NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0387-11T1 PETER INNES and VICTORIA SOLENNE INNES, by Her Guardian PETER INNES, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MADELINE MARZANO-LESNEVICH, ESQ., and LESNEVICH & MARZANO-LESNEVICH, Attorneys At Law, i/j/s/a, Defendants-Appellants/ Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. MITCHELL A. LIEBOWITZ, ESQ., PETER VAN AULEN, ESQ. and MARIA JOSE CARRASCOSA, Third-Party Defendants. _____________________________________________________ Argued October 8, 2013 – Decided April 7, 2014 Before Judges Messano, Hayden and Rothstadt. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7739-07. Christopher J. Carey argued the cause for appellant Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich, Esq. (Graham Curtin, P.A., and Lesnevich & Marzano-Lesnevich, LLC, attorneys; Michael R. Mildner, on the brief).
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION April 7, 2014 APPELLATE DIVISION
James H. Waller argued the cause for respondents Peter and Victoria Innes (Mr. Waller, attorney; Mr. Waller and Michael A. Casale, on the brief). Steven J. Tegrar argued the cause for respondent Peter Van Aulen (Law Offices of Joseph Carolan, attorneys; Mr. Tegrar and George H. Sly, Jr., on the brief). William F. O'Connor, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Mitchell A. Liebowitz, Esq. (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, L.L.P., attorneys; Mr. O'Connor, of counsel; Lawrence S. Cutalo, on the brief). Respondent Maria A. Carrascosa has not filed a brief. The opinion of the court was delivered by MESSANO, P.J.A.D. Plaintiff Peter Innes, individually and on behalf of his daughter, Victoria filed Solenne suit Innes (Victoria, defendants and collectively Marzano-
Lesnevich, an attorney, and her law firm, Lesnevich & MarzanoLesnevich The (the Lesnevich stemmed firm, from United and collectively defendants).1 improper mother,
complaint of Jose
defendants' States the
allegedly to to her
Separate counsel represented Innes and his daughter in the Law Division and on appeal, although plaintiffs filed a joint brief.
matrimonial proceedings between Innes and Carrascosa.2
alleged that Carrascosa used the passport in 2005 to "abduct" Victoria and bring her to Spain, where the child remains with her maternal grandparents, beyond the reach of her father. Defendants seeking client; filed an answer (1) the and third-party complaint former in the
contribution (2) Peter Van
Carrascosa, attorney for
matrimonial dispute; and (3) Mitchell Liebowitz, the attorney who initially represented Carrascosa. Before trial, Van Aulen
and Liebowitz were granted summary judgment, while defendants' motions seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint were denied. The court also sua sponte severed defendants' third-
party complaint against Carrascosa. Immediately before trial, defendants moved to exclude any claim for counsel fees, and to bar the testimony of plaintiffs'
The parties' divorce and related actions have resulted in several previous decisions in our courts, the federal courts and the courts of Spain. In our prior decision, we presented a comprehensive overview and held that New Jersey had subject matter jurisdiction over the parties' divorce, property distribution and child custody issues. Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J. Super. 453, 462 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 73 (2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1129, 129 S. Ct. 981, 173 L. Ed. 2d 167 (2009). See also Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir.) (affirming district court's determination that New Jersey Superior Court had authority to rule on the child's custody and to issue orders pertaining to the mother's civil contempt and incarceration), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 998, 129 S. Ct. 491, 172 L. Ed. 2d 363 (2008).
professional expert, attorney George Conk. both requests. The judge reserved
The judge denied on defendants'
motion to bar plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress damages. At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to establish proximate cause, and to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress
The judge denied both requests.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and awarded damages of $700,000 to Innes and $250,000 to Victoria. On May 20, 2011, judgment was entered that also included prejudgment interest of $133,815.07 for Innes and $47,791.09 for Victoria. On June 28, 2011, the judge entered an amended order
for judgment that additionally included counsel fees and costs for Innes and Victoria in the amounts of $158,517.70 and
$126,397.07, respectively. Defendants moved for a new trial or for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which the judge denied after initially judgment reserving pending decision. The of judge the granted a stay of
against Carrascosa. On July 18, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to
participate in the trial of defendants' third-party complaint against Carrascosa and to "bar the allocation of fault at
essentially that defendants were not entitled to contribution from Carrascosa. Defendants This appeal followed. raise myriad arguments regarding the
interlocutory orders denying their pre-trial motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint, as well as the orders granting Van Aulen and Liebowitz summary judgment. the trial itself, defendants contend the judge As to by
permitting Conk to testify, allowing the jury to award emotional distress damages without any medical testimony and amending his charge to the jury after defendants' summation. argue their motions for judgment and JNOV Defendants also have been
granted. Defendants also contend their third-party claim against
Carrascosa should not have been severed from the trial, and the judge erred by ultimately dismissing the complaint. defendants contest the award of any counsel fees. We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal standards. We affirm in part, reverse in Lastly,
part, and remand for entry of an amended judgment.3
Plaintiffs argue that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely, having not been filed within forty-five days of the (continued) 5
I. A. We first consider defendants' arguments regarding the pretrial orders granting Van Aulen and Liebowitz summary judgment. We need not set forth the entire factual history between Innes and Carrascosa, which was detailed in our prior opinion, see Innes, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 461-65, and we limit our
consideration as necessary to the motion record that existed when the orders were entered. See, e.g., Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J.
Super. 451, 463-64 (App. Div. 2000) ("In reviewing a summary judgment, we can consider the case only as it had been unfolded to that point and the evidential material submitted on that motion.") (citations omitted). In October 2004, Innes and Carrascosa were separated but neither had filed a divorce complaint. Van Aulen, was and four Carrascosa and was Innes was represented by by Liebowitz. with
represented years old and
(continued) July 18, 2011 amended judgment. R. 2:4-1(a). However, it was not until September 2, 2011, that the court dismissed the thirdparty complaint with prejudice, adopting the argument that plaintiffs made in their motion to intervene. Defendants' notice of appeal was timely filed thereafter. Plaintiffs' argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Carrascosa after the separation.
It suffices to say that the
instant litigation centered on the October 2004 agreement (the Agreement) executed by Innes and Carrascosa as it related to restrictions upon travel with Victoria. Super. at 462. Specifically, the Innes, supra, 391 N.J. Agreement, drafted by
Liebowitz on his letterhead, provided in relevant part: Neither . . . Carrascosa nor . . . Innes may travel outside of the United States with Victoria . . . without the written permission of the other party. To that end, Victoria['s] . . . United States and Spanish passport [sic] shall be held in trust by Mitchell A. Liebowitz, Esq. Victoria['s] . . . Spanish passport has been lost and not replaced, and its loss was reported to the Spanish Consulate in New York. . . . Carascosa [sic] will file an application for a replacement Spanish passport within [twenty] days of today. On November 23, 2004, Liebowitz responded to a letter
written by Sarah J. Jacobs, an associate with the Lesnevich firm, advising that Carrascosa had retained them and seeking release of the file.4 Liebowitz wrote: "As you may know, I am I would prefer picked up of by the
holding her daughter's United States Passport. if you arranged with On for the the original file to be
acknowledging Jacobs wrote
receipt to Van
Jacobs' prior surname was "Tremml." at trial bore that name.
The documentary evidence
indicating the Lesnevich firm's representation of Carrascosa and noting that, despite having signed the Agreement, Carrascosa
"ha[d] grave concerns" regarding provisions dealing with Innes' parenting time. Notes taken by Jacobs during an office
conference with Carrascosa on November 18, 2004, were filed in support of both Van Aulen's and Liebowitz's summary judgment motions. stole[n.] BACK[.]" In her deposition, Marzano-Lesnevich stated she received the file from Liebowitz and reviewed the Agreement sometime in December. the time, Victoria's United States passport was in the file at but it was missing after a December meeting with The notes contained the following: "Spanish passport GET
American passport turned over to attorney[.]
The implication was that Carrascosa had taken the
passport without Marzano-Lesnevich's foreknowledge. It was first revealed that Victoria was in Spain during proceedings before the Family Part in February 2005. In a
February 2006 letter to plaintiffs' attorney in this litigation, Marzano-Lesnevich claimed Liebowitz never advised her of "a
requirement to hold [the passport] in trust."
She also wrote:
"At the time we turned over the passport to the mother, the [A]greement between the parties was moot[,]" because "it had been repudiated by both parties immediately." (Emphasis added).
