Case Digests

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Duncan vs. Glaxo Case Digest Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc. G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004 FACTS: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid... ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid RULING: On Equal Protection Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee. On Constructive Dismissal Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. 1 Cynthia S. Bolos vs Danilo T. Bolos G.R. 186400 October 20. 2010 Facts: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. Later, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. Later, a copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely appealed an appeal. RTC subsequently denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied and the RTC issued the order declaring the decision which granted the annulment as final and executory. This lead to Danilo filing with the CA a petition for certiorari to annul the orders of the RTC. The CA granted the petition and reversed the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. Issue: W/N the phrase “Under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Respondent’s Contention: Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. Held: Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s 2 interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages." A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010 FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother? HELD: Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCexplicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the 3 party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. Grace Garcia vs Rederick Recio 366 SCRA 437 – Civil Law – Conflict of Laws – Foreign Law – Divorce Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on Ja In some cases, it might be combined with other treatments, such as chemotherapy and/or radiation therapy.nuary 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcia’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. Republic vs Dayot Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008 FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement. HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The 4 court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time. So Vs. Valera n Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, the Supreme Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband and the wife were in a common law relationship for 18 long years, had 3 children, and then got married. The husband subsequently filed a petition for annulment of marriage based on his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity. Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in 1975, 1978 and 1984) and established a business. On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him. The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of November 8, 1999. The RTC concluded that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her martial obligations. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological incapacity. According to the CA, Lorna’s character, faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although Lorna’s condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an “Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying with obligations essential to marriage. The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when the latter came home late was “a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him. Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the case of Molina. Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated October 18, 2001. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. According to the Supreme Court: Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono. While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind. In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, 5 rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable. . . As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship between the petitioner and respondent was going well,and future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.” The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological disorder was incurable: . . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. . . In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.” In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse “snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. BESO VS. DAGUMAN A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000 Complainant: Zenaida S. Beso Respondent: Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan, Pagsanjan, Samar Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago Facts: Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with the following facts: (a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar; (b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant; (c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered; (d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent. The respondent averred with the following rationale: (a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy; (b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married; (c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. (d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000). 6 Issues: The issues raised in this complaint are: (1) Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and (2) Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and not registering the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar. Held: (1) Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent member of the judiciary with the court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction: (1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death; (1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; (1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. In this case, non of the three instances is present. (2) Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to register the marriage is the respondent’s duty. The same article provides, “It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage… to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.”. The recommendation of the OCA stands. Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 429 FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas were married at Manila City Hall where they executed a marriage contract. A marriage license number was indicated in the contract, which Jaime never applied for. A church ceremony was conducted on May 31, 1969 using the same license. They lived as husband and wife and later on went to Spain for Jaime‘s medical education supported by Jaime‘s parents. When in Spain their marriage turned bad since Jaime was having a hard time balancing marriage and medical studies; obsession of Jaime with Carmelita‘s knees which he would take countless pictures of, intrafemural sex between her knees which are attributed to Jaime‘s drug addiction. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial separation in 1983. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States. Sevilla presented 3 certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan which states that the marriage license with that number cannot be found. The parish where they were wed presented a Certified copy of a Marriage certificate dated April 11, 1994. RTC ruled that marriage is null due to lack of marriage license. CA reversed RTC‘s decision. Marriage license was probably issued but cannot be located ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid HELD: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed. The local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." Failure to locate does not mean non-existence of the marriage license. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the indissolubility of marriage bonds. Always presume marriage. Joselano Guevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.7136, August 1, 2007 Facts: Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent. After leaving the conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living together in a residential house few blocks away from 7 the church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene. Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of merit. Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court. Issue: Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct? Ruling: Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal) Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay) Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent. Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the 8 couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second. Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause is the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. Syed Azhar Abbas vs Gloria Goo-Abbas Civil Law – Family Code – Bigamy – Void Ab Initio Marriage – Lack of a Marriage License Remedial Law – Evidence – Probative Value – Public Records In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo. Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura. To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo. 9 To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas. Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else. The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality). ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio. HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license. The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas. The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning. Navarro vs Domagtoy Navarro vs. Domagtoy AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996 FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law. It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void. HELD: The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable. Tenebro vs Court of Appeals Civil Law – Family Code – Bigamy – Exists even if one marriage is declared void Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating 10 that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Ferancullo vs. Ferancullo AILEEN A. FERANCULLO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, JR., Respondent A.C. No. 7214 November 30, 2006 Tinga, J FACTS: Petitioner Aileen Ferancullo filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent, Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. The two met in February 2004 when petitioner was referred to respondent as she was in need of legal aid concerning a string of complaints for estafa filed against her. Soon after, the two started their romantic relationship when allegedly ended up to their marriage on August 4, 2004. In an information filed by the petitioner, respondent Ferancullo allegedly took advantage of their attorney-client relationship to extort money from her in consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into marrying him by concealing his previous marriage. ISSUE: WON the respondent be suspended or disbarred from being a member of the bar. RULING: The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage certificate plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between respondent and complainant on 4 August 2004, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. The marriage certificate should prevail over respondent’s claim that the marriage certificate or his signature therein was falsified. Respondent’s intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Thus, the Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is adequate to penalize respondent for his grossly immoral conduct . Tenchavez vs Escano 15 Phil 355 Torts and Damages – When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises – Unfounded Suit 11 In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence he’s asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaños. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents. On the part of Escaño’s parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. Van Dorn vs Romillo, Jr. Leave a comment 139 SCRA 139 FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong Kong. After they divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership. Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property.Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy. ISSUE: Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property. HELD: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standard of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to use in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 12 To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653 FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Llorente vs CA 345 scra 592 Nationality Principle Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente? HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. 13 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner. Grace Garcia vs Rederick Recio 366 SCRA 437 – Civil Law – Conflict of Laws – Foreign Law – Divorce Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcia’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. Quita vs Court of Appeals December 22, 1998 Fact of the Case: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio. Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo. Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their country’s national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo. 14 WOLFGANG ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted to the father. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court. 2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded? RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577) Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law Tags: Divorce, Marriage 0 Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation. March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA. Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity? Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.” 15 Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Republic vs Orbecido Republic vs. Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006 ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents. FACTS: Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City. ISSUE: Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be intervenor in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife? RULING: No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved 16 the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based. G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007 FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? RULING: A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. San Luis vs. San Luis Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this. Facts FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages: 17 VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963 MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973 FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence -when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati -petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds: Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death) No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC) ---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff: Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue RTC Makati: Dismissed petition CA: reversed and set aside Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law WON Venue properly laid? YES -The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases. -there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's book) -it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again ---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void. Bayot vs CA G.R. No. 155635 Posted by kaye lee on 6:57 PM G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008 FACTS: On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California. In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997. She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity, 18 docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid. Ruling: Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid. Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic. Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations. The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG GR 186571 Facts Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he returned to the Philippines he found out that his wife was having an affair with another man 19 He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the same was granted After two years from the effectivity of the divorce decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to love Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the divorce decree on his and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce before the RTC RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code Issue W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree Ruling The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is “to avoid the absurd situation whre the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family Code provides the direct exception to the rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree) whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law Remedy Available to Alien Spouse The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132) Manzano vs Sanchez Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001 FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: 20 Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. ENRICO vs HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO & TRINIDAD MEDINACELI G.R. No. 173614 FACT: It is petition assailing the RTC’s reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed filed action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents father. Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad CatliMedinaceli, were married on June 14, 1962, begotten seven children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another woman named Lolita Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio passed away. Respondents filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petitioner and the respondent’s late father on two grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the requisite of marriage license, and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony due to respondent’s father serious illness that made its performance impossible. Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her exemption from getting marriage license. She sought then the dismissal of the respondent’s filed action by citing the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par. (a) Rule of the family code. Pursuant to “AM-02-11-10-SC” embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed the respondents filed action. Respondents filed motion for reconsideration invoking the ruling in the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a voidable marriage even after death of one of the spouses. RTC granted the motion and issued an order for reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby petitioner assailed a petition directly to Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1.)Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of Eulogio. 