Transcript
Nicolas
Sawicky
Disasters
Final
Paper
Bringing
Some
Heat
The
Chicago
Heat
Wave
of
1995
was
a
terrible
disaster
in
American
history.
What
is
even
more
regrettable
is
the
fact
that
this
tragedy
goes
mostly
un-‐noticed
in
history
books.
The
reality
is
that
over
seven
hundred
Americans
died
during
the
Chicago
heat
wave.
Many
people
argue:
there
were
things
that
could
have
been
done
to
prevent
such
a
disaster,
the
government
had
a
dismal
response,
the
medical
examiner
was
one
of
the
first
to
discover
the
disaster,
and
the
media
had
its
own
battle
against
what
the
heat
wave
was.
Whenever
someone
looks
back
on
a
disaster,
they
always
ask
the
question,
what
could
have
been
done
differently?
It
is
human
nature
to
look
back
and
want
to
blame
someone
for
a
tragic
event.
In
the
case
of
the
Chicago
heat
wave
of
1995,
there
is
someone
to
blame
besides
Mother
Nature.
The
city
of
Chicago
did
a
horrendous
job
preparing
its
employees
for
a
crisis
and
protecting
its
citizens
when
disaster
struck.
Before
disaster
even
struck,
Chicago
was
behind
the
8-‐ball.
First
off,
there
just
were
not
enough
ambulances
to
service
Chicago’s
population.
Paramedics
themselves
stated
that
the
city’s
56
ambulances
and
roughly
600
paramedics
were
inadequate
to
even
meet
regular
demands
for
care
(130).
Another
stunning
fact
is
that
the
city’s
hospitals
and
trauma
centers
were
concentrated
on
the
North
side,
1
creating
a
segregated
geography
of
medical
care
that
adds
to
the
vulnerability
of
the
relatively
poor
and
polluted
communities
on
the
South
and
West
sides,
both
areas
where
numerous
casualties
occurred
(131).
There
was
even
trouble
with
how
the
emergency
monitoring
system
was
setup.
The
Fire
department
had
not
centralized
the
system
for
monitoring
the
number
or
the
nature
of
the
requests
for
service
(133).
This
caused
the
disaster
to
go
unnoticed
by
a
lot
of
the
higher
up
officials
until
it
was
too
late.
When
disaster
struck
the
city
of
Chicago,
there
were
still
enough
resources
to
help
make
a
difference.
The
police
officers
of
Chicago
would
have
been
great
candidates
to
go
door
to
door
and
check
on
the
elderly.
Instead,
the
police
decided
to
continue
doing
the
job
they
signed
up
for,
law
enforcement.
Officers
did
not
want
to
become
“pooper
scooper
police”
and
they
believed
doing
social
work
seemed
like
extra
work
(151).
City
officials
had
a
pipe
dream
for
Chicago
police
officers
to
become
more
then
just
officers
of
the
law,
but
also
“neighborhood
organizers,
community
leaders,
liaisons
for
city
agencies,
and
provide
service”
(150).
Although
a
great
idea
on
paper,
it
was
not
implemented
very
well
and
when
the
city
expected
the
police
officers
to
take
on
this
role,
it
did
not
happen.
Most
police
officers
were
too
busy
dealing
with
another
task
that
was
assigned
to
them,
recording
deaths
and
dropping
of
the
bodies
to
Cook
County
(147).
You
would
think
that
someone
else
could
have
been
tasked
with
the
brainless
job
of
reporting
the
dead
and
transporting
them,
so
that
the
officers
could
use
their
leverage
in
the
community
to
check
on
the
elderly
that
might
still
be
alive.
The
officers
that
were
not
waiting
in
line
at
Cook
County
Medical
Examiners
Office
were
still
enforcing
the
law.
During
2
the
heat
wave,
there
were
134
narcotic
arrests
(99).
This
shows
that
even
with
innocent
people
dying
left
and
right,
the
priority
of
the
Chicago
police
department
was
to
go
about
business
as
usual.
Even
when
an
unprepared
government
is
faced
with
a
disaster,
this
handicap
can
be
overcome
with
a
quick
and
decisive
response.
The
city
of
Chicago
did
almost
the
opposite
of
what
was
necessary
for
the
given
situation.
When
the
first
reports
of
heat
related
deaths
hit
the
news,
Mayor
Daley
flat
out
denied
that
they
were
due
to
the
heat
and
refuted
the
evidence
provided
by
the
Cook
County
Medical
Examiners
office.
This
governmental
ignorance
did
not
end
with
the
mayor.
Numerous
paramedics
complained
to
their
bosses
about
the
severity
of
the
situation
unfolding
in
Chicago,
but
these
outcries
fell
on
deaf
ears.
Paramedics
informed
the
Fire
Department
administration
that
they
were
continually
denied
from
hospitals
that
were
full
and
had
to
spend
extra
time
driving
people
to
other
hospitals
until
they
found
one
that
was
not
yet
filled
(131).
One
paramedic
directly
called
the
deputy
commissioner,
only
to
be
told
that
he
was
being
paranoid
(133).