On this motion record, in December 2009, the judge granted Van Aulen summary judgment and dismissed the third-party claim against him. 2010 after Defendants moved for reconsideration in August securing the expert report of attorney John F.
In November 2010, the judge denied the motion for In his written opinion, the judge explained:
"Based on the facts herein, Van Aulen cannot be classified as a joint tortfeasor because he did not breach his duty to Innes and did not have a duty to anticipate that [defendants] would
violate a fiduciary obligation." Liebowitz sought summary judgment in August 2010. In
support, he attached defendants' answers to interrogatories in which they claimed that Carrascosa "took her daughter's
passport. over to
No one [at the firm] 'gave it' to her or 'turned it her.'" They also denied knowing that Carrascosa
intended to "remove Victoria . . . from the jurisdiction o[f] New Jersey." By the time Liebowitz's motion was filed, Jacobs had been deposed. She testified that Marzano-Lesnevich told her that she gave Victoria's passport to Carrascosa.
Carrascosa had also been deposed and testified that she always had Victoria's Spanish passport and it was never lost or stolen. Carrascosa asked the Lesnevich firm for Victoria's United States
passport and picked it up the day before her daughter travelled to Spain with her grandparents.5 Carrascosa also stated that she
told the firm "we were going to travel." In November 2010, the judge granted summary judgment to Liebowitz. after In his written opinion, the judge concluded that discharged him, Liebowitz could not have
reasonably anticipated that Innes would continue to rely on his (Liebowitz's) actions or representations. Liebowitz did not owe
a duty of care to Innes after transferring his file containing the passport to the Lesnevich firm. Defendants argue the judge erred by denying their motion for reconsideration of the prior summary judgment granted to Van Aulen and by granting Liebowitz summary judgment.6 "In an appeal
of an order granting summary judgment, appellate courts 'employ
Later testimony revealed that Victoria did not leave the United States until January 13, 2005, nearly a month after Carrascosa secured possession of the passport.
Defendants' notice of appeal did not list the November 2010 order denying reconsideration. See R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(A) (requiring the notice of appeal to include all orders for which review is sought). Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, we consider all issues raised regarding the dismissal of the third-party complaint against Van Aulen. See Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 461 (App. Div.) (recognizing that in some situations, "the basis for the motion judge's ruling on the summary judgment and reconsideration motions may be the same. In such cases, an appeal solely from the grant of summary judgment or from the denial of reconsideration may be sufficient for an appellate review of the merits of the case[.]"), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002).
the same standard [of review] that governs the trial court.'" Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Busciglio v. DellaFave, 366 N.J. Super. 135, 139 (App. Div. 2004)). We first determine
whether the moving party has demonstrated there were no genuine disputes as to material facts. Bottling Co., Inc., 387 N.J. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillside Super. 224, 230 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 189 N.J. 104 (2006). [A] determination whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party. [Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).] We then decide "whether the motion judge's application of the law was correct." 231. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 387 N.J. Super. at Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J.
We conduct our review de novo.
486, 499 (2012). Defendants were entitled to contribution from Van Aulen or Liebowitz only if either respectively was a joint tortfeasor, pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, N.J.S.A.
2A:53A-1 to -5 (JTCL).
Under the JTCL, "'joint tortfeasors'
means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1. "'It is common
liability at the time of the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action which is the Sine qua non of defendant's contribution right.'" Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 72
(2004) (quoting Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 200 (Law Div. 1974)). Since plaintiffs never asserted any claim against
either Van Aulen or Liebowitz, the inquiry is whether defendants presented plaintiffs. "The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are (1) the a of existence of care by of by an the attorney-client defendant relationship (2) the a prima facie case that either was liable to
attorney, and (3)
proximate McGrogan v. v. Hannoch
causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff." Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001) (citing Conklin
Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 416 (1996)). Defendants failed to present a prima facie case that Van Aulen Innes. committed When legal malpractice first in his for representation summary of
defendants produced no expert report supporting the elements of professional negligence. See e.g., Buchanan v. Leonard, 428
N.J. Super. 277, 288-289 (App. Div. 2012) ("As 'the duties a
lawyer owes to his client are not known by the average juror,' expert testimony must necessarily set forth that duty and
explain the breach.") (quoting Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 397 N.J. Super. 64, 78 (App. Div. 2007)). When DeBartolo's defendants report. sought reconsideration, the report they furnished some
"straightforward and prudent steps" Van Aulen might have taken, it did not state that he breached any professional standards or that proximately-caused that, because damages Carriscosa resulted. was solely Indeed, DeBartolo for
removing Victoria from the United States, defendants themselves were not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. The record also fails to support a claim that Liebowitz, who was not Innes's attorney, could be liable for breaching a duty owed to a non-client. Although our courts are generally
reluctant to permit a non-client to sue an adversary's attorney, LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 100 (2009), in limited
circumstances, "attorneys may owe a duty of care to non-clients when the attorneys know, or should know, that non-clients will rely on the attorneys' representations and the non-clients are not too remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection." Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 483-84 (1995).
"[T]he rule announced in Petrillo has been applied rather sparingly, . . . [but] [i]t is not . . . the only basis on which [the Court] ha[s] recognized the potential for a direct claim against an attorney by a nonclient." at 102. LoBiondo, supra, 199 N.J.
The Court has "authorized in principle a claim against
an attorney who participated in a civil conspiracy with the goal of assisting a client to engage in a fraudulent transfer of assets to the detriment of a lender." Ibid. (citing Banco
Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 177-78 (2005)). We have also recognized that "[p]rivity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary for a duty to attach 'where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which
Estate of Albanese v. Lolio, 393 N.J. Super. 355,
368-69 (App. Div.) (quoting Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 633 (App. Div. 1986)). a duty exists, "[t]he Ultimately, in determining whether question . . . is one of
Id. at 369. case, and Innes knew that were Liebowitz now had been
discharged, Carrascosa. upon Absent
At that point, he could no longer reasonably rely agreement to retain owed Victoria's no duty of passport. care to
Petrillo, supra, 139 N.J. at 482.
not reasonably foresee that, armed with full knowledge of the agreement and his expressed caution regarding the passport, Absent any
defendants would simply turn it over to Carrascosa.
reliance by Innes upon Liebowitz's continued retention of the passport, it would be patently unfair to extend a duty to
Liebowitz to safeguard the passport after he was discharged by Carrascosa. Summary defendants' Liebowitz. B. Defendants argue the judge erred by denying their motion for summary judgment before trial. In essence, they contend the Albanese, supra, 393 N.J. Super. at 369. judgment third-party was properly granted Van dismissing Aulen and
motion record failed to establish, and the judge did not find, that defendants owed Innes any duty, or that they made any
representations upon which Innes reasonably relied.7 In denying defendants' summary judgment motion, the judge reasoned:
Although not specifically contained in a point heading, defendants also contend the judge erred by denying them summary judgment on plaintiffs' alternative causes of action sounding in breach of contract, bailment, and breach of escrow. We need not address those issues because ultimately the case was submitted to the jury only as to the claim that defendants breached their professional duty.
[L]iability may be imposed on [defendants], not merely because [defendants] violated an RPC, but because of the affirmative acts of [defendants], specifically, the letters [defendants] sent to Liebowitz, [defendants'] awareness of the Agreement regarding Victoria's United States passport, accepting the passport with Carrascosa's file, and the notes and deposition testimony of the [defendants'] associates referencing the importance of the United States passport. The judge also concluded that a fact finder could determine that defendants should have foreseen Innes would rely upon them to retain Victoria's passport, return it to Liebowitz if they were not going to honor the agreement, or at least not let the
passport fall into Carrascosa's hands. We agree with defendants that whether a legal duty exists is a matter of law for the court. 479. Petrillo, supra, 139 N.J. at
But, contrary to defendants' assertions, the motion judge We discern defendants' argument more since they made no affirmative
decided there was a duty. precisely to be that
representation to honor the agreement, imposing a duty upon them to maintain possession of Victoria's We disagree. passport unreasonably
extends existing precedent.
As already noted, we have held a duty to a non-client may "attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which occurred." Albanese, supra, 393 N.J. Super. at 368It was entirely forseeable
69 (internal quotations omitted).
facilitate her ability to remove her daughter from the country. A lawyer may also be liable to a non-client third party "where an independent duty is owed." Estate of Fitzgerald v.