2.) Whether which of the two rule “AM 02-11-10-SC” or “Niñal v. Bayadog” shall govern the instant case HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity of the second marriage after the death of their father; because the rule on “AM 02-11-10-SC” shall govern the said petition, under the Family Code of the Philippines. Particularly Sec 2, par. (a) Provides that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern this case not the held decision on Niñal v. Bayadog case whereas the two cases expressed a common cause of issue? Here the court resolved that; in Niñal v. Bayadog case the heirs were allowed to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s second marriage even after their father’s death because the impugned marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Unlike in this case Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli where same holding cannot be applied because the marriage here was celebrated in 2004 where the Family Code is already effective and under family code is embodied the rule on “AM 02-11-10-SC” where this rule shall govern petitions for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages. Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs have still remedy to protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. Ty vs CA GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000 FACTS: Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on 21 April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty. HELD: SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Alcantara vs. Alcantara G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007 Facts: Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Was there an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio? Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification 22 to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. LLAVE V. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011] PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio. FACTS: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow. On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. HELD: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. RATIO: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity. As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or 23 this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.” HELD: The petition is DENIED. Sally Go-Bangayan vs Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. 0 0 SPONSORED ADS 0 2 0 0 0 Civil Law – Family Code – Marriage – Bigamy – Non-existent marriage In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982. In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous. HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of. SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code. HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997 24 FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection. ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity. HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage. Republic vs CA and Molina (G.R. No. 108763) Posted: August 18, 2011 in Case Digests Tags: Marriage, Psychological Incapacity, Void Marriages 0 This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and Reynaldo Molina’s marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code. FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a 25 psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the SolicitorGeneral to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. MARCOS V. MARCOS Facts Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. Issues Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. Held Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, 26 there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina. FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS GR NO 162368 July 17, 2006 Petitioner: Ma. Armida Perez-ferraris Respondent: Brix Ferraris Nature of the Case: Motion for reconsideration of the decision of the SC POnente: Ynares- Santiago, J. Issue: WON psychological incapacity exists in a given case Facts: 1) Reconsideration of the resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA RTC: denying petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage with Brix Ferraris - Suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity CA: affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court - Evidence did not establish proof of psychological incapacity not shown that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of marriage - Dr. dayan’s testimony failed to establish how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has mixed personality disorder and failed to show that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent’s character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying w/ essential marital obligations DECISION OF SC: motion for reconsideration is DENIED; motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error is DENIED WITH FINALITY REASONS: 1) Issue of WON psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case 2) Psychological incapacity- refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage; malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of marital bond one is about to assume; most serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to a marriage 3) During the relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent 4) Problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent’s infidelity 5) Respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving the house” attitude whenever they quarreled, violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, sexual infidelity, abandonment and lack of support and his preference to spend more time with his bandmates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage 6) Psychological defects spoken here were more of a “difficulty” if not “outright” refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity 7) It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological not physical illness 8) Sanctity of marriage stated in Constitution—protected by the state 9) Art 36 should not be confused with divorce law nor equated with legal separation 27 Te vs Yu-Te Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They did not have interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he is young and jobless but due to Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home. Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed for an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties’ unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines. ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina. HELD: The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining PI. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.” The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness. Set of [Strict] Standards in the Interpretation of Art 36 of the FC Established in the Molina Case (RP vs Molina) (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 28 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.” Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church— while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. So Vs. Valera n Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, the Supreme Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband and the wife were in a common law relationship for 18 long years, had 3 29 children, and then got married. The husband subsequently filed a petition for annulment of marriage based on his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity. Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in 1975, 1978 and 1984) and established a business. On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him. The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of November 8, 1999. The RTC concluded that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her martial obligations. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological incapacity. According to the CA, Lorna’s character, faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although Lorna’s condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an “Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying with obligations essential to marriage. The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when the latter came home late was “a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him. Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the case of Molina. Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated October 18, 2001. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. According to the Supreme Court: Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono. While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind. In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable. . . As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all indicate an 30 irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship between the petitioner and respondent was going well,and future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.” The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological disorder was incurable: . . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. . . In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.” In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse “snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. Suazo v. Suazo G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010 Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind HAD8J5EKCNKC Facts: A and B were married when they were 16 years old. They lived with B’s parent. A took odd jobs while B refused to work and was most of the time drunk. A urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, A left B 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36. A testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that B was psychologically incapacited. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage but the CA reversed it. Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Art. 36. Held: A’s evidence is insufficient to establish B’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated B’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of B’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to A’s psychological condition, this is not true for B’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of B’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. G.R. No. 173138 Baccay vs Baccay and Republic FACTS: 31 Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's snobbish and hard-to get traits attractive. Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. They agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the two had several romantic episodes. In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly married Maribel. The two lived on Noel's family. Maribel remained aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have sex with him. Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense quarrel about Maribel's alleged miscarriage causing the latter to leave the house and never came back. Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground of Maribel's alleged psychological incapacity. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who presented as Noel's witness, found Maribel unable to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist failed to establish that Maribel's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated under the Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent, G.R. No. 178741, promulgated on January 17, 2011. 639 SCRA 557, 567 Legal Issue: Is psychological evaluation a necessity for the establishment of psychological incapacity of a spouse for declaration of nullity of marriage? Legal Facts: In 1967 petitioner Rosalino Marable and respondent Myrna Marable were students in Arellano University who became lovers after they met in a bus. They got married on December 19, 1970, in civil rites of Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra, and that following day is a church wedding at the Chapel of Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. Somehow they were blessed with 5 children but several years after the marriage their relationship got soured with frequent quarrels as a consequence, their daughter rebelled and unexpectedly she got pregnant at her young age. Eventually, the petitioner had incessant marital conflicts leading to withdrawal of marital obligations. Rosalino Marable filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his own psychological incapacity. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who reported that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse which rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. The RTC granted the petition; 32 on the other hand the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC thus judgment of the Court denied the appeal. Holding and Reasoning: In this case yes but the examination still doesn’t corroborate the contention of psychological incapacity. The Court said that the petitioner was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities apparently, it doesn’t constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations. Policing: Psychological examination by means of getting the emotional quotient through test must be properly observed in every couple prior to marriage. Greater advantage if sets of personality and psychological examination after attending marriage seminars should be one of the additional requisites prior to the solemnization and in order to prevent any future relationship hostilities before entering marriage life. Synthesis: In Marable v. Marable, 639 SCRA 557, 567, The Supreme Court ruled that conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the provision in Article 36 does not stress either of its characteristic as to the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability, indicating such guidelines that the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff to which its medical or psychological examination clearly explains or bring about such totality of evidence in establishing psychological incapacity. YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011 Facts: Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December 21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood, petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be declared null and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination because of the respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to change children’s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence, this petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Ruling: No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: gravity, juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 33 Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as: true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In this case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but they have gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any major parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity. Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner vs Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondents G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011 Facts: Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin. He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose. Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage. Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history. On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability. OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision. Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Ruling: 34 No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage. The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity. Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively. Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Marcelino Galang vs Court of Appeals 0 0 SPONSORED ADS 0 0 0 0 0 Civil Law – Law on Sale – Conditional Sale – Specific Performance In July 1976, the Buenaventura siblings sold two parcels of land to Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang. The terms of the sale are as follows: 1. Galang shall pay 25% downpayment; 2. The next 25% shall be paid within the next three months or upon removal of the encargado (tiller-farmer) of the land. After payment, the Buenaventuras shall deliver the title to Galang; 3. The remaining 50% shall be payable within one year from the execution of the contract of sale subject to 12% interest per annum in case of delay. Galang made the downpayment. However, upon Galang’s offer of the second payment within the agreed period, the Buenaventuras refused to accept the payment as they insisted that the contract did not really contain the true intention of the parties. Now under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, in situations like this, the adverse party (the Galangs) has the option to either compel the other party to fulfill the contract of sale (specific performance) or ask for its rescission. Galang sued the Buenaventuras in court and filed for specific performance against them. The trial court however ruled that specific performance is not an option because it appears that the encargador is an agricultural tenant protected by PD 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant-Tillers in NonRice/Corn Producing Private Agricultural Lands). Said encargador cannot be simply excluded from the land. Hence, the condition of excluding the encargador is a legally impossible condition imposed on the contract of sale and cannot be complied with the by Buenaventuras without violating the law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals are correct. HELD: No. The interpretation of the lower courts of the contract is wrong. An action for specific performance should be allowed. The contract between the parties here is a contract to sell, which is still a form of a conditional sale. What we have here is a contract to sell for it is the transfer of ownership, not the perfection of the contract that was subjected to a condition. Note that after the parties agreed to the terms of the contract, it is only when the second term is fulfilled, i.e. payment of the second 25%, will the title vest in Galang. 35 The second term/condition in the contract merely provides the period as to when the Galang should pay the second 25%, i.e., pay it within the next three months from the execution of the contract or pay it when the encargador was removed from the land. The removal of the encargador is not a condition. Further, it is even of no moment whether or not the encargador is one which was contemplated under PD 1038. The conclusions of the Court of Appeals that the encargador is that kind of a tenant protected by PD 1038 were not fully substantiated. Given the amount of time that had elapsed since the filing of this case, the Galangs should immediately pay the remaining 75% to the Buenaventura and the latter shall deliver the title to the Galangs. The interest stipulated in the contract is no longer enforced because of the fact that while the case was pending, the Buenaventuras were still in possession of the land. AURELIO vs. AURELIO G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011 Facts: On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as seen from her quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and found that respondent’s petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with the Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. On October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Issues: Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid. Ruling: Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness, and (c) non-compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition for dismissal is denied. Cariño vs Cariño 0 0 SPONSORED ADS 0 1 0 0 9 Article 40 In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. 