. Two other witnesses testified that they saw the two accused. One of the witnesses said that one of the accused had an amputated hand. This, together with the other descriptions given by the other witnesses fit the accused Hector Maqueda alias “putol” Maqueda contends that on the day of the crime, he was in Quezon City working in a polvoron factory. Records show that after being informed of his rights, Maqueda signed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house. Maqueda also filed a motion to Grant Bail stating that he was willing to be a state witness. Prosecutor Zarate asked the Maqueda whether he was in the company of Salvamante. Upon giving an affirmative answer, the prosecutor denied the motion. The owner of the factory contended that it was impossible for Maqueda to have worked in his 86 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 shop when it was only on 30 August when he opened his shop. The trial court admitted the statement of the accused although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the statement was not therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Issue: W/N the statement of Maqueda should be admitted Decision: the exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed under Section 12 (1) Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at the stage when a person is “under investigation for the commission of an offense”. The court did recognize that once a criminal complaint or information has been filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge (Section 3 and 4 Rule 113) and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he was charged. If nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1) Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. MUTUC VS CA 190 SCRA 43 (1990) FACTS: The 4th division of the CA promulgated a resolution fixing the amount of the bond for the provisional release of Fortunato Medina pending his appeal before the said court. The appellee filed a MR. The Solicitor-General filed an opposition in Manila which was actually received in Baguio City when the 4 th division was holding session there. The MR was denied. But, before the CA could act on his MR, a news article attributed to Atty Amelito Mutuc, counsel of record of appellee, appeared in the Manila Times wherein Mutuc hit the Appeals Court ruling in denying Medina’s release without posting bail since he is a pauper and that his detention is illegal as found by the lower court. In the said news item, Mutuc advised Medina to escape from confinement. The SolicitorGeneral inquired if Mutuc did really made such advice and the latter affirmed and further said that he is willing to be imprisoned and disbarred. The 4 th division required Mutuc several times to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt but to no avail. Mutuc sought the inhibition of the members of the division but was denied. Hence, this petition. Vena V. Verga ISSUE: W/N petitioner was deprived of due process. DECISION: Due process does not always and in all situations require a trialtype proceeding. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal agreements in court. One may also be heard through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. Hence, petitioner cannot allege lack of due process since he was given ample time to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law in all the four questioned resolutions. RULE 116 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA I. Provisions and Notes Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. (c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. 87 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 (e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment. (f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill or particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period. A. How and when arraignment is made The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint was filed or assigned for trial. It is made: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information reading it in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. However, in the following cases, the accused should be arraigned with a shorter period: 1. Where the complainant is about to depart from the Philippines with no definite date of return, the accused should be arraigned without delay and his trial should commence within 3 days from arraignment. The trial of cases under the Child Abuse Act requires that the trial should be commenced within 3 days from arraignment. When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within 3 days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within 10 days from the date of the raffle. 2. 3. • B. The lawyer of the accused cannot enter a plea for him. The accused must personally enter his plea. Importance of arraignment: • • Arraignment is the means for bringing the accused into court and informing him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. During arraignment, he is made fully aware of possible loss of freedom or life. He is informed why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. It is necessary in order to fix the identity of the accused, to inform him of the charge, and to give him an opportunity to plead. C. Duplicitousness of information The judge has no obligation to point out the duplicitousness or any other defect in an information during arraignment. The obligation to move to quash a defective information belongs to the accused, whose failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to object. D. Defects: when a person is tried without being arraigned first The failure of the court to arraign a person before trial was conducted does not prejudice his rights since he was able to present evidence and cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution during trial. The error was cured by the subsequent arraignment. E. Presumption that there was an arraignment • • • • The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. If the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. If the accused pleads guilty and establishes self-defense, the court should withdraw the plea and enter a plea of not guilty. The general rule is that the accused should be arraigned within 30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period. In view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, it can be presumed that a person accused of a crime was arraigned, in the 88 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 absence of proof to the contrary. However, the presumption of regularity is not applied when the penalty imposed is death. When the life of a person is at stake, the court cannot presume that there was an arraignment; it has to be sure that there was one. Note: The accused is not entitled to know in advance the names of all of the prosecution witnesses. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if this right were granted to the accused. The witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coercion. The right time for the accused to know their identities is when they take the witness stand. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. F. When a person pleads guilty When an accused pleads guilty, it does not necessarily follow that he will be convicted. Additional evidence independent of the guilty plea may be considered by the judge to ensure that the plea of guilt was intelligently made. The totality of evidence should determine whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. A. Plead guilty to a lesser offense At arraignment, the accused may plead guilty to a lesser offense, which is necessarily included in the offense charged, provided that the offended party and the prosecutor give their consent. After arraignment BUT BEFORE TRIAL, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, after he withdraws his plea of not guilty. In such a case, the complaint or information need not be amended. When the penalty imposable for the offense is at least 6 years and 1 day or a fine exceeding P12,000, the prosecutor must first submit his recommendation to the City or Provincial Prosecutor or to the Chief State Prosecutor for approval. If the recommendation is approved, the trial prosecutor may then consent to the plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Question: X was charged with murder and entered a plea of guilty. He was later allowed to testify in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. At the trial, he presented evidence to prove that he acted in complete self-defense. The court acquitted him. Later, X was again charged with physical injuries. X invoked double jeopardy. Can X be prosecuted again for physical injuries? X can again be prosecuted for physical injuries. There was no double jeopardy. In order for double jeopardy to attach, there must have been a valid plea to the first offense. In this case, the presentation by X of evidence to prove complete self-defense had the effect of vacating his plea of guilt. When the plea of guilt was vacated, the court should have ordered him to plead again, or at least should have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Because the court did not do this, at the time of the acquittal, there was actually no standing plea for X. Since there was no valid plea, there can be no double jeopardy. Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. – At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. Vena V. Verga Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. – When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. A. Court’s action when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense The court should: 1. 2. conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness comprehension of the consequences of the plea. and full require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt and the precise degree of culpability of the accused for the purpose of imposing the proper penalty. ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 3. Note: A plea of guilty results in the admission of all the material facts in the complaint or information, including the aggravating circumstances. Because of this, the court should only accept a clear, definite, and unconditional plea of guilty. Plea of guilty be considered a mitigating circumstance if made before the prosecution starts to present evidence 89 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 B. Meaning of “Searching inquiry” In all cases, the judge must convince himself: (1) that the accused is entering the plea of guilty voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) that he is truly guilty and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt based on his testimony. In addition, the judge must inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment and the certainty that he will serve it at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. The judge must dispel any false notion that the accused may have that he will get off lightly because of his plea of guilt. Questions: A. Is it mandatory for the prosecution to present proof of aggravating circumstances? Yes. It is mandatory in order to establish the precise degree of culpability and the imposable penalty. Otherwise, there is an improvident plea of guilty. B. Can a court validly convict an accused based on an imprudent plea of guilty? Yes. If there is adequate evidence of the guilt of the accused independent of the improvident plea of guilty, the court may still convict the accused. The conviction will be set aside only if the plea of guilt is the sole basis of the judgment. Section 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence, discretionary. – When the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. Note: • Court’s action when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense: The court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. Unlike in a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the reception of evidence in this case is not mandatory. It is merely discretionary on the court. • Generally, a plea of guilty cannot be attacked if it is made voluntarily and intelligently. It can only be attacked if it was induced by threats, misrepresentation, or bribes. When the consensual character of the plea is called into question or when it is shown that the defendant was not fully apprised of its consequences, the plea can be challenged. Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty.– At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty. Note: • The withdrawal of the plea of guilty is not a matter of strict right to the accused but is within the discretion of the court. The reason for this is that trial has already commenced; withdrawal of the plea will change the theory of the case and will put all of the past proceedings to waste. Therefore, it may only be withdrawn with permission of the court. • Moreover, there is a presumption that the plea was made voluntarily. The court must decide whether the consent of the accused was, in fact, vitiated when he entered his plea. • A qualified plea (ex. the accuse says “hindi ko sinasadya”) is equivalent to a plea of not guilty. In order to be valid, the plea of guilty must be unconditional Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him. A. Action of the court when a defendant appears without an attorney during arraignment: The court has a four-fold duty: 1. 2. 3. 4. B. C. It must inform the defendant that he has a right to an attorney before being arraigned; After informing him, the court must ask the defendant if he desires to have the aid of an attorney; If he desires and is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to defend him; If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Reason for this four-fold duty: The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Effect of the failure of the court to comply with these duties: It is a violation of due process. Vena V. Verga 90 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Section 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused. A. Definition of counsel de oficio But during trial, there is no such duty. The accused must ask for a lawyer, or else, the right is deemed waived. He can even defend himself personally. • An accused be validly represented by a non-lawyer at the trial. If the accused knowingly engaged the services of the non-lawyer, he is bound by the non-lawyer’s actions. But if he did not know that he was being represented by a non-lawyer, the judgment is void because of the misrepresentation. Duties of the pubic attorney if the accused assigned to him is imprisoned 1. He shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner, requiring such person to advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial. Upon receipt of that notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. It at anytime thereafter, the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney. Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial. When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of the trial, the prisoner shall be made available accordingly. Counsel de oficio is counsel appointed by the court to represent and defend the accused in case he cannot afford to employ one himself. The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise shall appoint as counsel de oficio: 1. 2. such members of the bar in good standing who by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. C. 2. But, in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person who is: 1. 