Linnus, 336 N.J. Super. 458, 468 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Davin, L.L.C., v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 73-75 (App. Div. 2000); DeAngelis 1999)). v. Rose, 320 N.J. an Super. 263, 274-76 (App. Div. an
attorney 'owes a fiduciary duty to persons, though not strictly clients, who he knows or should know rely on him in his
R. J. Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger,
218 N.J. Super. 206, 209 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Albright, supra, 206 N.J. Super. at 632-33). In Davin, for example, attorney Jaffe prepared a multi-year lease that included the a covenant as for quiet enjoyment in while
foreclosure 329 N.J.
Super. at 63-64.
Neither the landlords nor Jaffe advised the Id. at 64.
defendants-tenants of the foreclosure proceedings.
The motion judge granted summary judgment, "conclud[ing] that Jaffe owed no duty to [the] defendants since he had never
represented them or spoke to them, and would have been acting adversely to the best interests of his clients, the [landlords],
if he advised [the] defendants of the [landlords'] financial difficulties. Id. at 73.
In reversing summary judgment, we said: The practice of law is a profession, not a business. An attorney is not merely a hired gun, but, rather, a professional required to act with candor and honesty. . . . Jaffe, as an attorney who participated to the extent he did in the efforts to stave off foreclosure, had an affirmative obligation to be fair and candid with [the] defendants. Moreover, he had an obligation not to insert the covenant of quiet enjoyment in the lease. He had an obligation to advise his clients . . . that they should disclose to defendants the fact that the property was in foreclosure. He also had a duty to advise his clients that the lease should not contain a covenant of quiet enjoyment in light of the fact that it was highly unlikely that [the] defendants would obtain the benefits of the covenant in light of the foreclosure. If they failed to follow his advice, he had the right, if not the duty, to cease representing them. [Id. at 76-77, 78.] We held that "the lawyer's duty of effective and vigorous
representation of his client is tempered by his corresponding duty to be fair, candid and forthright." Id. at 78.
In denying defendants' summary judgment motion here, the judge properly concluded that, despite the lack of any If were
affirmative representation, defendants owed a duty to Innes. they were unwilling to abide by the agreement, they
obligated to so advise Van Aulen or Liebowitz.
the passport to Carrascosa was a breach of defendants' duty, even if they believed in good faith that the Agreement had been "repudiated." Not only is this obligation entirely consistent with prior precedent, it is consistent with the Rules of Professional
While "a cause of action for malpractice cannot
be based exclusively on the asserted breach of" an RPC, "it is clear that the [RPCs] may be relied on as prescribing the
requisite standard of care and the scope of the attorney's duty to the client." Gilles v. Wiley, Malehorn & Sirota, 345 N.J.
Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 201 (1998)); Davin, supra, 329 N.J. Super. at 74 n.3). Therefore, a breach of an RPC "is evidential of [a] defendant's failure to comply with the required standard of care." 125-26 (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Id. at
Lavine, Nagy & Krasny, 340 N.J. Super. 84, 90 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that "the Rules of Professional Conduct may provide
guidance to the court in determining whether a duty exists"). RPC 1.15(a) requires a lawyer to appropriately safeguard the property of clients or third parties in his or her
RPC 1.15(b) obligates a lawyer to promptly notify a
third party of receipt of property in which the third party has an interest. "Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly property receive." light of deliver that to the client or or third third person is any . . . to
Ibid. the as
The clear import of these RPCs is that, in and Innes's competing were claim not to free the to
dispose of the passport as they saw fit.
The judge properly
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. II. We turn to the issues raised regarding the trial itself by first reviewing some of the testimony. Carrascosa was a Spanish
citizen and an attorney admitted to practice in the European Union. Spain. Victoria was a citizen of both the United States and Innes was concerned that Carrascosa might take Victoria
to Spain, and he noted that, while Victoria also had a Spanish passport, the family used the United States passport whenever it traveled to Spain. Although the Agreement had been executed by both parties, problems arose immediately. On November 22, 2004, Carrascosa
obtained a domestic violence temporary restraining order (TRO) against Innes. Liebowitz testified that he advised Carrascosa
against the filing, "given [the] facts she was presenting to [him] in support of the restraining order." The issuance of the
TRO resulted in the suspension of Innes's parenting time with Victoria.8 On December 8, 2004, Liebowitz transferred his entire file, including Victoria's United States passport, to defendants.
Efforts to negotiate a parenting time schedule thereafter were contentious and fruitless. Innes's last visit with his daughter
took place on November 4, 2004. Innes first learned that his daughter was in Spain when Marzano-Lesnevich disclosed the information to the Family Part judge during the hearing in February 2005. Innes subsequently
was told by law enforcement authorities that Victoria left the country aboard on a January British 13, 2005, with to her maternal grandfather and her
grandfather then traveled from England to Spain. Innes retained a Spanish lawyer, Elena Zarraluqui, to
assist with filing a petition to return his daughter and contest the annulment proceedings that Carrascosa had commenced in The
Innes went to Spain for a hearing in June 2005.
On December 6, 2004, the court dismissed the TRO against Innes at Carrascosa's request.
Innes filed the application for Victoria's return to New Jersey under the Hague International Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10, 498 (March 26, 1986), its Federal implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601 to -11611 (1988), and the New Jersey court (continued) 21
Spanish court denied Innes's petition and ordered Victoria to remain in Spain until age eighteen. filed several unsuccessful appeals. Innes proceeding returned in which to Spain in fall sought, 2005 for the nullity relief, Innes, through Zarraluqui,
termination of his parental rights.
According to Innes, at the
time of the trial in this case, the issue remained undecided. During both trips to Spain, Innes briefly saw Victoria.
Zarraluqui testified that she asked Carrascosa's lawyer if Innes and Victoria could speak to each other. Carrascosa initially
agreed, but then tried to prevent Victoria from going to her father, and Carrascosa's lawyer had to intervene. Zarraluqui
said that Victoria was "really kind with him," that Innes kissed her and started crying when Carrascosa ended the meeting after five or ten minutes. hard, emotional." Innes fourteen never returned to Spain been again, filed explaining against him that and Zarraluqui described the scene as "very
three were still pending.
He denied committing any crime or Given the notoriety of the case
abusing Carrascosa or Victoria.
(continued) order. Innes, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 466. We discussed the proceedings in the Spanish courts in greater detail in our earlier decision. Innes, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 466-72.
position unjustly to
Carrascosa's and a
Innes if he
Victoria were rebuffed by Carrascosa's family.
Aside from a
brief telephone conversation in 2007, he has not spoken to her since their 2005 meeting in the courthouse. The family refuses
to accept delivery of the Christmas and birthday gifts Innes sends every year. Innes testified extensively regarding his relationship with his daughter prior to her leaving the country in January 2005. He moved his office to the ground floor of the couple's highrise apartment building so he could be close to home and see her frequently. After the couple separated, he saw Victoria nearly
every day until Carrascosa ordered him to stay away. Innes also stated that he thinks about "this whole
situation" every day, cannot sleep and his business suffered. He received treatment from his doctor for anxiety, and he saw a therapist, who "helped [him] learn how to grieve the loss of [his] daughter," although he admitted seeing the therapist
infrequently in 2009 and not at all since. In 2006, Carrascosa returned to the United States for the divorce trial, leaving Victoria in Spain with her grandparents. On August 24, 2006, the Family Part granted the parties a
divorce, awarded Innes sole legal and residential custody of Victoria, ordered Carrascosa to dismiss all actions in Spain and return Victoria to New Jersey within ten days. The court
imposed sanctions of $148,000 in favor of Innes. not comply with any of these provisions.
Carrascosa was arrested in New York City in November 2006 and subsequently indicted. She was found guilty and sentenced At the time of trial, testified via video
to a prison term of fourteen years. Carrascosa conference. and said remained incarcerated and
She accused Innes of attempting to murder Victoria filed the TRO because of Innes's "relentless
stalking, abuse, [and] battering."
She claimed that she signed
the Agreement under duress and repudiated it "the very next day," something she told Marzano-Lesnevich. Carrascosa claimed that she asked Jacobs to retrieve
Victoria's passport from Liebowitz because she wanted to travel with her daughter. replied: "All right. She told Innes about her plans, and he Go ahead. Get on the boat." She also
told another associate at the Lesnevich firm, Francesca MarzanoLesnevich (Francesca),10 who told Carrascosa "they had spoken to . . . Van Aulen on the phone and everything was okay." In an e-
We apologize for the informality of using however, it is necessary to avoid confusion.
mail dated January 11, 2005, Carrascosa notified the Lesnevich firm that she was going to stop by. reception area where Francesca She then arrived in the gave her the passport.