36 Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all. CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO April 6, 2000 (GR No. 136467) PARTIES: Petitioner: MARIETTA CALISTERIO Respondent: ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO FACTS: • Marietta is the wife of the deceased, Teoderico Calisterio. • 13 January 1946, petitioner was married to James William Bounds • 11 February 1947, James Bounds disappeared without a trace • 08 May 1958, after 11 years, Teodorico and Marietta were married without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead • 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate • 09 October 1992, prespondent Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of deceased, claiming that she is the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, and alleging that the marriage between the latter and respondent being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void • The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia, but the CA reversed the decision. ISSUE: WON the marriage between deceased Teoderico C. And Marietta C. is valid. HELD: Yes. The law in force at the time of their marriage was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such 37 person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: 1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or 2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court Unlike in the Family Code, the New Civil Code does not necessitate a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. Republic vs. CA GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005 FACTS: Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as parttime taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD: The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC. Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews 38 and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality. HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such. Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy 143 SCRA 449 FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage. ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void. HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law. NARAG VS. NARAG (291 SCRA 451 06/29/1998) FACTS: Atty. Narag’s spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred. HELD: Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER 39 G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000 Facts: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss. Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. TODA, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS September 26, 2012 § Leave a comment TODA, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS March 26, 1990 (183 SCRA 713) FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno. After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further “disagreeable proceedings,” filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981. HELD: We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 “(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.” Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of 40 said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005 FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[ Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition ISSUE: 1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. 2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. HELD: the petition is denied. 1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between 41 respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent. 2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .” Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[ The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. NOTES: In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. De la Cruz v. Segovia GR# 149801 / JUNE 26, 2008 555 SCRA 453 FACTS Sometime in July 1985, Florindala wanted to purchase the Lot 503 and 505 located in Sta Mesa Manila for P180,000.00. Short of fund, she asked her sister Leonila to take the Lot 503 for P80,000. But Leonila with only P36,000 hard=earned savings, Florinda advanced her P64,000 for the full payment of the said lot. It was only on September 1991, did these sisters entered a payment scheme agreement. However, Florinda filed with 42 RTC on March 1996, a complaint annulling said agreement on the ground, among others that since her husband, Renato did not sign, it is void. ISSUE Whether or not subject Agreement is void absent the husband’s signature. HELD No. The absence of Renato’s signature in the agreement bears little significance to its validity. Art 124 of the FC provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife, in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. It requires the WRITTEN consent of the other spouse, of authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property, without which the disposition is void. The foregoing The foregoing provision finds no application in this case because the transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property belonging toFlorinda. At the outset, by paying the P36,000, Leonila shall have the Lot 503 and remaining balance be paid subsequently. Clearly, the transaction between sisters is that of a loan and not a sale of property. Though the lots are named under Florinda and her husband, it merely served as a security over the P64,000 advanced by Florinda. Even assuming that the transaction involves disposition of asset, the mere fact of Renato ,not signing on the agreement cannot negate the fact of his consent. First, he was present when the agreement was drawn by his wife and Leonila. Second, it was in fact presented to him for signature, but Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband. MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010 Facts: A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of AlfredoGozon. On 23 December 1991, Elvira Gozon, Alfredo’s wife, filed a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was also annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-10508. October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI). Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. Issues: Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to Buy and Sell he entered with Alfredo. Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with Alfredo. Ruling: No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. Still, Alfredo can’t sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or given authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is void. No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the property hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s donation of the property to Winifred was 43 without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith. Valdes vs CA Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage. In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply." Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. Issues: Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar. Held: Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial 44 court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996). Spouses Buenaventura vs. CA Post under case digests, Civil Law at Wednesday, March 07, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children. The petitioners contend that there was no actual valid consideration and that assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the small sums appearing therein. The RTC ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case. RTC’s ruling was affirmed by CA. Hence the appeal. Issue:Whether or not there was a valid consideration in the deeds of sale Held: If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave. Gonzales vs Gonzales Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147-Property Regime of void marriage] FACTS: After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza business. In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage." 45 In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage. RULING: No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code. These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. ABING V. WAEYAN (Coownership) 497 SCRA 202 July 31, 2006 Facts: In 1986, petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax declaration was thereafter transferred to respondent’s name. In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. Eventually, petitioner demanded respondent to vacate the annex structure when respondent failed to pay petitioner’s share in their properties. Petitioner alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the annex structure. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner. Held: Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom. Sales vs. Sales GR No. 174803 | Julky 13, 2009 | J. Quisumbing Marywin Albano Sales filed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties against her husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales Reynolan filed for the declaration of the nullity of the their marriage Consolidated and tried jointly Jan 4, 2004 – RTC declared marriage void due to mutual psychological incapacity, and directed them to liquidate, partition, and distribute their common property (FC 147) within 60 days from receipt of decision, and comply with FC 50, 51, and 52 as may be applicable 46 June 16, 2003 – After the decision became final, Marywin filed for execution and a manifestation listing her assets ith Reynolan for partition Reynolan opposed motion RTC already ordered the distribution of their common properties without specifying what these were Marywin has no share in the properties she identified because these were the fruits solely of his undustry Not a co-ownership  did not live together as husband and wife Marywin appropriated rentals of his properties and disposed one of them without his consent PRAYED for deferral of the resolution of the motion for execution  issues he raised should be resolved first Sept 3, 2003 – RTC set the case for hearing on Sept 25, 2003 and ordered the reception of evidence on claims Nov 24, 2003 – Marywin filed a reiterative motion for execution to implement the decision and to order partition of common properties Copy was furnished to Reynolan’s counsel Nov 28, 2003 – Reiterative motion heard in the absence of Reynolan and his counsel; RTC issued an order approving the proposed project of partition; clerk of court ordered to execute deeds of conveyance to distribute 8 townhouse units Dec 16, 2003 – Reynolan moved to reconsider RTC’s Order, prayed for its reversal, and reinstatement of Sept 25, 2003 Order (reception of evidence before partition) Grant of Marywin’s motion preempted issues he raised Marywin opposed Reynolan’s motion Issues of alleged fraudulent sale and non-accounting of rentals ere already waived by Reynolan when he failed to set them up as compulsory counterclaims in the case Court ordered liquidation and distribution; already a resolved issue April 12, 2004 – RTC denied Reynolan’s MR July 26, 2006 – CA ruled in favor of Nolan; remanded case to lower court for reception of evidence ISSUE Whether or not CA erred when it entertained respondent’s appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution HELD NO. 1) There were matters of genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husband’s consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each party. 