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Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210September 1991 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX- C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer- entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; item braces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings and other similar work which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions. People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda January 24, 2000 FACTS: This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence. It was howevere found that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Held: Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking. As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGAA.M. , No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001 Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for “Falsification of Public Documents” before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her. This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that hehas been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. ATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN, G.R.No. L-27654 February 18, 1970FACTS: FACTS: Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title. RULING: ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. IN RE: LANUEVO A.M. NO. 1162 AUGUST 29, 1975 FACTS: Oscar Landicho sent a confidential letter to the Court for re- correction and reevaluation of his answers to the 1971 Bar examinations and respectively invited the attention of the Court to the startling fact that the grade in one examination (civil law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year. He argued that if the bar examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request and motion therefor is made. Upon checking of the records of the 1971 Bar examinations, a successful bar candidate named Ramon Galang underwent some changes which were authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Each of the 5 examiners admitted having re-evaluated and/or re- checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. An investigation conducted by the NBI further revealed that Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student of MLQU was charged with the crime of slight physical injuris in the MTC of Manila against Eufrosino de Vera. Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with such crime. In all his applications to take the bar examinations, he did not mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Lanuevo should be disbarred. 2. Whether or not Galang should be disbarred. HELD: 1. Yes. The bar confidant does not possess any discretion eith respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee’s answers merit re-evaluation or whether the examiner’s appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate’s admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules. The facts show how the respondent adroitly maneuvered the passing of the examinee in the 1971 Bar exams. The respondent is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as bar confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. 2. Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971. All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled. Re: application for admission to the bar Vs. Vicente d. Ching,applicant. Facts: vicente d. Ching, a legitimate son of the spouses tat ching, a chinese citizen, and priscila dulay, a filipina, was born in tubao,la union on april 11, 1964.since birth,ching has resided in the philippines. on july 17, 1998,ching , after graduated of bachelor of laws course at st. Louis university in baguio city,filed an application to take the 1998 bar exam.the supreme court allowed him to take provided that he can produce proof of his philippine citizenship.in compliance with said requirements,ching submitted the following documents: A.) Certification from board of accountancy of the prc showing that he is a certified public accountant. B.) Voter certification from comelec tubao la union. C.) Certification that he served as sangguniang panlungsod member.. on april 5, 1999 ching was included as one of the lucky passers of the bar exam and the schedule of their oath taking was on may 5, 1999 but he was not allowed to take his oath due the questionable citizenship issue. Issue: is his election to philippine citizenship within the reasonable time prescribed by the law? Ruling: no.since the applicant was born on 1964,the governing charter with regards to citizenship issue is the 1935 constitution.therefore as what is provided by the said constitution,which said that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a filipino mother with an alien father followed the citizenship of the father unless upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years of age elected philippine citizenship.in the case at bar,ching did not elect his citizenship when he reach 21 years old but instead in 1999 which is 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered as not within the reasonable period of time considering the length of 14 years after he reaches 21 years old.in addition to that,the court said that philippine citizenship can never be treated like commodity tha can be claimed when needed and supressed when convenient.in view of the foregoing,the court deny vicente d. Ching’s application for admission to the philippine bar. In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and for disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar, Melendrez. FACTS: 1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. 1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical Injuries. i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter. 2. Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. 2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding. 1. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.” i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude. 2. Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk. 3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non- disclosure against Meling: 1. Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. 2. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. ISSUE: WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES. HELD: PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the bar). 1. Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.” 1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. i. Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE. 1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. 3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.” 1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that. ALAWI V. ALAUYA Facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors- at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney Held: He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. AGUIRRE V. RAMA FACTS Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice- Mayor. Respondent also signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her petition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate. On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate). The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (“OBC”) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBC’s Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. Respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. HELD Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied admission to the Philippine bar. 1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. - Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as “counsel” in the pleadings - was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and of party REFORMA LM-PPC *all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys 2. What constitutes the “practice of law” - The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts - all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. - any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. - perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. - render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. * respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. 3. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. - limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. - A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. - although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. People v Leoncio Santocildes, Jr. Y Siga-an FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine years old. The court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. However, during the proceeding, accused-appellant was not represented by a member of the Bar. Hence, he filed a Notice of Appeal and praying that the judgment against him be set aside on the ground that he was denied of his right to be represented by a counsel which results to the denial of due process. The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during the trial was not a member of the Bar, he was afforded due process since he was given opportunity to be heard and records reveal that said person handled the case in a professional and skillful manner. ISSUE: Whether or not a person not member of the Philippine Bar may represent an accused in a criminal proceeding. HELD: NO. The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man may be convicted without a counsel, not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. A person has the right to due process, he must be heard before being condemned - a part of person's basic rights. The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in the Constitution (Art. III,Secs. 12 & 14(2)], Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 1 of Rule 115), Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and the Rules of Court (Sec. 1 of Rule 138) The assailed judgment is Set Aside, and the case is hereby Remanded to the trial court for new trial. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning FACTS: 1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS. 1. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. 1. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer. a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows: i. Cipriano 10% ii. Quintin Muning 10% iii. Atanacio Pacis 5% iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers 1. Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence. b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. 2. The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. 1. Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees: i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services. a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination. b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico. ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4 iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school records or credentials. 3. PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys. 4. Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported: 1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his witnesses had turned hostile. i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified. 2. Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys. i. Respondent falsified his school records ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law. 5. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys. 1. He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him. 2. He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to Manila. 3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he received, i. Court denied the Petition. ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of merit. 4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions. ISSUE: May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition. WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. YES. It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated. HELD: ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING. 1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. 2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and for the protection of courts, clients and the public. 3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated: 1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law 3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members: 1. YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court on behalf of its members 2. If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875: i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines. 3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations. PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent. Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation. After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUE W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza? HELD NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter’ under Rule 6.03. The 'matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al. The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect. It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore- discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides. CATU V. RELLOSA FACTS Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner brought the case to court. Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety. IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.031 and RA 67132. The committee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from practice for 1 month. ISSUE W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 HELD No. Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service. Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71603, which actually allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do. SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. __________ Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession? Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says “if the constitution or law allows it” Public officers however are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from their department head. Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, AC-5365. April 27, 2005 Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault. Held: 1 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in service 2 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees 3 Local Government Code of 1991 Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. “A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent’s full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately. In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26 FACTS: Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim. ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law. HELD: YES. Petition granted. RATIO: Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society. Emilio Grande vs Evangeline de Silva Facts: Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in a criminal case, for Estafa and BP22 in RTC Marikina against Sergio Natividad. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant a check in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad. When complainant deposited the check he was told the account was closed. He demanded the payment of the check from respondent which she ignored so she filed a criminal case, for Estafa and BP22 in RTC Marikina against Atty. De Silva and a disbarment case of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. IBP found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Issue: WON respondent should be suspended. Held: The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account. It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9] The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12] Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession. Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We cannot tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession. SUSPENDED FOR 2 YEARS.