Carrascosa confirmed that she had never lost Victoria's Spanish passport, and that her daughter was still in Spain. The judge conducted to a bar N.J.R.E. Conk 104 as an hearing expert and denied
Succinctly stated, Conk rendered the following opinion: It was the duty of Marzano-Lesnevich as successor in fact to the possessory right of Liebowitz to inform Innes via his attorney and Liebowitz, who reasonably expected Marzano-Lesnevich to abide by the agreement, that she intended to dispose of the passport as her client sought fit and that she was renouncing any obligation to operate under the constraints imposed by the agreement on her predecessor . . . attorney. If adequate notice of such intention had been given[,] Liebowitz could have retaken possession and Innes or his attorney could have sought the assistance of a court if a . . . new escrow agent, could not be agreed upon. Thomas Kilbride, who worked for the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), testified that he received a request from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office to determine Victoria's travel history to and from the United States. His examination of ICE's database showed
The trial judge was not the judge who had heard and decided the pre-trial motions.
Airport on January 13, 2005, using her United States passport, as she had on September 12, and December 11, 2003, and January 8, 2004. Kilbride could acknowledged the that a person using with a dual
passport, but his search failed to reveal any record of Victoria ever leaving the United States using her Spanish passport. Plaintiffs read Marzano-Lesnevich's deposition testimony
and defendants' interrogatory answers to the jury that implied Carrascosa took the passport without the firm's foreknowledge. However, Jacobs testified that Marzano-Lesnevich said she gave the passport to Carrascosa. In admitted her that testimony she did before not the jury, or Marzano-Lesnevich Van Aulen before
giving Carrascosa her daughter's passport.
She believed that
because neither she nor Liebowitz held the passport in trust, Carrascosa, the parent with primary residential custody, had the right to safeguard the passport herself. Marzano-Lesnevich knew
of the Agreement and that Carrascosa had signed it, but she maintained it was repudiated because no one had followed its terms. Marzano-Lesnevich abandoned by . . . described Liebowitz and the passport in a as "simply She
maintained that she did not have the right to hold the passport absent a court order or successor agreement. also testified that Victoria could have Marzano-Lesnevich using her
Spanish passport and that an itinerary Carrascosa sent to the firm indicated mother and daughter intended to return to this country. However, the Spanish courts ordered Victoria to remain
in Spain until she turned eighteen. Marzano-Lesnevich her firm's strategy acknowledged was to focus on cross-examination on that
explaining that proceedings already had begun in Spain and it was important of her for Carrascosa She to receive an ecclesiastical that Carrascosa
wanted the matter heard in Spain. DeBartolo testified as an expert in the fields of family law and ethics. He opined that Liebowitz "should have notified
. . . Van Aulen that he was seeking to terminate his role as escrow agent, he should have notified his client, he should have notified any successor attorney, he should have asked to be relieved of the obligations that he voluntarily undertook as an escrow agent, as a trustee." He also concluded that Marzano-
Lesnevich did not violate professional standards by returning the passport to Carrascosa because she was not bound by the Agreement and never agreed to become trustee of the passport.
Marzano-Lesnevich that the had
representations and that
interest in the passport as the primary custodial parent.12 DeBartolo also opined that Carrascosa, not defendants, was the proximate cause of any damages. Even if Liebowitz had
retained the passport in trust or properly obtained a substitute trustee, DeBartolo believed Carrascosa could have easily
traveled with Victoria using her Spanish passport.
On cross-examination, however, DeBartolo acknowledged that our prior opinion affirmed the enforceability of the Agreement. There, we said that [u]nder New Jersey law and the Hague Convention, the October parenting agreement was valid, affirmed Carrascosa's intent that Innes have custodial rights in the child, and when plainly read, demonstrates that the removal of the child was wrongful. Indeed, Article 3 of the Convention provides that custody rights may arise "by operation of law, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State." The parenting agreement having been voluntarily and knowingly executed by both parents, and thus enforceable under the laws of New Jersey, Carrascosa's breach of that agreement was wrongful and violated Innes' custodial rights. [Innes, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 486.]
A. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint at the close of plaintiffs' case. See R. 4:37-2(b). They argued plaintiffs
failed to prove the release of Victoria's United States passport was a proximate cause of any damages. motion. The judge denied the
Defendants renewed the argument post-verdict when they
sought a new trial or JNOV, specifically contending that the finding of proximate cause was "against the weight of the
The judge denied the motion in a brief written
Defendants now renew this argument before us. for involuntary are dismissal, by all Rule the the 4:37-2(b), same and
Motions JNOV, Rule
"governed as true
supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according [her] the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable
In his written opinion, the judge noted that defendants also sought a new trial or JNOV because "the jury's finding regarding . . . Marzano-Lesnevich's deviation from the standard of care" was against the weight of the evidence. However, that contention was not advanced during oral argument on the motion. To the extent defendants argue that point in their appellate brief, we reject the contention. In light of the standards of review we discuss in this section, the trial testimony and with our discussion in section I.B., supra, regarding the duty owed to a non-client demonstrates the argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant further consideration. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
minds could differ, the motion must be denied." Ricca, 179 N.J.
1, 30 (2004) (first alteration in original) We apply the same standard on review.
Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000). "The trial judge's obligation on a motion for a new trial because the verdict is said to be against the weight of the evidence is quite a different and more difficult one." v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969). Dolson
Under Rule 4:49-1(a), a
court shall grant a motion for a new trial "if, having given due regard to the of opportunity the of the it jury to pass and upon the
appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." Ibid. The judge must take into account "not only tangible
factors . . . as shown by the record, but also appropriate matters of credibility, generally peculiarly within the jury's domain, . . . and the intangible 'feel of the case' . . . gained by presiding over the trial." apply a similar standard, Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 6. deferring to the trial We
assessment of those factors "which are not transmitted by the written record." overturn a jury Id. at 7. verdict Thus, "[a]n appellate court may if [that] verdict is so far
contrary to the weight of the evidence as to give rise to the inescapable conclusion of mistake, passion, prejudice, or
Kassick v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 120 N.J.
130, 134 (1990) (quoting Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 466 (1957)). To prevail at trial, plaintiffs needed to establish that defendants' breach of their professional duty was a proximate cause of their damages. Conklin, supra, 145 N.J. at 416. When
there are concurrent independent causes of harm, the jury must determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the ultimate harm. Id. at 422; see also Froom v.
Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298, 313 (App. Div.) ("plaintiff must present evidence to support a finding that defendant's negligent conduct was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about plaintiff's injury, even though there may be other concurrent causes of harm"), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 267 (2005). Here, the undisputed evidence was that Victoria exited the country could using her United her States passport. or Whether even Victoria her
Spanish passport was necessary for her entry into Spain, does not matter. was a Defendants' release of the United States passport factor" in bringing about the damages
plaintiffs claimed to have suffered.
B. Defendants moved pre-trial to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress damages, and the judge reserved decision. At
trial, plaintiffs called Janet S. Berson, a licensed clinical psychologist, as an expert regarding the effects of parental alienation on Innes and Victoria. hearing, that she the judge not precluded testify However, following a Rule 104 from a testifying, finding of
psychological certainty, in part because she had never examined Victoria and her opinions were based on an out-of-date
psychological report from Spain. that ruling on appeal. At dismiss the close of plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs do not challenge
considered the motion as if it applied to both plaintiffs.
concluded that "under traditional tort concepts the loss of the child's society and companionship could give rise to emotional distress." Citing our decision in Segal v. Lynch, 413 N.J.
Super. 171 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 96 (2010), the judge noted such circumstances "clearly engender a right to compensation," and he concluded that emotional distress damages could be presumed without evidence of physical injury or expert psychological testimony.
Following lengthy debate during the charge conference, the judge provided the following instruction to the jury: If you find in favor of the plaintiffs, the law recognizes as a proper item for recovery the mental suffering and distress that a person may endure as a result of the wrongful conduct of a defendant in a case such as the one before you. Since a parent is entitled to the services and companionship of a minor child, until that child reaches majority, you may award damages to . . . Innes for the loss of his daughter's companionship and society for as long as you reasonably and rationally conclude it has and will last. The measure of damages is what a reasonable person would consider to be adequate and just under all of the circumstances. Likewise, Victoria . . . is entitled to damages for the mental suffering and distress which she may endure as a result of being separated from her father. When they moved for a new trial or JNOV, defendants reiterated the argument, which the judge rejected. (i) Before us, defendants argue it was error to submit the issue of emotional distress damages to the jury because in a legal malpractice action emotional distress damages cannot be awarded "in the absence of medical evidence establishing
substantial bodily injury or severe and demonstrable psychiatric sequelae proximately caused by the tortfeasor's misconduct."
Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 399 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 109 N.J. 39 (1987).
Defendants specifically argue that
there was no such medical evidence in this case as to either Innes or Victoria. It is well-established that a plaintiff "'may recover for losses which are proximately caused by the attorney's negligence or malpractice.'" Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J. 256, 271
(1996) (quoting Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 341 (1980)). The availability of emotional distress
damages in a legal malpractice case has not been subject to extensive discussion in reported decisions in New Jersey. In Gautam, the plaintiffs alleged that their attorneys'
malpractice resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiffs' medical negligence claim. Gautam, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 391-92.
The "[p]laintiffs made no effort to establish the viability or value of their underlying medical malpractice action. they sought to recover damages for the mental Rather, and
emotional distress allegedly caused by the legal malpractice." Id. at 390. Plaintiffs testified "that they developed various
psychological problems because of their dashed expectations." Id. at 392. damages The jury awarded both compensatory and punitive the defendants. Id. at 394. Although we
reversed because of the inadequacy of the jury instructions, id. at 394-96, we concluded that a remand was unnecessary because
"the evidence was wholly insufficient to support a recovery of either compensatory or punitive damages." Id. at 396.
We began by noting "[t]he general rule is that an attorney is responsible for the loss proximately caused the client by his negligence." Id. at 397. "[T]he measure of damages is
ordinarily the amount that the client would have received but for his attorney's negligence." 84 N.J. at 342). proven by the Ibid. (citing Lieberman, supra,
We recognized that damages would often be within a suit" method, that is "by
introducing evidence establishing the viability and worth of the claim that was irredeemably lost." Ibid. However, we also
recognized the Court "eschewed rigid application of the 'suit within a suit' principle in favor of a more flexible rule." Id.
at 398; see also Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 361 (2004) (leaving it to the "court's
discretion to declare an appropriate trial model"). We were also "persuaded that emotional distress damages
should not be awarded in legal malpractice cases at least in the absence of egregious or extraordinary circumstances." supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 399. "Whether viewed Gautam, the
context of the traditional concept of proximate cause, or simply as a matter of sound public policy, we are convinced that
damages should be generally limited to recompensing the injured
omitted) (emphasis added). between the parties was
We observed that "the relationship predicated upon economic interest[,] Id.
[and] [t]he loss, if one occurred, was purely pecuniary." at 400.
We further noted that "[e]ven if emotional distress damages were recoverable in legal malpractice actions, such awards would be impermissible in the absence of medical evidence establishing substantial bodily injury or severe and demonstrable psychiatric sequelae proximately caused by the tortfeasor's misconduct."
Id. at 399. real and
"Aggravation, annoyance and frustration, however constitute unfortunate products of daily
living. Damages for idiosyncratic psychiatric reactions should not be permitted." Id. at 400. We also acknowledged that "the
outer-most boundaries of the law dealing with emotional distress damages are not yet visible," but the facts of the case did not permit such an award. Ibid.
We continued to recognize Gautam's general principles in Winstock v. Galasso, 430 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 487 (2013). There, the plaintiffs, a police
officer and his wife, filed a legal malpractice claim against their attorney who had provided them with advice concerning the legality of operating a club hosting poker games. Id. at 399-
The plaintiffs were subsequently arrested and criminally Id. at 408.
charged with perjury and various gambling offenses.
As part of a global plea agreement with the State, the husband entered a guilty plea and his wife entered the Pre-Trial
Id. at 395.
As a result, the husband Id. at 409. dismissing the
forfeited his position as a police officer. Although we reversed summary
plaintiffs' complaint, we affirmed the motion judge's dismissal of the plaintiffs' emotional distress claim. Citing Gautam,
supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 399, we noted, "[t]here is nothing in the record before us that substantiates a finding of 'egregious or extraordinary circumstances' warranting this form of relief." Id. at 418-19. The directly Super. only other reported issue decision is Kohn 1995), from v. in our courts 281 the that N.J. court were
addresses 235, 236-37 whether
recoverable when the attorney was retained to pursue the purely non-economic plaintiffs child. interests of his clients. to assist In them that in case, the a
Id. at 241.
They alleged that the attorney erroneously
disclosed confidential information in the adoption complaint and claimed this breach caused them to suffer severe emotional
Id. at 237.
The court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment and distinguished Gautam: While Gautam held that damages should be limited to recompensating the injured party for his economic loss, . . . that court was not asked to consider, nor did it address, whether damages for emotional distress were recoverable in cases involving non-economic claims where the "suit within a suit" framework is inapplicable. Consequently, it cannot be said that Gautam forecloses a plaintiff from alleging severe emotional distress where the underlying representation was for non-economic purposes. [Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).] The Law Division explained that, in an adoption or similar
proceeding, such as contested child custody disputes, attorneys would have virtual immunity for their negligence if plaintiffs had no ability to seek emotional distress damages. 39, 241-42. Two reported federal district court decisions also have Id. at 238-
distinguished Gautam so as to permit the assertion of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice claim when the client's interest was non-pecuniary in nature. First, in Lawson v.
Nugent, 702 F.Supp. 91, 92 (D.N.J. 1988), the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice claim against his attorney whose alleged malpractice resulted in an additional twenty months of
confinement upon conviction.
The plaintiff sought damages for
the "emotional anguish he sustained" as a result. court distinguished the case from Gautam,
relationship between plaintiff-client and defendant-attorney was not necessarily predicated upon economic interest." Id. at 93.
The court observed that because this was a "diversity case," it "must decide the at issues 94. in accordance noting with that the law of New for
emotional distress have been allowed by New Jersey courts in an increasing number and variety of contexts," ibid., the court concluded that the "plaintiff should be allowed to prove damages for emotional distress attributable to the extra twenty months of confinement in a maximum security penitentiary." In Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.Supp. 1451, Id. at 95. 1453 (D.N.J.
1989), the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of herself and the estate of her son, who committed suicide while in custody for motor vehicle offenses. One of the defendants was her son's
court-appointed attorney, who allegedly committed malpractice. Id. at 1453, 1462. Citing its prior decision in Lawson, supra,
the court again distinguished Gautam, noting that the attorneyclient relationship there was "predicated on an economic
interest, while . . . in the case at bar, the attorney was retained to provide a defense to a criminal prosecution, thus making emotional distress, in the latter situation, a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of an attorney's malpractice." 1464. Kohn's recoverable interests rule." holding in a at that emotional distress case where as
malpractice has been
non-economic the "minority
Leonard v. Walthall, 143 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1998).
In Leonard, the plaintiffs alleged negligence in the defendant's representation of their interests in an adoption. Id. at 467.
The Eighth Circuit was asked to predict "whether, under Arkansas law, plaintiffs may recover damages for their alleged emotional distress resulting the from defendant's fact negligent that conduct, have
suffered no physical injury or harm to a personal or economic interest." v. Squyres, Id. at 468. 877 S.W.2d Relying upon the decision in Thornton 921 (Ark. 1994), which involved the
plaintiff's "claim of outrage . . . based upon allegations that her attorney mishandled her divorce and thus caused her
temporarily to lose custody of her child," the Leonard court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. Ibid.; see
also Taylor v. Paskoff & Tamber, LLP, 908 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (rejecting claims for emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action involving representation in
adoption or custody matters).
However, nearly a quarter of a century ago, one commentator recognized "an emerging trend . . . that allows a client to recover for emotional distress." Kelleher, Joseph J., "An
Attorney's Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress," 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1309, 1319 (1990). This
"developing trend emphasizes the client's injured interest in determining the extent of the attorney's liability for emotional distress damages." Id. at 1320. "Where the attorney is
protecting a pecuniary interest, emotional distress damages are severely limited[,] [but] [w]here the interest is personal,
. . . courts adopting this view are more willing to compensate emotional harm." In Miranda Id. at 1320-21. v. Said, 836 N.W.2d 8, 11-13 (Iowa 2013),
relying upon their attorney's advice, the plaintiffs voluntarily left their children behind in the United States and returned to their native Ecuador, from where they intended to emigrate
When they attempted to return, they learned that they
were subject to a ten-year bar because they had voluntarily left this country. Id. at 12. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that
the facts presented warranted an exception to the general rule that denied recovery of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice case. foreseeable that Id. at 33. emotional The court noted it "is generally distress would accompany the
prolonged separation of a parent and child." McEvoy v. Helikson, 562 P.2d 540, 542,
Id. at 32 (citing 544 (Or. 1977),
superseded by rule on other grounds, Moore v. Willis, 767 P.2d 62, 64 (Or. 1988); Person v. Behnke, 611 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal den., 622 such N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1993)). The where
"[t]he relationship involved a transaction charged with emotions in which negligent conduct by the attorney was very likely to cause severe emotional distress." Id. at 33.