2. B. a resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability to defend the accused. 3. 4. Difference between the duty of the court to appoint counsel de oficio during arraignment and during trial During arraignment, the court has the affirmative duty to inform the accused of his right to counsel and to provide him with one in case he cannot afford it. The court must act on its own volition, unless the right is waived by the accused. On the other hand, during trial, it is the accused who must assert his right to counsel. The court will not act unless the accused invokes his rights. Note: • A non-lawyer cannot represent the accused during arraignment. During arraignment, it is the obligation of the court to ensure that the accused is represented by a lawyer because it is the first time when the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This is a task which only a lawyer can do. Section 8. Time for counsel de officio to prepare for arraignment. – Whenever a counsel de office is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment. Section 9. Bill of particulars. – The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired. A. Definition of bill of particulars Vena V. Verga 91 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 • It is a more specific allegation. A defendant in a criminal case who believes or feels that he is not sufficiently informed of the crime with which he is charged and not in a position to defend himself properly and adequately could move for a bill or particulars or specifications. What it should contain and purpose Its purpose is to allow the accused to prepare for his defense. The accused must move for a bill of particulars before arraignment. Otherwise, the right is deemed waived It should specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired. him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. A. Grounds for suspending arraignment 1. If the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition, which renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. The court should order his mental examination and his confinement, if necessary. If there exists a prejudicial question. If a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending either at the DOJ or the Office of the President. However, the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the petition for review. B. • • • Section 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. – Upon motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, object, or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies. A. Right to modes of discovery It is the right of the accused to move for the production or inspection or material evidence in the possession of the prosecution. It authorizes the defense to inspect, copy, or photograph any evidence of the prosecution in its possession after obtaining permission of the court. The purpose is to prevent surprise to the accused and the suppression or alteration of evidence. It is available during preliminary investigation in order to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty, and property. (Webb v. de Leon) B. 2. 3. Test to determine whether the insanity of the accused should warrant the suspension of the proceedings • The test is whether the accused will have a fair trial with the assistance of counsel, in spite of his insanity. Not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify suspension. II. Cases MAGSUCANG VS. BALGOS 398 SCRA 158 (2003) Facts: Pepito Lim, owner of Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a complaint for qualified theft against complainant’s daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, for misappropriating P11,200 with grave abuse of confidence. The respondent judge who conducted the PI issued a warrant of arrest and set the bail at P30,000. Rosalie was arrested but complainant posted bail for his daughter. Later, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Lim. After PI, warrants of 92 • • Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 arrest were issued and bail set at P24,000. Complainant had no money to post bail. Complainant faults judge for the irregularities in the PI when the judge administered the oath to Lim and having sent Rosalie to prison without hearing, and for requiring excessive bail. A letter-complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator. The judge maintained that he followed the procedure in filing criminal complaints. He further said that he found probable cause to hold her liable for 8 counts of qualified theft. The Court Administrator found the judge innocent of the charges except as to the excessive bail. Issue: W/N the judge abused his discretion in granting excessive bail. Decision: The charges on bias and partiality were not substantiated by the complainant. They were mere allegations, which were not supported by evidence to prove that the judge overstepped the parameters of his prerogative. A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function unless overcome by convincing evidence to the contrary. The judge did grant excessive bail. The judge failed to consider that Rosalie is illiterate, the daughter of a poor fisherman and has very limited financial ability to post bail. In fixing bail at P24,000, it is clear that he disregarded the guidelines provided in the Rules of Court. The excessive bail only means that her provisional liberty would be beyond her reach. PEOPLE vs. OSTIA 398 SCRA 132 (2003) Facts: Roberto Ostia was convicted of murder for the slaying of a four-yearold child. According to a witness, he saw Robert, with the victim Beverly, perched on his right shoulder walking towards the direction of the poblacion. When the child failed to return home, her parents asked the assistance of the authorities. The body of Beverly was found in a grassy area. According to the medico-legal report, the child was raped and that her death was due to hemorrhage. During the arraignment, Roberto pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape with homicide. Upon talking to his counsel de officio, he agreed to plead guilty to murder, which was a lesser offense. The accused was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty to the crime of murder. He was assisted by his counsel and the information was read and translated to him in the waray dialect. He was also Vena V. Verga informed that as a result of his plea of guilt, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information which were already read and translated to him. The judge rendered a decision finding Roberto guilty and sentencing the penalty of death. Roberto appealed the Supreme Court contending that the lower court erred in convicting him of the crime of murder despite hi improvident plea of guilty, in violation of Section 3, Rule 116 of the rules of court. Issue: W/N the court erred in accepting the plea of guilty without conducting searching inquiries as provided for in Section 3, Rule 116. Decision: Section 3 of rule 116 provides that when the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense the trial court is mandated to: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntaries thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe with fealty the said rule commits grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, it was proven that the accused did not even know how to read or write. The trial court failed to explain to the accused the nature of the crime of murder nor even asked his reasons for changing his plea. No searching questions were asked, thus the judge abused his discretion. Nonetheless, as held in the case of People vs. Jabien. Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, such plea loses its significance. However, even without considering the plea, he may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. Such is true in the case at bar. Roberto was convicted by the SC but modified the penalty. PEOPLE vs. SOLAMILLO 404 SCRA 210 (2003) Facts: Solamillo and three others were convicted for the crime of robbery with homicide for the slaying of Alexander Guiroy, the proprietor of Liberty Bakery and Grocery, with whom the three worked as employees. The victim suffered 21 hack wounds. It was also found that around Php 20,000.00 was stolen by the accused together with the victim’s wallet and watch. 93 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 After the decision was rendered by the court convicting all the accused, Julian Solamillo appealed to the court sating that the court erred in disregarding his tacit withdrawal of his guilty plea during arraignment. He claims that policeman Bayabos threatened to kill him if he will pleat not guilty. Issue: W/N the plea should be disregarded. Decision: No. Section 5 of rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that at nay time before the judgment of conviction becomes final;, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty. There is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty or that he, in any manner manifested unequivocally that he was withdrawing his plea. His statement during the trial that he was threatened by Bayabos, is not a positive and categorical declaration that appellant Julian was withdrawing his plea of guilty. Without any unequivocal act on his part, the trial court could not assume the he was withdrawing his original plea. Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and subsequently withdrew it, such fact does not operate to automatically exculpate him from criminal liability. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. Whether or not the plea of guilty was improvident. Is inconsequential for the simple reason that his conviction was based on other evidence proving his culpability for the offense charged. PEOPLE VS. DY 395 SCRA 256 (2003) Facts: The accused Bryan Dy and Giovani Bernardino filed separate motions of reconsideration questioning the decision of the lower court finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Bernardino contends that they were not accorded their right to a fair, unbiased resolution of the preliminary investigation. He also questions the speedy manner by which the trial was conducted and the lack of arraignment stating that the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel. Thus the lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial. Vena V. Verga Issue: W/N there was violation of rights on the part of the appellants. Decision: None: The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. However, it is a different matter when it was the accused themselves who refused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. It was established that the accused refused to be arraigned, thus, it was not the court’s fault that no arraignment was held. The records show that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the proceedings might have been of short duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of each party to due process. The trial court should even be commended for conducting a speedy trial, which should be the rule, rather than the exception. What is the prime consideration is not the speed by which the trial was conducted but the matter by which the procedural and substantial requirement were complied with. The records show that these requirements were adequately met. PEOPLE vs. MAMARION 412 SCRA 438 (2003) Facts: Mamarion and several others were convicted of kidnapping with ransom for the kidnapping of Roberta Cokin, a wealthy business woman in Bacolod city. Roberta was kidnapped by the group after she attended a cockfight. A ransom of two-million was asked of her sister. However, the recovery operation of the NBI failed. They were only able to recover the 2M but not Roberta. Roberta was then found dead in a shallow grave. One of the accused Gale became the state witness and was allowed to plea on a lesser offense. The accused Mamarion questions the decision of the court allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense (slight illegal detention) in consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness. Issue: W/N the court erred in allowing Gale plead to a lesser offense. Decision: No. Gale was validly discharged as a state witness. Gale was allowed to change his plea pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2 Rule 116 of the Rules of court. As stated in the said rule, the accused with the consent of the offended part and the fiscal may be allowed by the trail court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charges or is cognizable by a curt of lesser jurisdiction. 94 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. Plea-bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trail stage of the criminal proceeding. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Such a situation is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court. The court did not err in allowing Gale to plead to a lesser offense since his testimony is crucial to the case at bar. RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH quash since it goes into the very competence of the court to pass upon the case. Section 3. Grounds. – The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law (duplicitous); That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (double jeopardy) 9. I. Provisions and Notes Section 1. Time to move to quash. – At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. Section. 2. Form and contents. – The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. A. Form required for a motion to quash 1. 2. 3. It must be in writing. It must be signed by the accused or his counsel. It must specify its factual and legal grounds. Note: • Matters of defense are generally not a ground for a motion to quash. They should be presented at the trial. • Denial of due process is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash. • A motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be based only on this ground. If other grounds are included, there is a waiver, and the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A. Meaning of the statement that “a motion to quash hypothetically admits allegations of fact in the information”. It means that the accused argues that assuming that the facts charged are true, the information should still be dismissed based on the ground invoked by the defendant. Therefore, since the defendant assumes that the facts in the information are true, only these facts should be taken into account when the court resolves the motion to quash. Other facts, such as matters of defense, which are not in the information should not be considered. Exceptions to this rule are when the grounds invoked to quash the information are extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. In these cases, additional facts are allowed. 