2) The extent of properties due to respondent is not yet discernible without further presentation of evidence on the incidental matters he had previously raised before the RTC. Since the RTC resolved these matters in its Orders dated November 28, 2003 and April 12, 2004, disregarding its previous order calling for the reception of evidence, said orders became final orders as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the parties’ common properties. As such, it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal. Dino v. Dino Dino v. Dino G.R. No. 178044; January 19, 2011 FACTS: Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and sweethearts who started living together in 1984, separated in 1994, and lived together again in 1996. On January 14, 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On May 30, 2001, petitioner filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of the respondent’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, abandoned her responsibility to the family and that she was 47 unfaithful. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce and was granted by the Superior Court of California and that she married a certain Manuel Alcantara. Doctor Tayag submitted a report establishing that the respondent was suffering from Narcissitic Personality Disorder. ISSUE: Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code? HELD: Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Articles 40 and 45 and not under Article 36 which is the ground for the nullification of the petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Thus, the decision of the trial court is affirmed but with modifications. Agapay vs Palang Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina. In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision. Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel and Erlinda and the second, in favor of Erlinda alone. (2) The CA erred in not declaring Kristopher as Miguel’s illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel’s estate. (3) The CA erred “in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CAG.R. No. 24199. Issues: 1. Who owns the riceland? 2. Who owns the house and lot? 3. Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership? 4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession? Held: 1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. 48 Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same. Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. 2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. 3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred. 4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997). Tumlos vs Fernandez GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000 FACTS: 49 Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148. HELD: SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares. Mallilin vs Castillo Mallilin vs. Castillo GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000 FACTS: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the 50 name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. HELD: The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings. Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corporation GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005 FACTS: Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property. ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo. HELD: 51 The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise. The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed. Atienza vs de castro FACTS: The brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. were co-owners of a 26-ha. fishpond in Polo, Bulacan (now Valenzuela City). On Jan. 24, 1956, they leased the fishpond to Gregorio Atienza for five years from January 24, 1956, at a rental of P5,000 a year. The first year's rental was to be paid on February 1, 1956, the second on February 1, 1957 and the rental for the last three years on February 1, 1958. Rent for the first year was paid on time. Tomas died soon thereafter. In November 1956, Arsenio Sr. reached an agreement with Atienza for the former to return the P5,000 paid rental in exchange for the annulment of the lease contract. They intended to secure the consent of Tomas’ widow Felisa but she refused to sign the agreement. Failing to obtain the agreed refund, Atienza filed a collection suit on Jan. 7, 1957. The trial court and the appellate court dismissed the case on the ground that Felisa’s consent was not needed to cancel the lease as between Arsenio Sr. and Atienza; but Arsenio Sr. was ordered to pay Atienza P2,500 plus attorney’s fees and costs (which represented his share of the refund), hence the appeal to the SC by his descendants. ISSUE: W/N a co-owner needs to obtain the consent of the other co-owners to lease her share. HELD/RATIO: NO. The suit stemmed from Arsenio Sr.’s mistaken belief that Felisa’s consent was required to cancel the lease contract. Arsenio Sr. did not refund the 2,500 to Atienza because he failed to secure the consent of his sister-in-law, but such consent is not required to cancel the lease contract as between him and Atienza. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” Each co-owner is free to lease his interest in a property without forcing the other co-owners to lease theirs; and a cancellation of this lease does not affect the interests of the other co-owners, hence their consent is not required. According to the Court: “The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: 52 "Our view of the contract of lease Exhibit 1 is that each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-half interest in the fishpond they owned in common to the plaintiff. Could one of them have validly leased his interest without the other co-owner leasing his own? The answer to this is given by appellant in his own brief (p. 14) when he said that it would result in a partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half. If the lease could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as between plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's onehalf undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff.” Therefore, the lease of Arsenio Sr.’s one-half interest was validly cancelled, and he should refund his share of the rent to Atienza. ACRE VS YUTTIKKI Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM G.R. No. 153029 September 27 2007 [Art 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriages] FACTS: Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his prior marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting. Sofronio and Evangeline acquired properties where one parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttikki, married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki, married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married to Jose del Mar. Sofronio died after more than 24 years of union with Evangeline. The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of properties and/or partition with damages. They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject properties with his fund. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested properties. RULING: Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested properties. The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, considering that their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. If there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership. 53 The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here. The certificate of title on its face show that the one property were exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is well-settled that the words "married to" preceding Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status of Evangeline. Hontiveros vs. RTC GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151. ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151. HELD: SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151. VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 349 SCRA 135 FACTS: 54 1. Troadio Manalo died intestate in Manila on February 14, 1992. 2. He was survived by his wife Pilar and his eleven children. 3. At the time f his death, Troadio left several properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. 4. Eight of his children, herein respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo as administrator. 5. The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directed the publication of the order for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. 6. It also directed service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs mentioned in the petition. 