Transcript
VALWEN LORIEN D. LARIN
18, 2015
September
BA LM 4-A
The Colinares vs. People (G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011) Doctrine
I.
THE FACTS
Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated
homicide for hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He
alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to 6
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. His conviction was affirmed
by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
II.
THE ISSUES
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser] offense
[of attempted homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may he may still
apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?
III. THE RULING
The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal, MODIFIED the CA
decision and found Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not frustrated) HOMICIDE and
SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months of
arresto mayor as minimum and 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as
maximum. The Court also voted 8-7 to allow Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION within
15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to
trial court.
YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But,
the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but
fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.
While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the
right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply
for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2
years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the
lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him
the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that
such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction
for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial
court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now
also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He
was not in a position to say, “By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation.” The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that
choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It
remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have
the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first
time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded
Arnel the right to apply for probation.
VALWEN LORIEN D. LARIN
18, 2015
September
BA LM 4-A
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two
thousand twelve.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10592]
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 29 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. –
Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the
full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
“1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more
times of any crime; and
“2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have
failed to surrender voluntarily.
“If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the
time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
“Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
deducted from thirty (30) years.
“Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal
to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on
appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused
is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu
proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from
the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may
be sentenced is lestierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.”
SEC. 2. Article 94 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal liability is extinguished
partially:
“1. By conditional pardon;
“2. By commutation of the sentence; and
“3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.”
SEC. 3. Article 97 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any offender qualified
for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any
convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any
other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his
sentence:
“1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
“2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
“3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
“4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during
detention; and
“5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another
deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month
of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
“An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above
allowances for good conduct.”
SEC. 4. Article 98 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth of the period
of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following
the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his
sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe
enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
“This Article shall apply to any
imprisonment or serving sentence.”
prisoner
whether
undergoing
preventive
SEC. 5. Article 99 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:”
“ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.”
SEC. 6. Penal Clause. – Faithful compliance with the provisions of this Act is hereby
mandated. As such, the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment, a fine of One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and perpetual disqualification to hold office
shall be imposed against any public officer or employee who violates the provisions
of this Act.
SEC. 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall within sixty (60) days from the approval of this Act,
promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct and
time allowances, as may be necessary, to implement the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 8. Separability Clause. – If any part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the remainder of the provisions not otherwise affected shall remain valid and
subsisting.
SEC. 9. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive
order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended
accordingly.
SEC. 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) new papers of general
circulation.