95 Note: A court generally, cannot dismiss the case based on grounds that are not alleged in the motion to quash. The court cannot consider any ground other than those stated in the motion to quash. The exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. If this is the ground for dismissing the case, it need not be alleged in the motion to Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 B. Effect of an information that was signed by an unauthorized person It is a VALID information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. Thus, an infirmity in the information such as lack of authority of the officer signing it cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, express consent, or even amendment. C. Defendant enters his plea before filing a motion to quash Question A. While the case for adultery was being tried, X died. What happens to the criminal liability of X and Y? The criminal liability of X is extinguished. The criminal liability of Y subsists. The death of one of several accused will not be a cause for dismissal of the criminal action as against the other accused. B. What is the effect of the death of the offended party on the criminal liability of the accused? Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint or information is one against the state, involving peace and order, the death of the offended party before final conviction of the defendant will not abate the prosecution. Neither does the death of the offended party in private crimes abate the prosecution. By entering his plea before filing the motion to quash, the defendant waives FORMAL objections to the complaint or information. But if the ground for the motion is any of the following, there is no waiver. The ground may be raised at any stage of the proceeding: 1. 2. 3. 4. failure to charge an offense lack of jurisdiction over the offense extinction of criminal liability double jeopardy F. Distinctions between pardon and amnesty AMNESTY Political offenses PARDON Infractions of the peace (common crimes) An individual Not necessary Need for distinct acts of acceptance on the part of the pardonee Courts do not take judicial notice because it is a private act of the President. Therefore, it must be proved in court. Relieves the offender from the consequences of the offense (looks forward) Only after conviction 96 D. Extinction of criminal liability Under Article 89 of the RPC, criminal liability is extinguished by: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. E. death of the convict, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; service of sentence; amnesty; absolute pardon; prescription of the crime; prescription of the penalty; marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of the RPC. TYPE OF OFFENSE BENEFICIARY CONCURRENCE CONGRESS ACCEPTANCE OF Classes of persons Necessary Beneficiary need not accept Courts take judicial notice because it is a public act JUDICIAL NOTICE Partial extinction of criminal liability 1. 2. 3. Conditional pardon Commutation of sentence For good conduct, allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence EFFECT Abolishes the offense (looks backward) WHEN Vena V. Verga IT MAY BE Before or after Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 GRANTED prosecution by final judgment G. Effect of absolute pardon upon criminal liability Absolute pardon blots out the crime. It removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, such as the political rights of the accused. H. Effect of pardon by the offended party upon criminal liability As a general rule, pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal liability. Only civil liability is extinguished by express waiver of the offended party. However, pardon granted before the institution of the criminal proceedings in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness shall extinguish criminal liability. I. Effect of marriage of the offender with the offended party in private crimes It shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed. This applies even to co-principals, accomplices, and accessories. However, where multiple rape is committed, marriage of the offended party with one defendant extinguishes the latter’s liability and that of his accessories or accomplices for a single crime of rape cannot extend to the other acts of rape. Note: If the offender in rape is the legal husband of the offended party the subsequent forgiveness by the wife shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. But the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. J. Prescription a ground for a motion to quash This is meant to exhort the prosecution not to delay; otherwise, they will lose the right to prosecute. It is also meant to secure the best evidence that can be obtained. K. Prescriptive periods of crimes PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD 20 years 10 years Punishable by arresto mayor Libel or other similar offenses Oral defamation and slander by deed Light offenses 5 years 2 years 6 months 2 months Note: The accused can still raise prescription as a defense even after conviction. The defense cannot be waived. This is because the criminal action is totally extinguished by the expiration of the prescriptive period. The State thereby loses or waives its right to prosecute and punish it. The proper action for the court is to exercise its jurisdiction and to decide the case upon the merits, holding the action to have prescribed and absolving the defendant. The court should not inhibit itself because it does not lose jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the accused by prescription. L. Effect of prescription of the offense on the civil liability of the accused The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action to enforce civil liability arising from the offense charged, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. M. Courts action if the accused moves to quash the complaint or information on grounds that can be cured by amendment (duplicitous) The court should order that the amendment be made. N. Courts action if the accused moves to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense The court should give the prosecution the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or if, after it makes the amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the court should grant/sustain the motion to quash. O. Effect if a motion to quash is sustained OFFENSE Punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or reclusion temporal Punishable by other afflictive penalties Vena V. Verga 97 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 The court may order that another complaint or information be filed against the accused for the same offense, except if the ground for sustaining the motion to quash is either: 1. 2. extinguishment of the criminal liability of the accused, or double jeopardy. 2. 3. 4. 5. Court of competent jurisdiction Arraignment Valid plea The defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. The grant of a motion to quash on these two grounds is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made, or if no new information was filed within the time specified by the court, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged. P. Remedy of the accused if the court denies his motion to quash Note: For purposes of double jeopardy, a complaint or information is valid if it can support a judgment of conviction. It the complaint or information is not valid, it would violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. If he is convicted under this complaint or information, the conviction is null and void. If the conviction is null and void, there can be no first jeopardy. Questions: A. A crime was committed in Batangas but case was filed in Mindoro. When the prosecution realized that the complaint should have been filed in Batangas, it filed the case in Batangas. Can the accused invoke double jeopardy? No. The court in Mindoro had no jurisdiction; therefore, the accused was in no danger of being placed in jeopardy. The first jeopardy did not validly attach. B. X was charged with theft. On the day of the trial, the prosecution could not go to trial because important witnesses were unable to appear. Counsel for the accused moved to dismiss the case. The court dismissed the case provisionally. Subsequently, X was charged with theft again. Can X invoke double jeopardy? The accused cannot appeal an order overruling his motion to quash. This is because an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory; it does not dispose of the case upon its merits. The accused should go to trial and raise it as an error on appeal later. Q. Two kinds of jeopardy 1. 2. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. • Requisites for the accused to raise the defense of double jeopardy To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: 1. 2. 3. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt or a frustration thereof. No. The case was dismissed upon motion of counsel for the accused, so it was not dismissed without his express consent. Moreover, the dismissal was only provisional, which is not a valid termination of the first jeopardy. In order to validly terminate the first jeopardy, the dismissal must have been unconditional. C. X was charged with qualified theft. X moved to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of the information. The case was dismissed. Subsequently, the prosecution filed a corrected information. Can X plead double jeopardy? • Requisites for the first jeopardy to attach 1. Valid complaint or information No. The first jeopardy did not attach because the first information was not valid. 98 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 D. The estafa case against X was dismissed, but the dismissal contained a reservation of the right to file another action. Can another estafa case be filed against X without placing him in double jeopardy? Yes. To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the firs jeopardy must have been validly terminated. This means that there must have been either a conviction or an acquittal, or an unconditional dismissal of the case. A provisional dismissal, such as this one, does not validly terminate the first jeopardy. Note, however, that in the second kind of jeopardy (one act punished by a law and an ordinance), the first jeopardy can only be terminated either by conviction or acquittal, and not by dismissal of the case without the express consent of the accused. E. X was charged with theft. During the trial, the prosecution was able to prove estafa. X was acquitted of theft. Can X be prosecuted for estafa later without placing him in double jeopardy? original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense. H. X was charged with homicide. On the first day of trial, the prosecution failed to appear. The court dismissed the case on the ground of violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. X was later charged with murder. Can X invoke double jeopardy? No. The first jeopardy was not validly terminated. The judge who dismissed the case on the ground of violation of the right of X to speedy trial committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case after the prosecution failed to appear once. This is not a valid dismissal because it deprives the prosecution of due process. When the judge gravely abuses his discretion in dismissing a case, the dismissal is not valid. Therefore, X cannot invoke double jeopardy. Yes. For jeopardy to attach, the basis is the crime charged in the complaint or information, and not the one proved at the trial. In this case, the crime charged in the first information was theft. X was therefore placed in jeopardy of being convicted of theft. Since estafa is not an offense which is included or necessarily includes theft, X can still be prosecuted for estafa without placing him in double jeopardy. F. X was charged with slight physical injuries. On his motion, the case was dismissed during the trial. Another case for assault upon a person in authority was filed against him. Can X invoke double jeopardy? R. Requisites for a valid substitution of a complaint or information 1. 2. 3. S. No judgment has been rendered; The accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included in the offense charged; The accused will not be placed in double jeopardy. Dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal Acquittal is always based on the merits. The accused is acquitted because the evidence does not show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No. The first jeopardy was not terminated through either conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the express consent of X. The first case was dismissed upon motion of X himself. Therefore, he cannot invoke double jeopardy. G. X was charged with theft. During trial, the evidence showed that the offense committed was actually estafa. What should the judge do? The judge should order the substitution of the complaint for theft with a new one charging estafa. Upon filing of the substituted complaint, the judge should dismiss the original complaint. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the Vena V. Verga Dismissal Dismissal does not decide the case on the merits, nor does it determine that the accused is not guilty Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance. T. When dismissal equivalent to acquittal A dismissal upon motion of the accused or his counsel negates the application of double jeopardy because the motion of the accused amounts to express consent, EXCEPT: 99 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 1. 2. if the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution (demurrer to evidence), or denial of the right to speedy trial. The prosecutor then filed an information against X for murder. invoke double jeopardy? Can X In these two cases, even upon motion of the accused, the dismissal amounts to an acquittal and would bar a second jeopardy. But if the accused moves to dismiss on the following grounds, he can still be prosecuted for the same offense because he is deemed to have waived his right against a second jeopardy: 1. Lack of jurisdiction (Because if you move to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it means that you could not have been validly convicted by that court. You are later estopped from claiming that you were in danger of conviction). Insufficiency of complaint or information (Same reason. You could not have been validly convicted under that defective information, so you are estopped from claiming that there was a first jeopardy). No. X has not yet been arraigned under the first information. Therefore, the first jeopardy did not attach. A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he pleads is not equivalent to an acquittal and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. B. If the accused fails to object to the motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecution, is he deemed to have consented to the dismissal? Can he still invoke double jeopardy? No. Silence does not mean consent to the dismissal. If the accused fails to object or acquiesces to the dismissal of the case, he can still invoke double jeopardy, since the dismissal was still without his express consent. He is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy if he expressly consents to the dismissal. C. X was charged with murder. The prosecution moved to dismiss the case. Counsel for X wrote the words “No objection” at the bottom of the motion to dismiss and signed it. Can X invoke double jeopardy later on? No. X is deemed to have expressly consented to the dismissal of the case when his counsel wrote “No objection at the bottom of the motion to dismiss. Since the case was dismissed with his express consent, X cannot invoke double jeopardy. D. X was charged with murder. After the prosecution presented its evidence, X filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The court dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed. Can X invoke double jeopardy? No. X cannot invoke double jeopardy. The dismissal was upon his own motion, so it was with his express consent. Since the dismissal was with his express consent, he is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy. The only time when a dismissal, even upon motion of the accuse, will bar a second jeopardy is if it is based either on insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial. These are not the grounds invoked by X, so he cannot claim double jeopardy. E. X was charged with homicide. X moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction. Believing that it had no jurisdiction, the judge dismissed the case. Since the court, in fact, had jurisdiction over the case, the prosecution filed another case in the same court. Can X invoke double jeopardy? 