In Person, supra, 611 N.E.2d at 1353, the Illinois appeals court recognized "a valid claim . . . for noneconomic damages resulting from a plaintiff's loss of custody and visitation of his children which allegedly resulted from an attorney's
negligence." McEvoy presents strikingly similar circumstances to this case. The plaintiff-father brought suit against his ex-wife's McEvoy, supra, 562 P.2d at 541. decree, the plaintiff was awarded Pursuant to the custody of the
However, a subsequent order, executed by all
parties and the attorneys, gave the mother, a Swiss citizen, temporary custody, subject to both parents delivering all
passports to the defendant until the child was returned to her father. Ibid. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed
to honor the order and gave his daughter's passport to his exwife, permitting the child to be removed to Switzerland. 542. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the Id. at
Id. at 544.
It concluded that "conduct by defendant
which resulted in an infringement of" the plaintiff's right to custody of his daughter, "if established by evidence on trial, would entitle [the] plaintiff to recover damages for anguish and mental [suffering] due to the loss of his minor child, as
alleged in the complaint." alteration in original).
Ibid. (citations omitted) (second
We conclude that plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress damages was clearly appropriate under the facts of this case. We do not view this as an unwarranted extension of what we said in Gautam, specifically unavailable in that a emotional legal distress damages are
"egregious" and "extraordinary" circumstances. 215 N.J. Super. at 399.
We used those terms in Gautam to deny a
claim in the context of a "relationship between the parties" "predicated upon economic interest," where the plaintiffs' loss "was purely pecuniary." Id. at 400; and see Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 53 comment g. (2000) (emotional
distress "damages are inappropriate in types of cases in which emotional distress is unforeseeable"). However, when the harm caused by an attorney's professional negligence fundamental is personal in nature and emanates and child, from we the must
assess whether it was "egregious" and "extraordinary" through a different prism. decision in Segal. There, a father brought suit on behalf of himself and his children infliction against of the children's distress mother on for intentional of the The trial judge specifically relied upon our
Segal, supra, 413 N.J. Super. at 176-77.
For essentially two different reasons, we concluded that the plaintiff's Division. First, we noted that the suit presented a "litigation tugof-war" with the children in the middle. "satisfied that a [the] prima plaintiff's facie case cause of Id. at 189. of action harm We were . to . . the complaint was properly dismissed by the Law
children named as parties thereto." matter of public policy," we
Id. at 190-91. that
"grievances" must be brought in the Family Part "as part of an action for custody or parenting time, where the governing
principle for adjudication will be the best interests of these two children." Id. at 192.
We also concluded that the plaintiff had "not established a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
Id. at 191.
We noted that, among other things, the
elements of that tort required a showing that the "defendant's conduct was 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community[.]'" Ibid. (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund
Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988)).
Although the plaintiff failed
to allege such conduct in the case, we specifically did not foreclose the possibility that a cause of action may be brought alleging facts that are so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, thus satisfying prong two of the Buckley standard. . . . As we previously noted, cases involving prolonged parental abduction, where children are intentionally removed to foreign jurisdictions for the purpose of frustrating the innocent parent's custodial rights, or intentional false accusations of parent/child sexual abuse, are but two examples of factual scenarios that may satisfy the outrageous conduct requirement under Buckley. [Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).]
Defendants contend that applying Segal here would be an unwarranted "extension of liability for a client's intentional infliction of emotional distress to the tortfeasor's attorney by way of a legal malpractice claim[.]" agree. We do not necessarily
However, we need not directly address that contention
because we conclude that Segal does have relevance to the extent that it explained the kind of "egregious" and "extraordinary" conduct stake, that, permit when combined for with the personal distress interests damages in at an
action sounding in legal malpractice. We hasten to add that most factual situations will not support such a claim, even when the underlying interests are non-pecuniary and personal in nature. We view the "egregious"
and "extraordinary" qualifier as a sensible limitation on what might otherwise become an increasing slew of litigation arising out of the obviously emotionally-charged proceedings that occur daily in the Family Part. extraordinary So, for example, absent egregious and a client's claim that his
attorney's malpractice resulted in an order awarding custody to his adversary or limiting his parenting time would not support an award of emotional distress damages. In such situations, the
deprivation to the client can be fully redressed by the Family Court through applications addressed to the sound discretion and
equitable powers of the judge, including future modification of the award. To the extent Kohn suggested otherwise, we
disapprove it.14 Moreover, legal permitting action, to for claims even for one emotional centered on distress the might in a
client's provide to the
opposed cover but
litigation in all forms. Hill, 143 N.J. 391, 399
See Picogna v. Bd. of Educ. of Cherry (1996) (denying "litigation-induced"
stress as a component of emotional distress damages). In this case, however, defendants' actions were "egregious" and "extraordinary." that the it had Despite been knowing by of the the Agreement, and the
parties of the
separation and Innes's reliance on the safekeeping of Victoria's passport, defendants breached their duty and simply gave the passport to Carrascosa. and without seeking They did so without notifying Van Aulen from the court. Defendants'
Because the issue is not before us, we specifically do not decide whether the deprivation of a liberty interest, like the facts presented in Lawson, supra, and Snyder, supra, is the kind of personal interest that would support an award of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action either with, or without, proof of egregious and extraordinary circumstances.
permit an award of emotional distress damages in this case. (ii) Defendants argue that plaintiffs presented insufficient
evidence of emotional distress damages because they failed to prove, through expert medical testimony or otherwise, that they suffered "demonstrable psychiatric sequelae proximately caused" by defendants' negligence. 399. Gautam, supra, 215 N.J. Super. at
To address this argument, we need to consider the origin
of the requirement for this "heightened showing of emotional distress." Menorah Chapels at Millburn v. Needle, 386 N.J.
Super. 100, 116 (App. Div.) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 489 (2006). Whether intentionally, it is alleged or that the the defendant Court has acted said
that recovery lies only if the plaintiff can prove the emotional distress "severe," produced Buckley, by the defendant's 111 N.J. at tortious 367, or conduct "genuine was and
substantial." 430 (1989).
Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc., 116 N.J. 418, "'Severe emotional distress means any type of
severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so . . . .'" Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 515 (1998)
(quoting Poole v. Copland, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 88, 93 (N.C. 1997)). "Although damages New Jersey permits the recovery potential for for emotional distress claims
justifies a requirement of enhanced proof to support an award of such damages." Picogna, supra, 143 N.J. at 396-397.
"By circumscribing the cause of action with an elevated threshold for liability and damages, courts have authorized
legitimate claims while eliminating those that should not be compensable." Buckley, supra, 111 N.J. at 367 (emphasis added).
As the Court said in Decker, While the foreseeability of injurious consequences is a constituent element in a tort action, foreseeability of injury is particularly important in the tort of negligent infliction of emotional harm. This reflects the concern over the genuineness of an injury consisting of emotional distress without consequent physical injury. In these situations, there must be "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [116 N.J. at 429-30 (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 54 at 362 (5th ed. 1984)) (emphasis added).] Our courts have recognized two types of tortious conduct that support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
"A claim of direct, negligent infliction of emotional can exist where the plaintiff claims proximately-
caused damages as a result of the breach of a duty owed by the defendant. Lascurain v. City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 251, A second type of claim, first recognized
277 (App. Div. 2002).
in Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101 (1980), exists if the plaintiff witnessed the death or serious physical injury of
another, with whom he shares a marital or intimate, familial relationship, as the result of the defendant's negligence.
McDougall v. Lamm, 211 N.J. 203, 214-215 (citing Portee, supra, 84 N.J. at 101). In both, the id. plaintiff at 215, must or demonstrate and N.J.
Super. at 277. "'The severity of the emotional distress raises both
questions of law and fact.