7. On the date set for the hearing for the petition, the trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world in default, except the government.” 8. The trial court set the reception of evidence of petitioners. 9. However, the order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners Pilar and the remaining three other children. 10. The trial court issued an order admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate. 11. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 12. Among their contentions was the absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members of the same family; and no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition. 13. The CA denied the petition so was with a Motion for Reconsideration. 14. Hence this petition averring that the petitioner should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with as their was failure to comply with the requirement in Article 222 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an ordinary civil action? Would Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code apply as a ground for the dismissal of the petition? HELD: It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of 55 Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 4, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father. Concededly, the petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admission and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaim for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo in as much as the latter provision is clear enough. Article 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear form the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or person against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law afford him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family. Manacop vs. CA GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992 FACTS: Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is 56 therefore exempt from attachment. ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment. HELD: The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010 Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. Ruling: 57 Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid. GR No. 170829 PATRICIO VS. DARIO NOVEMBER 20, 2006 FACTS: M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his estate. One of the properties he left was the family home. A new title for the said property was thereafter issued under the name of the wife and the two children as co-owners. After some time, the wife and one of the sons expressed their desire to partition the family home and terminate the co-ownership. The other son opposed the partition on the ground that the family home should remain despite the death of one or both the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the decedent. ISSUE: Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such a partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home. 58 HELD: To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants' contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, respondents. November 24, 2010 G.R. No. 175080 FACTS: Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan (4,527 square meters, more or less, and covered by a TCT --property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents). Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) filed a complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan alleging that they’re the legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land( that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property). 59 Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property. According to Eugenio: Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada receivedP50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Provincial Adjudicator – Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse, should have peaceful possession of the land. DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. !!! ON APPEAL, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir. ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute. HELD: NO. RATIO: We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book “Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus: The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: “The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack. De Jesus vs. The Estate of decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001 JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., 60 INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents. Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G. Dizon in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August 23, 1964 and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the following year, Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion for reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings. Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with their submission of their answers and several motions, they filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the complaint. They contend that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. They also asserted that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of paternity and filiation because the same could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding. And at this instance, the trial court favored with the respondents and therefore dismissed the complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of action and being improper. 61 Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent. Ruling: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment. However, based on the records presented, they showed that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. 62 Estate of Ong v. Diaz GR No. 171713, December 17, 2007 Chico-Nazario, J. Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts:  Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her mother Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support against Rogelio Ong before RTC  February 1993: Jinky married Japanese Hasegawa Katsuo  November 1993: Jinky and Rogelio got acquainted and fell in love  January 1994-September 1998: Jinky and Rogelio cohabited  February 1998: Joanne was born, Rogelio paid all expenses, recognized child as his  September 1998: Rogelio abandoned them and stopped giving support, alleging that he is not the father of the child  RTC ordered defendant to recognize plaintiff as natural child and provide monthly support  RTC granted Rogelio’s Motion for New Trial (because he was declared in default before)  RTC declared Joanne to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz. Support to continue until she reaches majority age.  Rogelio appealed to CA but he died in February 2005 during its pendency  December 2000: CA granted appeal and remanded case to RTC for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of Joanne Issue: WoN CA erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to Rogelio’s death Held: No, the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA  Even if Rogelio already died, any of his biological samples may be used for DNA testing  “Biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs, and bones.  Death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. According to jurisprudence, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. (People v. Umanito, citing Tecson v. COMELEC) Petition denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed. Quita vs CA- please see case 20 Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli “Corazon” Angeles MAGLAYA (G.R. No. 153798; Sept 2, 2005; J. Garcia) FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that she and Francisco adopted a child. Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous 63 possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf, and she also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”. Pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her scholastic and government service records, were also offered as evidence. RTC ruled in favour of Petitoner, CA ruled in favor of respondent. ISSUE: WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado? HELD: NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter. Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased. Herrera vs. Alba Facts: In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armi’s allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against selfincrimination. ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct. HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002). In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, 64 whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires: Whether the theory or technique can be tested, Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review, Whether the rate of error is acceptable, Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with. What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological father? Then the evidence is merely corroborative. Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination MONTEFALCON vs. VASQUEZ G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008 FACTS: In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. Vasquez was declared in default for failure to answer the service of summons(substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in tryingand deciding the case as it "never" acquired 65 jurisdiction over his person, aswell as in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant." The appellate court granted Vasquez’s contention. ISSUE: Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence. HELD: YES. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act. As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove that. JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Nachura, J.) Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mother’s account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal documents. Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent. Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. After learning of the RTC’s order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. 66 Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. ISSUE: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. HELD: Petition GRANTED. Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the “prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence.” It seeks “to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public.” Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) 67 was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established. Court order for blood testing equivalent to “search” under the Constitution. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; “Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.” The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. DOLINA V. VALLECERA GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010] DOCTRINE: To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond 68 question, support follows as matter of obligation. FACTS: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the child’s father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial support. RTC dismissed petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child? HELD: Yes. RATIO: Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera. 69 To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. n Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. HELD: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 70 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being. HERBERT CANG VS CA G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998 FACTS: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert. The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them. RULING: Yes. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child. Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." 71 In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims. Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998 Case Doctrines: ● Illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother , and this is rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. ● Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar Calasan (married), signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child. The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother. Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration. Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the decision. Issue: 72 Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity? Held: No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname. Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. DOLINA V. VALLECERA GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010] DOCTRINE: To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. FACTS: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. 73 Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the child’s father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial support. RTC dismissed petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child? HELD: Yes. RATIO: Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera. To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. 74 n Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. HELD: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being. HERBERT CANG VS CA G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998 FACTS: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's 75 extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert. The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them. RULING: Yes. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child. Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 76 Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changedto Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname. The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557. Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to 77 present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother. Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and reestablish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. De Asis vs. CA GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999 FACTS: Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right 78 to claim support. ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support. HELD: The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver. Gan v. Reyes Law in question: Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court Facts: Bernadette C. Pondevida instituted in behalf of her daughter, Francheska Joy, a complaint against herein petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. For failure to file an answer within the reglementary period, petitioner was declared in default. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex-parte. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to recognize Francheska as his illegitimate child and to support her monthly (20,000 a month to be paid every 15th starting April 15, 2000). Likewise, petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Bernadette moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling. Petitioner questioned the issuance of the writ of execution by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be 79 executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing. Ruling of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution? Held: No. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, hence, denied the petition. Ratio: According to the Court, Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance execution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. On the validity of the writ 80 Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy. Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice. On the issue of Paternity We note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano: The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enroll in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed. SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent. G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013 SUMMARY Mother of two seeks spousal and child support from rich husband. FACTS On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7 months that lapsed). Respondent filed an MFR asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and 81 respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The MFR was denied. His second MFR also having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well, and thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed. ISSUE W/N the CA erred in deducting said amount from the current total support in arrears DECISION The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal. Sagala-Eslao v. CA G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997 Facts: - Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. - Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. - Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. 82 - The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision. Issue: Does the Teresita have the right to the custody of the child? Ruling: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child. Santos Sr vs CA (G.R. 113054) FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate 83 court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-inlaw, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents. ISSUE: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. RULING: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH, Respondents. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter Simone. Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay. Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court, CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below. Held: The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. 7 Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. 1avvphi1 84 Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch. G.R. no. 168785 February 05, 2010 Dacasin v. Dacasin Herald Black Dacasin, petitioner vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin , respondent  FACTS: On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines. The following year respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.  ISSUE:  Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case  Whether the agreement or contract is valid   HELD: Case was dismissed dated March 1, 2005. Court’s Rationale:   It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent  The divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction Agreement is void   The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction. FACTS: Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the divorce decree obtained by 85 respondent is void. Thus, the divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case. In its order on June 23, 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration because petitioner is under the laws of his nationality, which is American. Hence, the petitioner filed alternative theories for the validity of the agreement: > The agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from the sole to joint > The agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondents II. ISSUE   Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit  Whether the trial curt can enforce the Agreement on joint custody HELD Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle Stephanie’s custody. (Article 213 of the Family Code lost its coverage over Stephanie. Stephanie was already almost 15 during this time thus, she is entitled to choose to whom she want to be) Instead of dismissing the case, court chose to remand the case in order to settle Stephanie’s custody. Court decided to REVERSE the orders dated March 1, 2005 and June 23, 2005. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. 86