100 2. U. The conditions when dismissal or termination will not place the accused in double jeopardy are: 1. 2. The dismissal must be sought by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and Such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. V. There was no double jeopardy in case before the prosecution could finish presenting its evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence and the court granted the motion and dismissed the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. The reason for this is that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the case even before the prosecution could finish presenting evidence. It denied the prosecution of its right to due process. Because of this, the dismissal is null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Double Jeopardy Hypothetical Questions A. The prosecutor filed an information against X for homicide. Before X could be arraigned, the prosecutor withdrew the information, without notice to X. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 No. X is estopped from claiming that he was in danger of being convicted during the first case, since he had himself earlier alleged that the court had no jurisdiction. F. X was charged with homicide. The court, believing that it had no jurisdiction, motu propio dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed, claiming that the court, in fact, had jurisdiction. Can X invoke double jeopardy? Yes. When the trial court has jurisdiction but mistakenly dismisses the complaint or information on the ground of lack of it, and the dismissal was not at the request of the accused, the dismissal is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. G. X was charged with rape. X moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was insufficient because it did not allege lewd designs. The court dismissed the case. Later, another case for rape was filed against X. Can X invoke double jeopardy? No. Like the previous problem, X is estopped from claiming that he could have been convicted under the first complaint. He himself moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was insufficient. He cannot change his position and now claim that he was in danger of being convicted under that complaint. H. X was charged with murder, along with three other people. X was discharged as a state witness. Can X be prosecuted again for the same offense? It depends. As a general rule, an order discharging an accused as a state witness amounts to an acquittal, and he is barred from being prosecuted again for the same offense. However, if he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge, he can be prosecuted again. I. Can a person accused of estafa be charged with violation of BP22 without placing him in double jeopardy? Yes. Where two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of the is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. Other examples: Illegal recruitment and estafa, illegal fishing and illegal possession of explosives, alarm and scandal and illegal discharge of Vena V. Verga firearms, brigandage and illegal possession of firearms, consented abduction and qualified seduction. But take note of the following: Possession of a shotgun and a revolver by the same person at the same time is only one act of possession, so there is only one violation of the law. Conviction for smoking opium bars prosecution for illegal possession of the pipe. He cannot smoke the opium without the pipe. Theft of 13 cows at the same time and in the same place is only one act of theft. Conviction for less serious physical injuries bars prosecution for assault upon a person in authority. Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and serious or less serious physical injuries is only one offense. If it is slight physical injuries, it can be broken down into two offenses, since a light offense cannot be complexed. J. X installed a jumper cable which allowed him to reduce his electricity bill. He was prosecuted for violating a municipal ordinance against unauthorized installation of the device. He was convicted. Can he still be prosecuted for theft? No. Under the second type of jeopardy, when an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under once will bar a prosecution under the other. (But remember, that there has to be either conviction or acquittal. Dismissal without the express consent of the accused is not sufficient). W. Exceptions to double jeopardy The conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following circumstances: 1. the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; 101 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 2. 3. the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and the offended party except if the offended party fails to appear at the arraignment. Note: As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, an attempt or frustration thereof, or one included or which includes the previous offense. The exceptions are: 1. 2. 3. if the dismissal of the first case was made upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant, unless the grounds are insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial; if the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. X. Doctrine of supervening fact If, after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes on which the defendant may be held liable, altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Double Jeopardy Hypothetical questions A. X was charged with frustrated homicide. There was nothing to indicated that the victim was going to die. X was arraigned. Before trial, the victim dies. Can X be charged with homicide? It depends. If the death of the victim can be traced to the acts of X, and the victim did not contribute to his death with his negligence, X can be charged with homicide. This is a supervening fact. But if the act of X was not the proximate cause of death, he cannot be charged with homicide. B. X was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and was acquitted. The heirs of the victim appealed the civil aspect of the judgment. X claims that the appeal will place him in double jeopardy. Is X correct? No. There was no second jeopardy. What was elevated on appeal was the civil aspect of the case, not the criminal aspect. The extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. C. X was charged with murder and was acquitted. Can the prosecution appeal the acquittal? No. The prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal, since it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Even if the decision of acquittal was erroneous, the prosecution still cannot appeal the decision. It would still place the accused in double jeopardy. Y. Effect of the appeal by the accused If the accused appeals, he waives his right against double jeopardy. The case is thrown wide open for review and a penalty higher than that of the original conviction could be imposed upon him. Z. Action of the accused do if the court denies the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy He should plead not guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy. In case of conviction, he should appeal from the judgment, on the ground of double jeopardy. Section 4. Amendment of complaint or information. – If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. – If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the 102 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another charge. Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this Rule. In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. Section 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116. Note: • A case can only be dismissed provisionally if the accused expressly consents, and with notice to the offended party. Provisional dismissal does not place the accused in double jeopardy. But, ff the accused objects to the provisional dismissal, a revival of the case would place him in double jeopardy. • The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount shall become permanent after 1 year without the case having been revived. • For offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years, the provisional dismissal shall become permanent after 2 years without the case having been revived. After the provisional dismissal becomes final, the accused cannot be prosecuted anymore. Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. – The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. II. Constitutional Law Notes 103 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 SECTION 21 NO PERSON SHALL BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY OR PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. IF AN ACT IS PUNISHED BY LAW AND AN ORDINANCE, CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL UNDER EITHER SHALL CONSTITUTE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACT. • • Jeopardy means danger Requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy: 1) FIRST JEOPARDY MUST ATTACHED PRIOR TO THE SECOND (a) upon a valid information or indictment (1) complaint (2) information Note: both substance and form must be valid: (1) substance – when the complain adequately informed the accused of the nature and cause of the accusations which means that: 1.1 the essential facts are alleged 1.2 the legal description of the offense is alleged 1.3 in ordinary and concise language (2) form Note: if defective, the remedy is to quash the information decide the case (geographical – proper place; and jurisdictional – has jurisdiction over the crime aspects) Note: if filed in improper court, remedy is dismissal (c) After arraignment – without this, the court has no jurisdiction over the body of the accused (d) After a valid plea – there must be no withdrawal of original plea. (1) the accused must know enough about the cause and nature of the offense charged against him/her (2) if the guilty plea is entered, the court cannot summarily convict the accused on the basis of evidence to prove mitigating circumstance, to do so would deprive the state of due process – first jeopardy does not attach. 2) FIRST JEOPARDY MUST HAVE TERMINATED (a) upon acquittal (1) failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt Vena V. Verga (b) there must be a competent court with jurisdiction to hear and (2) erroneous judgment that has attained finality (3) dismissed on prescription (4) dismissal was due to violation o the defendant’s right to speedy trial Note: Acquittal, the case was decided based on merits but the prosecution was not able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal is based on the allegation of the court’s jurisdiction, or any other ground that does not decide the merits of the issue. (b) Final Conviction (1) appeal period expires (2) service of sentence has been totally or partially served (3) express waiver in writting (4) applied for probation (c) dismissal of the case based on the merits – lack of evidence 3) SECOND JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE (a) identical (b) when it is an attempt or frustration of the other (c) when it is necessarily included in the first offense or when it includes the first offense (d) subject to the doctrine of supervening fact/event  One may be charged for the same act if it constitutes at least two different offenses under two statutes or two ordinances as provided by the elements of committing the crime. Conviction or acquittal in one will serve as a bar to prosecution under the other. This does not apply to continuing crimes.  DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING FACT – where after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes, for which the defendant is responsible, which together with the existing facts, changes the character of the offense, such constitutes a new and distinct offense – and the accused cannot be said to be in double jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. RATIONALE: the rule of identity of offense does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution –for the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility of convicting the accused during the first prosecution for yet inexistent second offense. A. ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN Arraignment and plea constitute the final step in the commencement of jeopardy. It is at the arraignment and plea that issues are joined. Jeopardy attaches (a) upon a good indictment, (b) before competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) after plea. 104 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN The nature of Balicasacan’s evidence amounted to withdrawal of his plea of guilty, and since no new plea was entered, there was no jeopardy, which the acquittal could terminate. CINCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Petitioners apprehension that they might be put in JEOPARDY of being charged with informations or crimes other than the crime imputed is baseless. No DOUBLE JEOPARDY as they have not yet pleaded to the offense. A preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double jeopardy attaches. It is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. NAVALLO vs. SANDIGAN BAYAN P.D. 1606 is explicit and clear. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of petitioner. When all elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in the first offense charged, can rightly be barred. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused, which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. CUNANAN vs. ARCEO (murder; transfer to Sandiganbayan before RTC made a decision) The dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The “dismissal” (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had not jurisdiction to try the case at all. No double jeopardy when case transferred to Sandiganbayan after trial but before decision was rendered at the RTC. RTC had no jurisdiction, therefore accused was not in jeopardy. PEOPLE vs. MONTESA Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition (dismissal or conviction), rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor after a reinvestigation should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the Vena V. Verga substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. The decision of the judge based on his belief that arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever be foreclosed, on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case, is void. DELA ROSA vs. CA Double jeopardy cannot apply in the instant case. The requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking. The dismissal of the case was upon the motion of the petitioner as shown by the records. PEOPLE vs. CAWALINGAAppellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate General’s Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered. Therefore, first jeopardy never attached. CUDIA vs. CA (cure for defective jurisdiction and filing of info; valid complaint) There is no breach of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy for the reason that the absence of the authority of the city prosecutor. PEOPLE vs. MAQUILING An appeal or a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal is barred by the rule on double jeopardy. B. TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY BULALONG vs. PEOPLE It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. BUSTAMANTE vs. MACEREN 105 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 As a general rule, where the defendant has executed or entered upon the execution of a valid sentence, the court cannot, even during the 15-day period, set aside and render a new sentence. A judgment of conviction may only be modified or set aside before it has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment becomes final when no appeal is filed or the defendant has totally or partially satisfied the sentence. PEOPLE vs. OBSTANSIA The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines, which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. Hence, the accused cannot plead double jeopardy. RIVERA vs. PEOPLE Verbal dismissal is not final until written and signed by the judge PEOPLE vs. BELLAFLOR Protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. MERCIALES vs. CA The acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without due regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there is no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. POSO vs. MEJIARES Lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the authorization for temporary liberty on recognizance and finally the grant of probation, the orders of the respondent judge arising from these proceedings do not constitute res judicata or even double jeopardy. PEOPLE vs. ALBERTO No double jeopardy has attached when order made by the trial court was not valid. CONRADA vs. PEOPLE General rule: following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: 1) a valid indictment 2) before a court of competent jurisdiction 3) the arraignment of the accused Vena V. Verga 4) a valid plea entered by him The acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent Two exceptions to the foregoing rule: 1. insufficiency of charge against the accused 2. unreasonable delay in the proceedings (violation of rt. To speedy disposition of trial) PEOPLE vs. ROMERO There can be no double jeopardy where dismissal was granted on the ground of denial of the right to a speedy trial. The dismissal in this case was with the consent of the accused. PEOPLE vs. PABLO When dismissal constitutes abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal is invalid and is therefore no bat to reinstatement of the case. C. RULE ON SUPERVENING ACTS MELO vs. PEOPLE The rule for the identity if offenses do not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. Where after the fist prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and together with the facts existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in double jeopardy of indicted for the new offense. PEOPLE vs. BULING Where the exact nature of the injury could have been discovered, but was not, because of the incompetence of the physician, the subsequent discovery of the real extent of the injury would not be supervening fact which could warrant the Melo doctrine. D. SAME OFFENSES PEOPLE vs. TIOZON Double jeopardy can be invoked only if the offenses committed are the same and identical. Offenses committed arising from the same set of facts but defined in 2 different laws or provisions of the same law, where the elements of one of the offenses are not essential elements of the other, prior jeopardy as to one of them does not bar the prosecution. GONZALEZ vs. CA 106 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element, i.e. carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects. PEOPLE vs. MANUGAS A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [RPC, Art 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction. PEOPLE vs. QUIJADA In the present case, they are separate offenses, the first punished under the RPC and the second under a special law. When the offenses charged are penalized by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or murder; these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former is malum prohibitum while the latter are mala in se. No violation of the constitutional bar against double jeopardy PEOPLE vs. BALLABARE Homicide/murder committed through use of unlicensed firearm is punished in the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866 but People v. Quijada states that the person can be guilty of 2 separate offenses (under RPC and PD 1866 sec.1 par.2) PEOPLE vs. SALEY Conviction for various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa in RPC. E. NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL F. PARTIES METROBANK vs. MERIDIANO That there is no indication that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of TC’s decision amounts to double jeopardy G. ORDINANCE AND STATUTE PEOPLE vs. RELOVA When the offenses charged are penalized either by different section of the same statue or by different statutes the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses charged. When the offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute. The critical inquiry is to the identity f the acts which the accused is said to have committed. If the acts are the same. RULE 118 PRE-TRIAL Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. Note: • Pre-trial is mandatory in all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, RTC, MTCs and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. • It should be conducted after arraignment and within 30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 107 SAN VICENTE vs. PEOPLE The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter will be respected absent any grave abuse of discretion. A grant of demurrer is effectively an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the Constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. This is an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. They call this the “Finality of Acquittal Rule”. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 • The following things are considered during a pre-trial: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. plea bargaining stipulation of facts marking for identification of evidence of the parties waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case The pre-trial order binds the parties, limits the trial to matters not disposed of, and controls the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. Definition of Plea Bargaining It is the disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecution and the accused. It is encouraged because it leads to prompt and final disposition of most criminal cases. It shortens the time between charge and disposition and enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. It is not allowed under the Dangerous Drugs Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. FULE VS CA 162 SCRA 446 (1988) FACTS: The accused Manolo Fule was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before 21 January 1981 drawn in favor of Roy Nadera in remittance of collection but the same was dishonored because the account was already closed. At the hearing, petitioner waived the right to present evidence and in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum affirming the stipulated facts. The trial court convicted him of violation of the BP22 on the basis of the facts stipulated by both parties in the pre-trial conference. The CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the lack of signature of the accused and his counsel in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference is admissible in evidence. DECISION: Rule 118, Section 4 is mandatory because of the use of the word “shall.” The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel renders the Stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer confirmed the stipulation of facts in the memorandum did not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel. What the prosecution should have done was to present evidence to prove the crime. Without said evidences, the guilt f the accused cannot be established. Hence, the CA decision is set aside and the case remanded for further trial. PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ 260 SCRA 25 (1996) 108 Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. Note: Any agreement or admission entered into during the pre-trial conference should be: 1. 2. 3. 4. in writing Signed by the accused Signed by counsel Otherwise, it cannot be used against the accused. Section 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. – If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. Section 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course f the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. A. Definition of a pre-trial order It is an order issued by the court after the pre-trial conference containing: 1. 2. 3. a recital of the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked. Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 FACTS: The accused Cristina Hernandez, the general manager of the Phil-Thai Association, Inc. in Ermita, Manila, recruited 14 people to work in Taipeh without the required license or authority from the POEA. She asked for placement and passport fees which the complainants gave in installments. After receiving the full amount, they were not able to leave for Taipeh despite the assurance of the accused. They demanded the return of their money but to no avail. The accused was then charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. She pleaded not guilty in the arraignment and trial on the merits endued. The trial court found her guilty of the said crime. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the agreement or admission during the trial should be reduced into writing and signed by the accused and his counsel, and should be allowed in the trial. DECISION: No, the admission during the trial need not be in writing and signed. A stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned by law pursuant to Rule 118. A stipulation of facts by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing in the transcript of proceedings of the court. The signature of the accused is unnecessary because his lawyer has authority to make admissions by pleadings, whether oral or written, and such are conclusive unless withdrawn. For this purpose, the counsel acts as agent of the accused and the acts of the former binds the latter. The stipulation of facts should be allowed during the trial to expedite the trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit. It is evident in the case that the prosecution and the defense counsel stipulated that the accused is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit overseas workers and that this fact may be confirmed by the representative of the POEA should he take the witness stand. PEOPLE VS TAC-AN 398 SCRA 373 (2003) FACTS: The accused Mario Austria was the OIC Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail when he took advantage of his position in falsifying a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, a public document of the said office, by stating that a Colt pistol with 40 rounds of ammunitions is a provincial government property issued to a civilian agent in connection with the performance of his official duties. Only three of the 14 witnesses were notified of the arraignment and pre-trial but none of them appeared. Upon motion of the accused and objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that witnesses should be present during the trial to participate in the plea Vena V. Verga bargaining and stipulation of facts. The CA dismissed the MR on the ground that the reinstatement of the case will place the accused in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the absence of the witnesses in the pre-trial is a ground for dismissal. DECISION: The absence during pre-trial of any witnesses for the prosecution listed in the information, whether or not said witnesses is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel. Even if none of the witnesses appeared, the trial should proceed since the public prosecutor appeared for the State. Hence, the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case. However, the witnesses may be cited in contempt of court if their absence was unjustified. RULE 119 CASES PEOPLE VS CHAVES 397 SCRA 228 (2003) FACTS: Informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of the Bucag family were filed against eight accused. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. Two years later, an amended information was filed impleading Felizardo Roxas as a co-accused. He engaged the services of Atty Miguel Paderanga. In the preliminary investigation, he implicated the lawyer as the mastermind. An amended information was again filed. In the trial, the prosecution presented Roxas as its first witness which Paderanga objected to. The court sustained the objection in a hearing for the discharge as a state witness on the ground that it will violate his right to self-incrimination and that Roxas must first be discharged as a state witness. Further, only the sworn statement of Roxas may be admitted as evidence. The OSG filed a petition or certiorari which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: W/N the prosecution may present the testimony of Roxas as a hostile witness. DECISION: The accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not necessary that the court discharges him first as state witness. According to Rule 119, 109 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 Section 17, the trial court may direct the accused to be discharged with their consent after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge. There is no distinction as to what evidence the prosecution may present. In addition to the sworn statement, other evidences may be presented to determine the existence of the conditions of the discharge. There is no indication that the testimony of the accused may be excluded. However, it is still premature for private respondent to raise this question in the instant petition. Hence, the petition is granted. SANTOS VS PEOPLE 395 SCRA 507 (2003) FACTS: Complainant 18 year old Transuelo de Jesus was about to buy a mosquito coil in the store of Marina Ablaza when she was grabbed by the accused Virgilio Santos and pulled her to a vacant lot. He covered her mouth, embraced, kissed, touched her private parts and poked the victim’s vagina with his penis while holding a bladed weapon and threatening to kill her. The accused left when her mother called her. The next morning, she told the incident to her mother. They then filed a complaint with the barangay chairman, MTC and the Provincial Prosecutor but the same was dismissed. They appealed to the Justice Secretary who ordered the prosecutor to file a criminal complaint against the accused for attempted rape. The trial court found the accused guilty. Later, the