Thus, the court decides whether as a
matter of law such emotional distress can be found, and the jury decides whether it has in fact been proved.'" Lascurain, supra,
349 N.J. Super. at 279 (quoting Buckley, supra, 111 N.J. at 367). We have said that "[i]n order to be actionable, the
claimed emotional distress must be sufficiently substantial to result in physical illness or serious psychological sequelae." Aly v. Garcia, 333 N.J. Super. 195, 204 (App. Div. 2000).
Complaints such as lack of sleep, aggravation, headaches and depression have been frequently deemed insufficient as a matter of law. DeAngelis v. Hill, 180 N.J. 1, 20-21 (2004);
Buckley, supra, 111 N.J. at 368; see also Juzwiak v. Doe, 415 N.J. Super. 442, 453 (App. Div. 2010) (finding complaints of "weight loss, sleeplessness, anxiety and depression" without
"objective documentation of [the] claims" to be insufficient); Lascurain, supra, 349 N.J. Super. at 280; but see Wigginton v. Servidio, 324 N.J. Super. 114, 123-24, 132 (App. Div. 1999) (finding the plaintiff's sixty-day medical leave of absence from work and symptoms severe of to "nausea allow and to diarrhea" proceed and to depression on an
emotional distress claim), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 11 (2000). We acknowledge distress that was Innes's testimony and regarding no expert his own
evidence was introduced on his behalf. qualify distress witness. as an expert and witness there was
As noted, Berson did not Victoria's otherwise emotional from any
regarding no proof
The trial judge cited Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 312-13 (1995), for the proposition that expert medical evidence of plaintiffs' emotional distress was unnecessary. that was part of the Court's holding in Rendine. Undoubtedly, However, the
Court's decision in that case was based upon both the broad remedial purpose of the Law Against Discrimination, (LAD),
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, and the then recently-enacted amendment, N.J.S.A. 10:5-3, that specifically recognized "emotional stress" as cognizable damages under the statute. N.J. at 312. distress Rendine, supra, 141
In this case, plaintiffs' claims for emotional were allegedly the result of defendants'
Unlike Rendine, there was no broad, statutorilythat necessarily relieved plaintiffs of their
burden to prove "severe" or "genuine and substantial" emotional distress. However, in certain circumstances, "[t]he Court has
distinguished a cause of action in tort or contract seeking consequential damages for emotional distress from a cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, holding that only the latter requires a heightened showing of emotional distress." 116. Menorah Chapels, supra, 386 N.J. Super. at
For example, "[c]ourts have required little or no proof
with regard to intangible damages for malicious use of process, apparently in the belief that a normal person subjected to
wrongful litigation would have suffered at least some damages." Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282, 307 (App. Div. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We also rejected the need for an enhanced standard of proof in Geler v. Akawie, 358 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 223 (2003). There, the plaintiffs brought a
medical malpractice claim against various doctors based upon the "wrongful birth" of their son, who was stricken with Tay-Sachs disease and died within two years of his birth. Id. at 443.
The trial judge granted the defendant-doctor's motion for JNOV on the jury's award of emotional distress damages. Id. at 444.
In reversing, we held that the "elevated standard" for emotional distress claims did not apply. Id. at 450.
[W]e note a distinction between the judicial treatment of claims for parental emotional distress arising from negligence directed solely at the parents, as here, and claims for parental emotional distress arising from negligence also directly affecting their newborn child. This case falls within the former category, and thus squarely within Supreme Court precedent recognizing, without mention of an enhanced standard of proof, parental emotional distress as an element of damages in other genetic counseling malpractice contexts. [Ibid. (citing Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421 (1979)).] We also recognized that "an award of damages for emotional
distress . . . [was] one of the few avenues of redress for tortious conduct in this circumstance." Id. at 451.
In this case, plaintiffs did not seek emotional distress damages under the rubric of negligent or intentional infliction
of emotional distress, torts whose essential elements require a "heightened Menorah showing" of physical 386 or psychological Super. at 116. and sequelae. Rather, proximate
Chapels, sought of
N.J. as the
responsibility. Under the particular facts of this case, plaintiffs were entitled enhanced to recover based for emotional the distress damages and without
consequence of defendants' breach of the duty owed, i.e., the complete, and potentially, permanent rupture of the parent-child bond. The nature of this particular harm mitigates against the
reason for an enhanced standard of proof in the first instance — the elimination of spurious claims. In such "'special
circumstances,'" "'an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress . . . serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.'" Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., 109
N.J. 523, 537 (1988) (quoting Prosser, supra, § 54 at 362). For example, in Menorah Chapels, supra, 386 N.J. Super. at 106, 116, we reversed dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim seeking emotional alleged distress breach of damages a as a to result perform of the
services in strict accordance with orthodox Jewish custom and
We found it was foreseeable that, because the contract interests the Id. so personal breach see and would Muniz particular result v. United in to the
implicated defendant, anguish.
plaintiff's at 115-18;
Medical Center Presbyterian Hospital, 153 N.J. Super. 79, 82 (App. Div. 1977) (reversing dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint against the defendant-hospital, noting "a deviation from the standard in of care with reasonably corpses to and be expected the of a
foreseeability that such a deviation would cause emotional and substantial physical disability with respect to persons normally constituted"). In Berman, supra, 80 N.J. at 433, the Court recognized the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress damages against the defendant doctors who "directly deprived [the mother] . . . of the option to accept or reject a parental relationship with the child[,] and thus caused them to experience mental and emotional anguish upon their realization that they had given birth to a child afflicted with Down's Syndrome." eloquently, "[b]ecause of the unique Justice Handler wrote nature of the tort,
involving as it does the denial of the opportunity to decide whether to become the parents of a handicapped child, the
suffering of the parents assumes another, important dimension."
part); see also Portee, supra, 84 N.J. at 101 (where the court noted that the "interest in personal emotional stability is
worthy of legal protection against unreasonable conduct," when the "emotional harm follow[s] the perception of the death or serious injury to a loved one . . . , for few persons travel through life alone"). In this case, Innes's testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to award him emotional distress damages proximately caused by defendants' breach of their duty. Unlike Gautam,
supra, 215 N.J. Super. at 400, where "the relationship between the parties was predicated upon economic interest[,] [and] [t]he loss, if one occurred, was purely pecuniary[,]" the loss in this case was particularly personal in nature - the inability of a father to see his he daughter never for see many her years, again. that and The "'[t]he the New likely Jersey to
prospect Supreme . . .
that Court raise
recognized [is an]
right[,] . . . far more precious than property rights.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986) (first alteration in original) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972)). The emotional distress caused by the irreparable
genuine and easily appreciated by the average person without the need for expert testimony. Furthermore, there is no other form of redress for
defendants' tortious conduct in this case. N.J. Super. at 451.
Geler, supra, 358
"Any other ruling would in effect immunize Berman, supra, 80 N.J. at 432.
[defendants] from liability[.]"
We therefore affirm the award of emotional distress damages to Innes.15 We are, nevertheless, compelled to reach a different result with respect to the award on Victoria's behalf. There was
simply no testimony regarding her emotional distress, meaning the jury's award was based upon speculation. See Jablonowska v.
Suther, 195 N.J. 91, 102 (2008) (where, discussing historical limits on claims for emotional distress, the Court noted that "[f]rom a policy standpoint, courts . . . feared a 'flood of litigation[ ] in cases . . . where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation'") (quoting Ward v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 65 N.J.L. 383, 386 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (emphasis added)).
Defendants have not specifically challenged the amount of the award.
Although Berson did not testify before the jury, during the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, she was asked "what effect, if any, do you know of that the alienation [from her father] had upon
Berson answered, "I don't know this particular Plaintiffs contend
So I can't possibly answer that."
that they were denied the opportunity to have Victoria evaluated because of defendants' actions. We cannot determine on this
record whether that is necessarily true, but the trial judge rejected that excuse as a reason to permit Berson's testimony. We therefore reverse that part of the judgment awarding
emotional distress damages to Victoria. C. Citing Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001), and Saffer, supra, 143 N.J. at 256, the judge observed that clients could recover reasonable expenses and attorney's fees as consequential damages for an attorney's negligence. explained that even though plaintiffs were not He
clients, defendants owed them a duty to hold Victoria's passport in trust, and defendants knew or should have known of Inness's reliance upon them. Defendants contend it was error to award plaintiffs
attorneys' fees because "the narrow exception to the American
Rule in the context of a legal malpractice action" does not apply since Innes was not defendants' client. The American Rule prohibits the We disagree.16 party from
recovering counsel fees against the losing party. Trust, 176 N.J. 282, 294 (2003). "The purposes
In re Niles behind the
American Rule are threefold:
(1) unrestricted access to the
courts for all persons; (2) ensuring equity by not penalizing persons for exercising their right to litigate a dispute, even if they should lose; and (3) administrative convenience." The Court, however, has "created carefully Ibid. and
closely interrelated exceptions to the American Rule[.]" Estate of Vayda, 184 N.J. 115, 121 (2005).