The
fact
was,
only
they
held
the
power
to
call
in
additional
ambulances
from
the
surrounding
suburbs,
but
choose
to
be
fiscally
responsible
instead
of
saving
lives.
The
paramedics
summed
it
up
best
when
they
said:
“The
city's
refusal
to
update
and
expand
its
emergency
care
system,
as
well
as
its
reluctance
to
recall
off-‐duty
officers
and
bring
in
additional
ambulances
during
the
heat
wave,
reflects
a
systemic
prioritization
of
cost
containment
over
life
preservation”
(134).
The
medical
examiner,
Edmund
Donoghue,
was
one
of
the
first
people
to
really
understand
the
severity
of
the
Chicago
heat
wave
of
1995.
He
understood
the
3
difficulty
with
determining
whether
a
person
died
from
natural
causes
or
from
the
heat.
Donoghue
even
understood
that
heat
waves
are
sometimes
hard
to
view
as
disasters
since
their
destruction
is
invisible
to
the
naked
eye.
He
used
his
medical
background
to
devise
a
3-‐point
checklist
that
would
determine
whether
each
death
that
came
into
Cook
County
was
heat
related
(26).
After
the
reports
of
hundreds
of
deaths
related
to
the
heat
wave
got
out,
Mayor
Daley
publically
discredited
the
reports.
Knowing
that
his
reports
were
fact,
Donoghue
refused
to
bow
to
the
external
pressure
and
change
his
death
reports,
effectively
preventing
the
city
leaders
from
dismissing
the
severity
of
the
disaster
without
a
public
battle
(28).
Looking
back
on
the
tragedy,
Edmund
Donoghue
actually
gave
the
city
an
“A-‐plus
for
their
effort”,
but
was
quick
to
point
out
that
they
should
“continue
until
there
are
no
heat-‐related
deaths
in
the
summertime,
and
that’s
doable”
(228).
During
any
disaster,
the
media
plays
a
key
role
in
determining
the
amount
of
attention,
if
any
that
a
disaster
receives.
This
especially
holds
true
for
the
Chicago
Heat
Wave
of
1995.
The
media
first
treats
it
as
a
meteorological
event,
then
a
natural
event
that
was
killing
the
elderly,
and
finally
a
disaster
that
the
city
government
was
partially
responsible
for.
The
Chicago
Tribune
originally
reported
the
heat
wave
exclusively
as
a
“meteorological
event,
describing
it
with
little
detail
and
placing
it
in
the
weather
section
of
the
paper”
(144).
This
lack
of
coverage
then
changed
when
heat
related
deaths
started
to
pile
up.
This
is
when
the
medical
examiner
report
came
out
and
the
Mayor
denied
the
relation
between
these
deaths
and
the
current
heat
wave
that
Chicago
was
experiencing.
4
Two
reporters
for
the
Chicago
Tribune
were
quick
to
defend
the
mayor
and
his
lack
of
response
during
the
disaster.
John
Kass
wrote;
“Trying
to
blame
the
mayor
for
an
act
of
god
is
not
only
unfair,
it
also
does
an
injustice
by
wrongfully
framing
the
debate”
(144).
He
goes
on
to
blame
individual
citizens
for
abandoning
their
elderly,
saying
that
it’s
not
the
city’s
problem
that
they
were
left
alone
during
the
heat
wave.
Cindy
Richards
takes
a
similar
approach
when
she
writes;
“When
scores
of
elderly
residents
succumbed
to
the
sweltering
heat,
residents
and
community
activists
didn’t
ask
how
they
could
have
worked
to
prevent
some
of
these
deaths.
They
instead
asked
why
the
city
had
not
done
more”
(144).
Although
it
is
true
that
it
is
not
entirely
the
city’s
fault,
some
blame
must
rest
on
their
shoulders.
The
citizens
of
Chicago
pay
taxes
for
things
like
emergency
services,
something
that
was
severely
lacking
during
that
summer.
Although
the
fact
that
people
were
dying
from
the
heat
wave
was
finally
getting
out,
the
trend
of
categorizing
the
heat
wave
as
a
natural
disaster
continued.
The
reporting
from
the
media
was
“far
from
initiating
serious
inquiry
or
probing
public
discussion
about
the
social
or
political
conditions
contributing
to
the
lethal
nature
of
the
event”
(190).
There
were
dramatic
images
of
dead
bodies
and
wilted
emergency
workers
that
dominated
the
heat
wave
coverage
across
the
media,
which
made
for
a
memorable
week
of
news.
Unfortunately
these
images
“did
little
to
help
audiences
to
understand
the
sources
of
the
trauma
that
was
happening
around
them
or
to
establish
connections
between
social
and
political
conditions
in
the
city
and
the
emerging
health
crisis”
(218).
This
means
that
for
most
of
the
heat
wave
people
understood
that
people
were
dying,
but
reporters
never
looked
into
what
was
5
causing
such
high
fatalities
besides
the
fact
that
it
was
hot
outside.