accused filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration attaching sworn statements of desistance of Transuelo and witness Emeteria de Jesus. However, the court still found him guilty, which decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the affidavit of desistance by a witness after conviction of the accused may be a ground for the dismissal of the case. DECISION: An affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable and deserves only scant attention. The affidavits of desistance filed by the private complainant and her witnesses were executed 12 days after the promulgation of judgment of conviction and are clearly mere afterthoughts. Hence, they cannot have the effect of negating a previous credible declaration. Not all kinds of discrepancies and inconsistencies in testimonies have the effect of discrediting a witness. In the case at bar, the discrepancies and inconsistencies refer to the time and place when the private complainant met and told her mother-in-law about the incident. These are mere collateral matters inconsequential in the determination of the criminal liability of the accused. More important is the spontaneous, categorical and straightforward testimony of the private complainant on the violation against her person. She Vena V. Verga never faltered in her narration of the essential elements of the subject offense, whether before the investigating judge or prosecutor, or the trial judge. LUCES VS PEOPLE 395 SCRA 524 (2003) FACTS: Dante Reginio, Nelson Magbanua and Clemente dela Gracia were on their way to the house of Didoy Elican when the accused Joel Luces collared Dela Gracia and stabbed him in the chest which caused his death shortly thereafter. The place was illuminated by a street light. Reginio and Magbanua executed sworn statements identifying the accused as the culprit. In the cross examination, an affidavit of desistance of Reginio was submitted but its existence was denied by him. Meanwhile, Magbanua was presented as hostile witness for the defense and executed an affidavit of desistance stating that the culprit was not Luces and might be other persons. The accused pleaded not guilty in the arraignment. However, the trial court still found the accused guilty of homicide, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: W/N the affidavits of desistance should be considered by the court. DECISION: The affidavits of desistance relied upon by the petitioner as a means to exculpate himself from criminal liability was sufficiently impeached by the testimonial evidence of the very same persons who allegedly executed the same. Reginio declared that the signature found therein was not his, while Magbanua merely signed it out of pity for petitioner’s wife. As between the affidavits of desistance and the sworn testimonies of the witnesses before the court, the latter should prevail. An affidavit of desistance obtained as an afterthought and through intimidation or undue pressure attains no probative value in light of the affiant’s testimony to the contrary. Further, the testimony of the notary public whose only participation was to administer the oath to the persons who signed the affidavits and who did not ascertain if the persons who appeared before her and represented themselves as the affiants were indeed the same persons cannot outweigh the testimony of said persons denying the veracity of said affidavit. SALAZAR VS PEOPLE 411 SCRA 598 (2003) FACTS: An information for estafa was filed against Anamer Salazar and Nena Jaucian Timario with the Legazpi RTC which alleged that the two conspired in that the latter issued a check in favor of J. Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation and the former endorsed and negotiated it as payment for the 300 cavans of rice obtained from the J. Y Brothers knowing that the same had no sufficient funds. The check was dishonored and the accused refused to pay despite 110 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 demands to the prejudice of J. Y Brothers. After the prosecutor rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court on the ground that she could not be charged since she is merely an indorser and only the issuer is punished by the law; that there was no evidence of conspiracy; and that the dishonored check was replaced by a second one, which is a novation of the first transaction. Moreover, the dishonor of the second check was a result of Drawn against uncollected deposit which means that there are sufficient funds but is restricted since the check was not yet cleared. The trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime but ordered her to remit the amount to the complainant. Conspiracy was also not proved. Petitioner then filed a MR of the civil aspect with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence that she was not civilly liable. ISSUE: W/N the Demurrer to Evidence may be granted. DECISION: If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence in the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. In the case, petitioner was charged with estafa. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the criminal action. The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process. PEOPLE VS TAC-AN 398 SCRA 373 (2003) FACTS: The accused Mario Austria was the OIC Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail when he took advantage of his position in falsifying a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, a public document of the said office, by stating that a Colt pistol with 40 rounds of ammunitions is a provincial government property issued to a civilian agent in connection with the performance of his official duties. Only three of the 14 witnesses were notified of the arraignment and pre-trial but none of them appeared. Upon motion of the accused and objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that witnesses should be present during the trial to participate in the plea bargaining and stipulation of facts. The CA dismissed the MR on the ground Vena V. Verga that the reinstatement of the case will place the accused in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the trial of the case should continue. DECISION: The accused is entitled to a speedy trial. The accused cannot use the absence of the witnesses as a ground for violation of his right to a speedy trial. Even if none of the witnesses appeared, the trial should proceed since the public prosecutor appeared for the State and the case may not be dismissed on the ground that no witnesses appeared before the court. PEOPLE VS TEE 395 SCRA 419 (2003) FACTS: Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a taxi driver, was hired by appellant Modesto Tee to transport boxes of blue seal cigarettes which were in fact marijuana to the rented house owned by Albert Ballesteros. Ballesteros asked for its removal. Abratique was again hired to transport the contraband to a room in his grandmother’s house which was managed by his aunt. Bothered by the nature of the goods, Abratique’s aunt, Nazarea Abreau, confided the matter to her daughter Alice who disclosed the same to his brother-in-law who was an NBI agent. The NBI and PNP NARCOM conducted a joint operation. With permission of Nazarea, they entered the room, searched the premises and found therein 4 boxes and 13 sacks of marijuana totaling 336.93 kilograms. Later in the evening, the NBI special agent and Abratique as witness applied for a search warrant from Judge Reyes at his residence. When the Clerk of Court arrived, the judge questioned them and then issued a warrant to search the house of appellant for marijuana in Baguio. The agents served the warrant to the appellant himself. They were able to seize 26 boxes and a sack of dried marijuana in the water tank, garage, and store room of the residence with the presence of appellant, members of his family, barangay officials and the media. Appellant alleged that the evidences were illegally acquired, hence, inadmissible. Further, the search warrant was too general and did not follow the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. The trial court held that the evidence was illegally obtained hence, inadmissible. The TC acquitted him of the charge but convicted him illegal possession of marijuana. Hence, this automatic review. ISSUE: W/N the absence of the prosecution witness violated appellant’s right to a speedy trial. DECISION: There is no showing that the prosecution capriciously caused the absences of the prosecution witness Abratique which totaled 20 hearing days so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony. The prosecution even prayed 111 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 for the court’s order for Abratique’s arrest to compel his attendance. The prosecution tried to get the NBI to produce him but to no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and rest its case. The delay of 20 hearing days is not an unreasonable length of time. Further, Modesto Tee did not object to the inability of the prosecution to produce its witnesses. Appellant could have moved to require the witness to post bail, or to hold him in contempt. It is too late for the appellant to invoke now his right to a speedy trial. In the absence of a showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused. Hence, appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. PEOPLE VS GAVINO 399 SCRA 285 (2003) FACTS: Wenna Gavino, a nine- year old minor, was ordered by appellant to sleep beside him. Her brothers slept in the living room while her mother was out on a teaching job. At about midnight, appellant hit her thrice and made her lie on the bed with her back against him. He inserted his fingers into her organ before penetrating her. Appellant left her in pain and threatened to kill her if she disclosed the same. The sexual assaults continued until Wenna was 15. She was again raped. She then decided to tell her science teacher that appellant was beating her up but did not disclosed the sexual abuses. She was brought to the DSWD where she finally disclosed her ordeal. She executed a statement to the police and had a medical examination. After the filing of the rape charges, Wenna’s mother and two others fetched her and proceeded to Atty Demecillo where she signed a document which was an affidavit of desistance. She was prevented to read its contents. Later, she went to the NBI and executed an affidavit of retraction deposing that she signed the desistance under duress. The defense presented several witnesses. After trial, the court found him guilty of qualified rape and sentenced him to death. Hence, this automatic review. ISSUE: W/N the affidavit of desistance was valid. DECISION: The prosecution duly established that Wenna signed Affidavit of retraction under duress. Her relatives accosted her in school while she was under the custody of the DSWD and took her to Agusan to sign the said affidavit. Its content was not explained to Wenna nor was she given a chance to read it. She was forced to sign the affidavit as she was threatened that she could not return to Cagayan de Oro city if she refused. RULE 120 CASES Vena V. Verga PEOPLE VS BON 396 SCRA 506 (2003) FACTS: Maricris Bonode, then 6 years old, is staying at their house along with the accused Nemesio Bon, a brother of her mother Violeta. One afternoon, Violeta saw the accused lying on top of her daughter. The accused was wearing pants while Maricris was wearing sando and shorts. Violeta inquired but Maricris cried. She learned from her youngest daughter that accused sexually abused Maricris by poking her private part. Instead of confronting the accused, they transferred to Quezon Province. When Violeta learned that the accused was in jail for acts of lasciviousness, she revealed to her husband that the accused molested their daughter. The PNP Medico-Legal Officer examined the victim and found that she is not anymore a virgin but there were no external signs of violence. An information for rape was then filed against the accused. Trial on the merits ensued. The trial court found the accused guilty of rape and sentenced him to death. Hence, this automatic review. ISSUE: W/N the accused could be convicted of acts of lasciviousness on an information charging rape. DECISION: Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, interpreting the insertion of one’s finger into the genitals of another as rape through sexual assault does not apply at the case at bar. The governing law during the commission of the crime was Article 335 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, where insertion of one’s finger into the genitals of another does not amount to rape. Nevertheless, the accused is not completely without liability. Although the information charged the crime of rape, the accused can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because it is included in rape and all the elements for the said crime were established. The judgment is then modified such that the accused is found guilty of acts of lasciviousness. PEOPLE VS HAMTON 395 SCRA 156 (2003) FACTS: Spouses Teofilo and Leonida Garcia were the sole distributors of Singer Sewing Machines under the business name Garmer Industrial Machines. One morning, Jun Notarte and Reynold Yambot, both armed entered their office and announced a hold-up. After emptying the drawer of cash, they took Teofilo into a light gray Mitsubishi Lancer where Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan were waiting. Teofilo was blindfolded in the back seat. His abductors took his gold ring, bracelet necklace, and cash. When he was led out of the office, Leonida arrived and saw her husband. He approached the car and asked the abductors. The appellant hit her instead on the nose with a gun. The car sped away. He was transferred into a trimobile where he was taken into room with no windows and his left wrist chained into an iron grill. The appellant Adan Manalo 112 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 called Leonida asking for 10 million pesos as ransom. After several calls and negotiations, the abductors agreed to a P1,200,000 ransom. They told her to bring the money at the Magallanes flyover before 4pm, open the hood to make it appear that the pajero has engine trouble. Appellant would then stop beside her car and after identifying himself as Adan, she should hand over the ransom to him. However, she coordinated with the PACC under Col. Michael Ray Aquino who instructed her to go on with the pay-off and wear a green dress. The pay-off took place. After assuring that they would drop him and give him P300 for his taxi fare, they noticed a white Nissan Sentra pursuing them. When they reached the intersection of Guadix and ADB Avenues, the abductors fired at the PACC agents. Notarte escaped but Pangilinan and Yambot were captured. Teofilo was rescued and the ransom money and the unlicensed firearms were recovered. Antonio Hamton was separately apprehended because he negotiated with Leonida for the ransom at the same time with the true abductors. He was able to extort P50,000 from her. An information for kidnapping and ransom was filed against the abductors. Later, a second information for illegal possession of firearms was filed. They pleaded not guilty but the court found them guilty of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and illegal possession of firearms. Hamton was found guilty of robbery. The appellants appealed alleging that the prosecution failed to