One such exception
permits the successful plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to recover the attorneys' those are fees incurred in prosecuting caused by that the
attorney's negligence. 271). The Court
Ibid. (citing Saffer, supra, 143 N.J. at
allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees in attorney malpractice actions . . . to include actions for attorney misconduct[.]" Ibid. (citing Packard-Bamberger, supra, 167 N.J. at 443). In
Defendants do not challenge the amount of the fee awards or the judge's methodology in calculating the awards.
director of, and legal counsel to, the plaintiffs, "committed intentional misconduct in his role as counsel." Packard-
Bamberger, supra, 167 N.J. at 442.
The Court said
[s]tated plainly, an attorney who intentionally violates the duty of loyalty owed to a client commits a more egregious offense than one who negligently breaches the duty of care. A client's claim concerning the defendant-attorney's breach of a fiduciary duty may arise in the legal malpractice context. Nonetheless, if it does not and is instead prosecuted as an independent tort, a claimant is entitled to recover attorneys' fees so long as the claimant proves that the attorney's breach arose from the attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, we hold that a successful claimant in an attorney-misconduct case may recover reasonable counsel fees incurred in prosecuting that action. [Id. at 443.] However, the Court also said that "a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client Id. at 443. explained Rule as the expansion its "focus of on this the relationship as a
prerequisite to recovery." The exception Court to
recovery of attorneys' fees as damages directly and proximately arising from the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the plaintiff." added). Estate of Vayda, supra, 184 N.J. at 122 (emphasis
In In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 307 (2008),
Packard-Bamberger "in claims
attorneys who intentionally violate their fiduciary duties[.]" (Citing Packard-Bamberger, supra, 167 N.J. at 443). And, in
Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 405 (2009), the Court described Saffer and Packard-Bamberger as examples of "a tightly circumscribed common law exception to the American Rule that defies ready description, but may be titled loosely as fiduciary malfeasance cases[.]" We extends conclude Saffer's that although to no the reported American case Rule specifically to a suit
brought against an attorney by a non-client, attorney's fees should be awarded in this case as a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions. 84 N.J. Saffer, at 341. supra, To 143 N.J. at 272; would
essentially eviscerate the very purpose of the exception to the American Rule by denying plaintiffs as a a full award of for the
The attorney fee award is particularly appropriate in this case, since defendants were holding Victoria's passport in trust and knew Innes and his attorney were relying upon the Agreement.
Nevertheless, they intentionally violated the Agreement and gave the passport to Carrascosa upon her request. We affirm that portion of the judgment that reflects the award of counsel fees to Innes. Because we have reversed the
judgment on behalf of Victoria, she is not a prevailing party, and therefore is not entitled to an award of fees. that portion of the judgment. III. We next consider defendants' claim that it was error to sever their third-party complaint against Carrascosa from trial and to dismiss the complaint with prejudice after trial. The We vacate
trial judge raised the severance issue sua sponte and provided all parties with an opportunity to address the issue several months before the trial began. In a short written opinion dated February 18, 2011, the judge decided severance was appropriate "for the convenience of the parties, and to avoid prejudice to . . . Carrascosa." The
judge noted that defendants were being represented at trial by Walter Lesnevich, a principal in the Lesnevich firm and husband of Marzano-Lesnevich. Relying on RPC 1.9, the judge determined
that Lesnevich was disqualified from representing defendants in litigation against their former client, Carrascosa. The judge
concluded that defendants would not be prejudiced by a severance
because they were able to present their defense at trial, and, if successful, the contribution claim against Carrascosa would "evaporate." If unsuccessful, defendants were free to pursue
their contribution claim at a second trial represented by other counsel. Rule 4:38-2(a) provides that a court may order a separate trial of any claim for the convenience of the parties or to avoid prejudice. "[O]ur Rules vest the determination whether or
not to sever claims to the sound exercise of a trial court's discretion." 2(a)). "RPC 1.9(a) plainly provides that [a] lawyer who has Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at 310 (citing R. 4:38-
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or substantially related matter in which that client's interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing." v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 451 (2010). "substantially related" if (1) the lawyer for whom disqualification is sought received confidential information from the former client that can be used against that client in the subsequent representation of parties adverse to the former client, or City of Atlantic City Matters are considered
(2) facts relevant to the prior representation are both relevant and material to the subsequent representation. [Id. at 467.] Subject to certain exceptions that do not apply here, "[w]hen lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by . . . RPC 1.9 [.]" RPC 1.10(a).
Here, the judge did not mistakenly exercise his discretion by severing defendants' contribution claim against Carrascosa. Lesnevich clearly could not represent defendants in a
"substantially related matter in which" defendants' interests were "materially adverse" to those of their former client. In the end, however, the severance decision was immaterial because the judge ultimately dismissed defendants' contribution claim against Carrascosa. In his written opinion, citing
Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90 (1991), the judge concluded that any apportionment of fault was inappropriate because
defendants had a duty to prevent the "specific misconduct" of their client. As the judge explained:
As a result of the attorney-client relationship between . . . Carrascosa and the defendants, a relationship that derives its genesis from Victoria's passport and the attendant ramifications arising from that document, the Lesnevich firm was also charged with preventing any harm from befalling Peter and Victoria Innes. The
jury verdict was issued in accordance with this notion. All of these factors therefore coalesce to place . . . Carrascosa outside the boundaries of the traditional joint tortfeasor realm. Defendants argue before us that they are entitled to
contribution from Carrascosa under the JTCL. affirm the judge's dismissal of
We disagree and third-party
complaint for contribution. Pro rata apportionment tortfeasors is of liability appropriate among negligent upon and the
"percentages of fault assigned by the trier of fact." supra, 124 N.J. at 105, 107-12. general rule applies "when the
However, an exception to the duty of one encompassed the
obligation to prevent the specific misconduct of the other." Id. at 111 (citing Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982)). Application of this exception relies upon both the
foreseeability of the "specific misconduct" and its "adequate causal relationship" to the duty imposed on the other tortfeasor to prevent it. Id. at 112. See e.g., Waldron v. Johnson, 368
N.J. Super. 348, 349-50, 352 (App. Div.) (rejecting the Blazovic exception where the plaintiff's recovery against a shopping mall for an assault at an automatic teller machine "was not so
foreseeable nor did it bear such a close causal connection to
the [m]all's slow response to the melee that it should justify imposing upon the [m]all the entire responsibility for [the] plaintiff's injuries"), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004);
Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 345 N.J. Super. 278, 292 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff's sexual assault in the defendant's hotel was "neither sufficiently foreseeable nor sufficiently related to [the hotel's] alleged fault to justify imposing responsibility on [the hotel] for all of the
[plaintiff's] injuries"). Here, the judge correctly held that the Blazovic exception applied. Defendants were fully aware of the Agreement and
assumed a duty to safeguard Victoria's passport. Because they released the passport to Carrascosa without notice to Innes or his attorney, defendants failed to prevent the "specific Moreover,
misconduct" that enabled Victoria's removal to Spain.
based upon the evidence adduced at trial, that specific harm was entirely foreseeable. IV. The balance of defendants' arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a written opinion. 3(e)(1)(E). R. 2:11-
Conk was clearly qualified to render the opinions
he gave at trial, and the judge did not mistakenly exercise his discretion in so ruling. See Koseoglu v. Wry, 431 N.J. Super.
140, 159 (App. Div.) (quoting Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993)), ("'[T]he competency of a witness to testify as an
expert is remitted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.'"), certif.
denied, 216 N.J. 4 (2013). Defendants cannot assert prejudice when they provided the judge with of a proposed the law charge regarding that contained an improper and then
commented on it extensively in summation. did not discern his the error until gave
Although the judge he a properly curative
afterwards, the jury
instruction. In sum, we affirm the judgment in all respects as it
applies to Innes.
We reverse the judgment in all respects as it
applies to Victoria, and remand the matter to the Law Division for entry of judgment in defendants' favor as to her claims. do not retain jurisdiction. We