Loan

Transcript

Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose Bagtas, Felicidad Bagtas, administratrix of the intestate estate left by Jose Bagtas Facts: On May 8, 1948, Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Bureau of Animal Industry 3 bulls for 1 year for breeding purposes, subject to breeding fee for 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration of the contract, Bagtas asked for a renewal for another year. The renewal granted was only for 1 bull. Bagtas offered to buy the bulls at book value less depreciation, but the Bureau told him that he should either return the bulls or pay for their book value. Bagtas failed to pay the book value, and so the Republic commenced an action with the CFI Manila to order the return of the bulls of the payment of book value. Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and administratrix of the decedent’s estate, stated that the 2 bulls have already been returned in 1952, and that the remaining one died of gunshot during a Huk raid. As regards the two bulls, is was proven that they were returned and thus, there is no more obligation on the part of the appellant. As to the bull not returned, Felicidad contends that the obligation is extinguished since the contract is that of a commodatum and that the loss through fortuitous event should be borne by the owner. Issue: Whether, depending on the nature of the contract, the respondent is liable for the death of the bull Held: A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum . . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event: (2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . . (3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event; The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability. Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Q-200), the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court. Carmen Liwanag v. CA and People G.R. No. 114398 October 24, 1997 Romero, J. Facts:  Liwanag asked Isidora Rosales to join her and Thelma Tagbilaran in the business of buying and selling cigarettes. Under their agreement, Rosales would give the money needed to buy the cigarettes while Liwanag and Tabligan would act as her agents, with a corresponding 40% commission to her if the goods are sold; otherwise the money would be returned to Rosales.  Rosales gave several cash advances amounting to 633,650.  Money was misappropriated. Rosales files a complaint of estafa against them. Issue: 1. WON the parties entered into a partnership agreement; 2. if in the negative, WON the transaction is a simple loan Held: 1. No. Even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between the parties, when money or property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose and he later misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa. 2. No. In a contract of loan once the money is received by the debtor, ownership over the same is transferred. Being the owner, the borrower can dispose of it for whatever purpose he may deem proper. GOPOCO GROCERY (GOPOCO), ET AL. vs. PACIFIC COAST BISCUIT CO., ET AL. March 31, 1938 G.R. Nos. L-43697 and L-442200 Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. Facts: Mercantile Bank of China was declared in liquidation as it could not continue operating as such without running the risk of suffering losses and prejudice its depositors and customers. Gopoco Grocery, Et Al alleged that they deposited sum of money in the bank under liquidation on current account. To resolve these claims, Fulgencio Borromeo was appointed as commissioner and referee to receive the evidence which the interested parties may desire to present. Borromeo resolved the claims by recommending that the same be considered as an ordinary credit only, and not as a preferred credit as Gopoco Grocery, Et Al wanted, because they were at the same time debtors of the bank. Gopoco Grocery, Et Al contends that they are preferred credits because they are deposits in contemplation of law, and as such should be returned with the corresponding interest thereon. Issue:Whether or not deposits on current account in the bank now under liquidation be considered preferred credits or should they be considered ordinary credits only? Ruling: Deposits on current account in the bank now under liquidation are considered ordinary credits only. Gopoco Grocery, Et Al themselves admit that the bank owes them interest which should have been paid to them before it was declared in a state of liquidation. This fact undoubtedly destroys the character which they nullifies their contention that the same be considered as irregular deposits, because the payment of interest only takes place in the case of loans. The so-called current account and savings deposits have lost their character of deposits and are convertible into simple commercial loans because, in cases of such deposits, the bank has made use thereof in the ordinary course of its transactions as an institution engaged in the banking business, not because it so wishes, but precisely because of the authority deemed to have been granted to it by Gopoco Grocery, Et Al to enable them to collect the interest which they had been and they are now collecting, and by virtue further of the authority granted to it by Corporation Law and Banking Law. Wherefore, deposits on current account of Gopoco Grocery, Et Al in the bank under liquidation, with the right on their part to collect interest, have not created and could not create a juridical relation between them except that of creditors and debtor, they being the creditors and the bank the debtor. SPS. ERMITAÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127246, April 21, 1999 The following are the facts of the case: Luis Ermitaño was a BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC) credit cardholder while his wife, Manuelita Ermitaño, was an extension cardholder. On August 29, 1989, Manuelita’s bag which contained the credit card was snatched in Makati. Immediately, she reported the loss and thereafter sent written notice to BECC. BECC however, billed Luis for purchases made on August 30, 1989 through Manuelita’s lost card totalling P3,197.70. To justify the billing, BECC cited the following stipulation in their contract: “...the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases made through the use of the lost/stolen BPI Express Card until after such notice has been given to BECC and the latter has communicated such loss/theft to its member establishments.” The issue is whether or not the stipulation on notice required by BECC in case of loss or theft of the credit card is valid. The Supreme Court held in the negative. Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its memberestablishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly run against public policy.