established conspiracy and that they were in physical and constructive possession of the firearms. ISSUE: W/N the judgment was valid. DECISION: The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the testimonies of all the witnesses is not a compelling reason to jettison the findings of the court a quo. This circumstance does not ipso facto render the judgment erroneous, more so when it appears to be fully supported by the evidence on record. While a judge in such a situation has no way to test the credibility of all the witnesses, since he did not have the unique opportunity of observing their demeanor and behavior under oath, the trail court’s findings are nonetheless binding on this court when these are ably supported by the evidence on record. Unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. UNIDAD VS CA 399 SCRA 27 (2003) FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo Criste Unidad, the Chief Operations Officer of the WPD was charged with homicide in an information filed before the court. Testimonies and evidences revealed that the victim was kneeling or sitting in Vena V. Verga front of the accused who was then standing when the latter shot the former. The trial court promulgated its decision on 31 August 1994, but amended the same on 5 September 1994. Both contained the same dispositive portion. Petitioner claimed that the amended decision was promulgated on 16 September 1994 after he had perfected his appeal. The CA affirmed the lower court’s amended decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the amended decision was validly done by the trial court. DECISION: A comparison of the decision and amended decision of the trial court readily shows that no substantial variance exists. The trial court merely made more clear which side presented which witness, but the contents of their testimonies remained the same. As stated, the dispositive portions are identical, and the same is consistent with the rest of both the decision and the amended decision. It can, therefore, be concluded that no prejudice resulted to any party from the amendment, and that it referred only to insubstantial matters. The same is clearly well within the inherent powers of courts to amend and control their processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. Furthermore, there is no showing that the records had been forwarded to the CA at the time said amendment was effected. PEOPLE VS ROMERO 399 SCRA 386 (2003) FACTS: After drinking tuba in his house, Rodolfo Moreno and Augusto Ruba went to the house of the brother of the appellant to drink beer and gin. Later, the two left and while in the national road, they saw appellant Paquito Romero in a squatting position because the place was illuminated by a fluorescent light two meters away. As Ruba passed, appellant stood and struck him with an air pump at the back of the head. Moreno ran. He related the incident to Ruba’s father. When they returned to the scene and brought him to the hospital, the victim’s sister Corazon Junsay said the name of Paquito with whom the victim replied with a clenched fist. The investigating officer went to the hospital and asked the victim the identity of the appellant. The victim replied that it was Paquito Romero. The questions and answers were reduced into writing and was thumbmarked by the victim and signed by the doctor and the victim’s sister as witnesses. An information for murder was then filed against the appellant. The parties agreed that the appellant would enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of homicide. The court issued an order that the prosecution accepted the plea under the conditions that there would be no modifying circumstances, reimbursement of expenses and civil indemnity and recommendation of the penalty of prision mayor. Before the court rendered a decision, the prosecution moved for the re-opening of the case on the ground that appellant violated the conditions when he refused to pay the victim’s father. The court granted it and commenced with the trial. Appellant however filed a motion to dismiss on the 113 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 ground of double jeopardy which was denied and later convicted the accused of murder. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N there was already a judgment when the court issued the order granting the lesser plea. DECISION: The trial court was correct in holding that there was no double jeopardy in the case considering that it was terminated as a result of appellant’s acquittal, conviction or dismissal. The order approving the guilty plea to homicide, with conditions, was not a judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion of the said order which in part reads “Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, this case is deemed submitted for decision” clearly shows that the trial court still had to render a decision on the criminal and civil liabilities of the appellant. The said order merely approved the agreement between the parties on the new plea to a lesser offense by the appellant and the conditions attached to it. The trial court neither sentenced the accused nor made any ruling on the civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim. RULE 121 CASES AMARILLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 434 (2003) FACTS: Petitioners who are all officials of the DPWH Aurora Engineering District together with Carolina Querijero, a private contractor were charged with falsification of public documents. They simulated a contract for the repair of the Pugo and Dyos bridges which were damaged by flashfloods. In the preliminary investigation, the investigator considered the certifications of the Bgy chairperson and kagawad, social welfare officer and the Municipal agriculturist. The certificates in effect averred that no repair was made and that the flashfloods occurred on Dec. 24, 1995. Petitioner Querijero submitted a photocopy of the letter of the request of the mayor to utilize the crane and boom of Industrial Development Corporation and a letter of the IDC General Manager granting the said request. Finding sufficient ground, an information for estafa through falsification of official documents was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The information was amended to cure some defects such as the non-inclusion of the phrase “committing the offense in relation to office. Petitioners filed a motion for leave of court to file a motion for reinvestigation on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of the administrative officer of IDC that the mayor requested IDC for the utilization of its equipments for the repair of the bridges. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the motion for reinvestigation may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. DECISION: Taduyo’s affidavit is not newly discovered evidence. It could have easily been produced during the investigation of the case. There was no showing of Taduyo’s non-availability at the time of the investigation or the absence of the correspondence between the Mayor and IDC. Also, assuming that said affidavit could not have been reasonably produced during the investigation still it can not qualify as newly discovered evidence because it was not material to the issue. It merely stated the letter request. There was no allegation that he actually saw or had personal knowledge of the repairs by petitioners through Caroline Construction. Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the motion for reinvestigation. PEOPLE VS DATU 397 SCRA 695 (2003) FACTS: Appellant Romeo Datu is engaged in selling hardware and construction materials in Aurora, Isabela which is also the line of business of the victim Antonio Chan in Burgos, Isabela. Datu sold an Isuzu dump truck to Chan for P480,000, the latter issuing 4 postdated checks as payment. Three of the checks were encashed but Chan stopped payment for the fourth check to accommodate Amadeo Yap for unpaid lumber which Datu bought from Yap. Datu confronted Chan about the dishonored check and refused to entertain Chan’s explanation. He hurled threats against Chan’s employees. He employed several persons including Batuelo and witness Madayag whom he promised to pay P10,000. The assailants boarded a white Mitsubishi L-300 van, went to Chan’s compound and hid. When Chan came out, they rushed to him. Chan was able to struck Madayag with a wood in the forehead. Batuelo sprayed tear gas on Chan until he was finally subdued. One of the assailants tied a rope around the victim’s neck and hung him in the basement of the house. Susan, the victim’s wife, stood up from her sleep, saw the appellants and her husband, shouted for help and then collapsed. The appellants left. After his wound healed, Madayag returned to Datu to collect the balance of P9,000 but his sister told him that 3 men were looking for him. He then decided to disclose the crime to his wife and then to his wife’s second cousin, Sgt. Flordelito Sabuyas who arranged a meeting with his camp’s provost marshal, Col. Hernani Acosta. Madayag agreed to execute a statement implicating the appellants in exchange for the forgiveness of Susan. The appellants raised the defense of denial and alibi. An information for murder was then filed. As directed by the court, the information was amended to include Madayag as one of the accused. Later, Madayag was discharged as a state witness. The appellants were convicted as charged. The appellants filed a motion for new trial/mistrial on the ground that witness Sgt. Sabuyas executed an affidavit of retraction that Susan and Madayag framed up the appellants which motion was 114 Vena V. Verga Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 denied. Another motion for new trial was filed in light of an affidavit by Roosevelt Salvador that Madayag was physically manhandled to testify for the prosecution, which motion was again denied. Hence, this automatic review. ISSUE: W/N the motion for new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. DECISION: The affidavit of Salvador declaring that he and other military men including Sabuyas abducted, manhandled and physically abused Madayag to admit complicity in the killing of Chan, and as a state witness, to implicate appellant Datu. Salvador further said that Madayag agreed to cooperate after Susan offered him a reasonable financial package for his testimony. Such statement after the trial was finished is evidence which appellants could not have secured during the trial such that it must be considered as newly discovered evidence that may be presented in a new trial. As a rule, recantations are regarded with disfavor as it can be easily secured from a poor and ignorant witness for monetary consideration. However, since the penalty imposed is death, the testimony of Sabuyas is worthy of note and key to the solution of the case. There should be no of shadow of doubt in the case that may vitiate the result. Every piece of pertinent evidence must be adduced before the trial court. Hence, the new trial may be granted and the case remanded for further proceedings. RULE 122 CASES PEOPLE VS PINUELA 396 SCRA 561 (2003) FACTS: One morning, Salvador Galvez was talking to Henry Hualde in front of his store. David Galvez and Rodney Albito were cleaning their trisikad while Victor Penasales was a nearby water vendor. Suddenly, the accused alighted from a trisikad and shot David at the head. He then fired 5 times at Salvador hitting him in the abdomen and right thigh. Salvador fired back but missed. Both were taken to the hospital but only Salvador survived. Two informations for frustrated murder and murder were filed against the accused. The two cases were jointly tried. The trial court convicted him of murder and frustrated homicide. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the appellate court may correct errors in the judgment of the lower court on appeal. DECISION: When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open for to the review of the appellate court, which is then called Vena V. Verga upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate whether favorable or unfavorable to him, and whether they are assigned as errors or not. Such an appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The identity of the accused was clearly and positively established not only by Salvador Galvez, Jr., who knew the accused for many years, but also by the prosecution witness Rodney Albito, who was not known to have any misunderstanding or grudge against him. This finding of the trial court is binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. The Court agrees with the trial court that the killing of David Galvez was attended by treachery because it was established that there was a sudden attack without provocation on Galvez who was squatting on one side of the road with his head bent down. Galvez was not in a position to defend himself. On the other hand, the trial court erred in finding that the attack on Salvador was not treacherous. The sudden and unexpected attack without provocation on Salvador, who was just talking to Henry Hualde in front of his store, showed that treachery attended the shooting. He could not defend himself from such assault. True, the victim was able to fire back at his assailant. However, he was able to do so only after he was mortally wounded by the treacherous attack made by the accused. His recovery due to the timely medical intervention does not diminish the treacherous character of the attack. Hence, the accused is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of David Galvez. He also guilty of frustrated murder for the near fatal shooting of Salvador Galvez, considering that the same was attended by treachery. PEOPLE VS MANLUCTAO 404 SCRA 580 (2003) FACTS: Marcelina Manluctao was then 13 years old when she was first raped by her father, Romeo Manluctao. The rape took place when the appellant ordered her siblings to go out and told her to go to her room. In her room, the appellant kissed her, touched her private parts, inserted his penis and did a push and pull movements. She cried and resisted but she could not do anything because she was threatened by a knife. This was repeated three more times but Marcelina did not give any details or particulars on the third incident. Appellant was charged with 4 counts of rape in separate charge sheets. He pleaded guilty to all 4 charges with the assistance of a counsel de officio. The defense admitted the minority of the victim, the child of the victim, his paternity and his identity. Only the prosecution presented its evidences. The trial court convicted the appellant in all four cases with death as penalty in each of them. Hence, this automatic review. 