Things
began
to
change
towards
the
end
of
the
heat
wave
as
select
reporters
began
to
dig
deeper
into
why
people
were
dying
during
the
heat
wave.
The
tribune
and
the
sun-‐times
published
exemplary
pieces
of
news
reporting
about
people
who
died
alone
that
managed
to
make
it;
neighborhood
conditions
that
made
some
areas
especially
vulnerable;
and
emergency
city
programs
that
were
not
mobilized
(194).
Unfortunately,
these
stories
became
buried
in
the
back
sections
and
inside
pages
that
fewer
readers
see.
There
was
also
a
division
that
formed
between
newspaper
editors.
Those
that
supported
the
mayor
agreed
that
the
mortality
figures
were
overstated.
The
editors
that
remained
were
convinced
that
the
city
was
experiencing
a
genuine
catastrophe
(195).
The
Chicago
heat
wave
of
1995
truly
is
a
great
example
of
the
power
government
can
hold
over
the
press.
It
only
took
a
few
words
from
the
mayor
to
completely
change
the
way
a
disaster
was
reported.
Natural
or
not,
disasters
are
a
part
of
life.
What
makes
them
important
is
their
ability
to
bring
out
the
worst
in
society.
In
the
case
of
the
Chicago
heat
wave,
what
started
as
a
completely
natural
heat
wave
soon
spiraled
into
a
crisis
for
Chicago’s
emergency
services.
That
disaster
pointed
out
glaring
weaknesses
in
the
city’s
government
and
it
cost
hundreds
of
people
their
lives.
The
reality
is
that
there
were
things
that
Chicago
have
been
done
to
prevent
such
a
disaster;
the
city
government
had
a
dismal
response;
the
medical
examiner
was
one
of
the
first
to
discover
the
disaster
and
report
about
it;
and
the
media
had
its
own
battle
against
what
the
heat
wave
was,
both
internally
and
externally.
6
Urban
Heat
Island
Effect
An
Urban
Heat
Island
Effect
is
a
phenomenon
that
arose
with
the
creation
of
large
urban
environments.
Roofs
and
pavements
in
large
cities
are
at
the
root
of
the
cause
because
their
surfaces
are
dry
and
easily
absorb
heat.
This
in
turn
causes
the
city
temperature
to
become
higher
than
surrounding
regions
(Notes
10/12).
This
absorption
is
not
an
issue
with
more
rural
regions
since
open
land
and
vegetation
are
permeable
and
moist
(EPA).
Heat
Islands
occur
both
on
the
surface
and
in
the
atmosphere.
Surfaces
like
roofs
and
pavements
can
become
up
to
50-‐90
degrees
Fahrenheit
hotter
than
the
air,
while
moist
surfaces
remain
around
the
same
temperature
(EPA).
Atmospheric
heat
islands
are
more
present
after
the
sun
goes
down.
This
is
due
to
all
the
heat
that
was
absorbed
during
the
day
is
now
being
released
into
the
air,
while
the
air
in
the
surrounding
regions
just
cools
down.
When
this
occurs,
there
can
be
a
temperature
difference
of
as
much
as
22
degrees
Fahrenheit
between
the
city
and
its
surrounding
regions
(EPA).
It
is
important
to
know
and
understand
heat
islands
and
ways
to
prevent
them,
because
they
can
negatively
affect
a
community’s
quality
of
life.
One
of
the
major
impacts
of
heat
islands
is
the
increase
in
energy
consumption
and
elevated
emissions
of
air
pollutants
(EPA).
The
higher
air
temperatures
mean
that
most
people
will
be
using
an
air
conditioner
to
cool
down
their
homes.
This
causes
a
peak
in
energy
demands
and
with
it,
the
burning
of
coal
to
produce
electricity.
7
Thankfully,
there
are
ways
to
prevent
this
effect
on
cities.
One
of
the
simplest
changes
is
an
increase
in
tree
and
vegetation
cover
(EPA).
The
addition
of
trees
on
sidewalks
can
go
a
long
way
in
to
improving
life
in
the
city.
Something
else
that
has
recently
caught
on
in
popularity
is
the
use
of
“green
roofs”.
These
roofs
not
only
eliminate
the
absorption
problems,
but
also
add
oxygen
to
the
atmosphere.
The
Urban
Heat
Island
Effect
is
something
that
can
be
seen
not
only
in
cities
across
the
world,
but
in
history.
The
Chicago
heat
wave
of
1995
is
a
great
poser-‐ child
for
why
the
Urban
Heat
Island
Effect
should
be
eliminated
from
cities.
When
the
rest
of
the
areas
around
Chicago
were
surviving
the
heat
wave,
the
city
saw
over
seven
hundred
people
die
from
heat
related
deaths.
If
Americans
do
not
want
to
see
such
a
tragic
disaster
happen
again,
they
need
to
help
push
the
elimination
of
heat
islands
in
their
cities
by
including
green
roofs
and
increasing
the
use
of
trees
and
vegetation
on
sidewalks.
8