115 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 ISSUE: W/N the appellate court may correct errors in the judgment of the lower court on appeal. DECISION: An appeal or automatic appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing court to correct errors as it may find in the lower court’s judgment, regardless of whether it is assigned as an error or not. The Court agrees with the trial court that complainant’s testimony alone is sufficient in the conviction of appellant. The crying of the victim on the witness stand is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotions indicates the pain that she feels as she recounts the details of her sordid experience. In the third incident of rape, the victim did not provide details, but the elements of rape on that incident have been sufficiently established. However, both the qualifying circumstances of age of the victim and her relationship with the accused were not alleged in the information. Such failure is fatal and bars conviction of the accused in its qualified form which is punishable by death. Hence, he could only be convicted of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, not death. PEOPLE VS PARADEZA 397 SCRA 151 (2003) FACTS: One evening, Lailani Gayas was at their house in Zambales with her younger brother who was watching TV. She was about to go out of their house when she was grabbed by Romeo Paradeza back into the house. He laid her in a bamboo bed, undressed her, took out a knife, fondled her breasts, and had carnal knowledge with her while covering her mouth. After satiating his lust, he went home. Gayas, who was 26 years old but has the mental ability of a 6 or 7 year old child, told her mother and grandmother about the incident. She was examined and was found to be mentally retarded. He was then charged with rape. He pleaded not guilty with the assistance of a counsel de parte. The trial court convicted him of the crime charged. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Both the appellant and appellee filed their briefs. However, the Public Attorney’s Office filed a motion to withdraw appeal. ISSUE: W/N the court may grant the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by the appellant. DECISION: The withdrawal of an appeal is a matter of right before the filing of the appellee’s brief. After that, withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court. The appellant’s motion to withdraw his appeal was made only after Vena V. Verga the OSG had filed the Brief for appellee. However, the Court had required appellant to file his reply brief. It could therefore be said that the appellant had not yet completed the process of filing briefs when he moved to withdraw his appeal, a situation which may call for a more liberal rule. Appellant is a hardly illiterate functionally and of very low socio-economic standing as a mere bangus fry catcher. In making his appeal, he is actually wagering his life as against his sentence below. Regardless of his reasons, it is within his rights to seek such withdrawal. Hence, in the interest of justice and in the exercise of sound discretion of the court, the withdrawal of the appeal may be granted. He will thus remain in custody and serve the sentence imposed upon him by the lower court. NAYA VS ABING 398 SCRA 364 (2003) FACTS: Orlando Naya, as seller, and Abraham and Guillerma Abing, as buyers, entered into a contract to sell two parcels of land for P60,000 payable in monthly installments of P1,015.74 for five years after paying a downpayment of P20,000. Naya bound himself to execute a deed of sale and deliver the title free from encumbrances and liens upon full payment of the price. Naya paid P2,000 a month even in excess of the amount agreed upon. Unknown to Abing, Naya sold his lots including the disputed lots to William Po for P200,000, Naya represented that he is the owner of the same. Abing continued remitting payments to which Naya issued the corresponding receipts until the spouses had paid P54,000. Naya consented to the construction of a fence and a house or warehouse by Abing. The spouses bought hollow blocks worth P40,000. However, hey were evicted from the property by Po and the hollow blocks remained unused. Subsequently, the spouse learned of the second sale. An information for estafa was then filed against Naya after a preliminary investigation. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, the court set the case for continuation for Naya to present its evidence. However, his counsel failed to appear. The court then issued an order that the accused had waived his right to adduce evidences. The court convicted him of estafa which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the appellate court may correct errors in judgment whether assigned or not. DECISION: An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and the appellate court is mandated to correct any error in the appealed judgment whether this is assigned as an error or has not assigned as error the issue of whether or not under the information petitioner was charged with and may be convicted of estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC. 116 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 There was no allegation in the information that petitioner expressly represented in the sale of the subject property to Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, petitioner was not charged with estafa under Art 316(2). Hence, the trial court committed error in finding him guilty of estafa and the CA likewise erred in affirming the same. Notwithstanding his acquittal, he is nevertheless liable to the spouses Abing to return the purchase price and reimburse the amount of the hollow blocks. PEOPLE VS SUBE 401 SCRA 169 (2003) FACTS: Julio Solis and his brother Nicanor were resting inside their house which was illuminated by a double rechargeable lamp. Later, Julio heard shouts that Bobot, also Julio, will be killed. He saw Lastide Sube, Rolando Menzon, Felizardo Ontog, Benedicto Acala and Dino Ayala outside carrying flashlights and bladed weapons. He tried to rouse Nicanor but the latter was ill and could not get up. He ran out and hid behind some trees 5 meters away from the house. He saw the five accused enter the house and hit his brother with his father’s airgun. Then, he saw the five accused came out with Nicanor’s hands bound with a nylon cord. Thereafter, he reported the incident to his father and to the police. They went to the house of Sube but they were refused. They returned to the crime scene but found no body. A few days later, Sube was turned over by Col Obillo to the Antipolo Police HQ. Sube disclosed the incident and where Nicanor was buried. Menzon was also arrested. An information was then filed against Sube and Menzon and the other accused. The trial court convicted Sube, Menzon and Ontog for the murder of Nicanor and archived with respect to Ayala and Acala. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the accused Ontog may withdraw his appeal and thereafter be benefited from the modification of the trial court’s judgment. W/N the findings of the trial court are binding on the appellate court. DECISION: Ontog indicated his desire to withdraw his appeal. The request was treated as a motion to the same effect and granted. Hence, Ontog’s appeal was dismissed in a Resolution. However, in light of the fact that we have seen fit to modify the trial court’s judgment in a manner that is favorable to the accusedappellants, then such modification should apply to Ontog as well. As a general rule, the findings of the trial court on matters of credibility are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. In the case at bar, the trial court gave more credence to the testimony of Julio over the combined testimonies of the appellants. Julio’s testimony was straightforward and convincing. He gave a chilling account of the incident and positively identified the five accused. He Vena V. Verga maintained his story and did not waiver even when he was subjected to rigorous probing during the cross-examination. RULE 124 CASES VITTO VS CA 404 SCRA 307 (2003) FACTS: Fredelito Vitto, Vic Pizarro and Danilo Pajaron were charged with homicide under an information filed with the RTC. The court convicted all the accused. They appealed to the CA but remained at large for failure to post bail on appeal. The CA required them to explain why their appeal should not be abandoned in view of their failure to submit themselves to the proper authorities. Petitioner, through counsel, explained that he was not aware that he should surrender. His counsel requested an additional period to contact the accused in Mindoro, to submit him to the jurisdiction of the CA and to file the appellant’s brief. However, the accused did not appear and the brief was not filed. The court then dismissed the appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for leave of court to file appellant’s brief, which motion was denied on the ground that the dismissal of the appeal has already become final and executory. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the CA may dismiss the appeal for abandonment, failure to prosecute and failure to file appellant’s brief. DECISION: Petitioner, through counsel, asked for an extension within which to submit himself and to file the appellant’s brief. However, petitioner failed to comply which is fatal to his appeal. The CA considered his appeal as having been abandoned and consequently dismissed the same. The motion for leave to file appellant’s brief filed two months after the finality of the dismissal of the appeal was correctly denied. His insolent refusal to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court cannot be countenanced. He should have informed his lawyer of his whereabouts and in the same manner, his lawyer should have acquainted him regarding the proceedings in the CA. RULE 126 CASES PEOPLE VS SARAP 399 SCRA 503 (2003) 117 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 FACTS: SPO4 Guarino and PO2 Navida, armed with a search warrant, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal St, Poblacion, Banga, Aklan due to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants. The occupants were apprehended for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained in Banga police station. In the investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly and Roger were the suppliers and will be back later. One day, the caretaker of the house told the police that two strangers were looking for the occupants of the house. The police arrived and saw Melly Sarap and Roger Amar. Upon seeing them, Sarap threw her black canvass bag which Roger picked up. Guarino seized Sarap and grabbed her green plastic bag which upon inspection, contained 2 blocks of marijuana. Navida pursued and arrested Amar. An information was filed charging the appellants with sale of prohibited drugs. The court acquitted Amar and convicted Sarap of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. DECISION: The Banga police officers were not armed with a warrant of arrest. Sarap cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. She was merely walking in the alley near the house of Ricaforte. Guarino would not have apprehended her were it not for Iguiz’s identification. The Banga police could have secured a search warrant when the house occupants disclosed that a certain Melly and Roger would be back. The persons intended to be searched were particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also ascertained although it was uncertain when they would arrive. These particulars would have provided sufficient grounds to secure a search warrant. Instead, the police acted only upon the information of the caretaker. They cannot dispense with a warrant on the basis of urgency since they have 24 hours to do so. They had prior knowledge of Sarap’s alleged activities. Hence, the police could not effect a warrantless search and seizure since there was no probable cause and Sarap was not lawfully arrested. The instant case does not also fall within the purview of the plain view doctrine because the marijuana contained in the green plastic bag was not visible and not apparent. That the search disclosed marijuana confirming the police’s initial information and suspicion did not cure its patent illegality. Thus, Sarap is acquitted. PEOPLE VS SIMBAHON 401 SCRA 94 (2003) FACTS: One early morning, the police, with the bgy chairman and the media, served a search warrant upon Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia and Charito Mangulabnan at their residence in Sampaloc, Manila. With slight resistance, the police gained entry. Their search yielded a brick of dried flowering tops Vena V. Verga wrapped in a newspaper and placed in a plastic bag and a black bullet pouch containing 6 ammunition, al of which were found under the bed of Simbahon and Mangulabnan. The police found a pencil case containing shabu and ammunition in the room of Morgia. They also found a red and black synthetic case containing shabu, sniffing paraphernalias such as improvised burner, tooter, scissors, aluminum foil, plastic sachets with residue, and empty plastic sachets in the living room. An inventory receipt was issued and signed by Simbahon. The three were arrested and brought to the precinct for investigation. Separate informations were filed against against the three for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and illegal possession of firearms. The charges against Mangulabnan were dismissed upon motion of the prosecution. The court acquitted Morgia but convicted Simbahon. ISSUE: W/N the search conducted prior to the arraignment of the appellant was valid. DECISION: The case should be dismissed on the ground of manifest violations of the constitutional right of the accused against illegal search and seizure. While appellant may be deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence seized for failure to raise his objections at the opportune time, however, the record shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which rend the same null and void. The caption, as well as the body of the search warrant, shows that it was issued for more than one offense, for violation of the DDA and illegal possession of firearms. Further, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The search warrant issued by the court merely referred to appellant’s residence as premises without specifying its address. Furthermore, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant. The seizure by the police conducting the search of articles not described therein was beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Hence, the search was illegal and Simbahon should be acquitted of the crime charged. PEOPLE VS TEE 395 SCRA 419 (2003) FACTS: see rule 119 ISSUE: W/N the search warrant satisfied the constitutional requirement. DECISION: The thing sized is a property of a specific character, marijuana, an illicit drug. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and circumstances. The description “illegally n possession of undetermined quantity of dried marijuana leaves and shabu and sets of paraphernalia” particularizes the things to be 118 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005 seized. The search warrant has satisfied the constitutional requirements on particularity of description. Further, it was not disputed that Judge Reyes personally examined NBI Special Agent Investigator II Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo Abratique, who personally saw and handled the marijuana. The non-attachment of the depositions of the two is not fatally defective as long as there is evidence on record showing what testimony was presented and that such was never raised by appellant. The NBI submitted a detailed sketch of the ensuring that there would be no mistake. reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the from other places in the community. Hence, sufficient. premises prepared by Abratique The executing officer, can with place intended and distinguish it the description of the place was Hence, the search warrant complied with the constitutional requirements. Vena V. Verga 119