Judicial Precedents Order

Order discussing value of district court orders as precedent.
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Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 1 of 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT SO UTH ERN D ISTR ICT O F FLO RIDA CASE NO .1:10-cv-24590-K ING HARTFORD ACCIDEN T AND INDEM NITY COM PANY,a foreign corporation,asequitable subrogee and realparty intereston behalf of M iller& Solomon GeneralContractors,lnc., Plaintiff, VS. CRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE COM PAN Y,a foreign corporation, D efendant. HARTFOO ACCID ENT AND INDEM NITY COM PAN Y,a foreign corporation,asequitable subrogee and realpm'ty in intereston behalf of M iller& Solomon GeneralContractors,lnc., Plaintiff, V S. W ESTCHESTER SU RPLUS LINES IN SUM N CE COM PANY ,a foreign corporation, Defendant. / ORDER DENYING JOINT M O TIO N TO VACATE CERTAIN O RDER S AND FIN A L JU D G M E N T S TH IS CAUSE com es before the Court upon the parties' Joint M otion to Vacate Certain Ordersand FinalJudgments(DE 242).Thisisaclosed case.On June 15,2012,the Courtgranted the defendants'motions for summary judgment againstPlaintiff,Hartford Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 2 of 14 Accident and Indemnity Company (dillartford''),and entered finaljudgments accordingly. SeeDE 194-197.H artford appealed.See DE 199 & 200. W hile on appeal,the parties attended a m ediation conference, as directed by the Eleventh Circuit,l but failed to reach an agreem ent. The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argum ents and,m ore than one year later,sua sponte referred the parties to m ediation again. ln this second m ediation,the parties reaehed a tentative settlem ent agreement- tentative because itSsisexpressly conditioned and contingentupon theissuance ofa final,written order vacating''thisCourt's d'Sum m ary Judgm ents and the resulting CostOrders....''DE 242,at 3;seeDE 242-2.Butratherthan seek vacaturin theappellateCourtunder28 U.S.C.j2106, thepartiesmoved forithereunderFederalRule ofCivilProcedure60(b)(6).2Thereafter,the Eleventh Circuitgranted theparties'lsgjjointmotion to stay proceedingson appealpending theDistrictCourt'sdecision ontheirjointmotionto vacatecertainorders.''DE 244,at2.For thereasonsthatfollow,the Courtdeniestheparties'm otion. 1. G O VERNING LEG AL STANDARD S $iAs a generalm atter,the filing of a notice of appealdeprives the district courtof jurisdiction over al1issues involved in the appeal.''Mahone v.Ray,326 F.3d 1176,1179 (11th Cir.2003).'il-lowever,itdoes notpreventthe districtcourtfrom taking action $in furtherance ofthe appeal,'''which includes isthatdistrictcourtsretainjurisdiction afterthe 1Thisisaccording to theparties. They provided no record ofthisdirective. 2 Ifthe parties had m oved for vacatur in the Eleventh Circuit, that courtwould have been entitled to 'srem and the case with instructions that the district courtconsider the request, which itmay do so pursuantto federalruleofCivilProcedure60(b).''U S.Bancorp M ortg. C<).v.BonnerMallP 'shlp,513 U.S.18,29 (1994). 2 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 3 of 14 filing ofa notice of appealto entertain and deny a Rule 60(b) motion.''f#.at 1179-80 (cltation omitted).tillowever,foltowing thetlling ofanotice ofappealdistrictcourtsdo not possessjurisdiction tograntaRule60(b)motion.''f#.at1180(emphasisadded). Accordingly,adistrictcourtpresented with aRule60(b)motion afteranotice of appealhas been filed should consider the m otion and assess its merits. It m ay then deny the motion orindicate its beliefthatthe argum ents raised are m eritorious.Ifthe districtcourtselects the lattercourse,the movantm ay then petition the courtofappealsto remand thematterso asto conferjurisdiction on the districtcourtto grantthe m otion. 1d.This procedure is codified in FederalRule of Civil Procedure 62.1,Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1,and Eleventh CircuitRule 12.1-1. UnderRule60(b)(6),$$(o)n motion andjustterms,thecourtm ay relieveaparty orits legalrepresentative from a finaljudgment,order,or proceeding for''ltany ...reason that justitses relief.''The rule enables courts ûflto vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.'...M otions under the rule are directed to the sound discretion ofthe districtcourt.''Gr#hn v.Swim-Tech Corp.,722 F.2d 677,680 (11th Cir. 1984)(quotingKlapprottv.United States,335 U.S.601,615 (1949)).Therefore,thisCourt mustdeterm inewhethervacating itspriorordersto fulfilla condition ofthe parties'tentative settlementon appealisappropriateto accomplishjustice. II. ANALYSIS AzTheBancorp Decision ln U S.Bancorp M ortg. Co.v.Bonner M allP ' shlp,513 U.S.18, 19 (1994),the Suprem e Courtconsidered dûwhetherappellate courtsin the federalsystem should vacatecivil judgments of subordinate courts in cases thatare settled afterappealis filed orcertiorari 3 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 4 of 14 sought.''In thatcase,BonnerM allPartnership (the iipartnership'')defaulted on itsrealestate taxes.f#.U.S.Bancorp M ortgage Co.(çsBancorp''),who had acquired aloan and mortgage secured by the realestate,scheduled a foreclosure sale.1d.The day before the sale, the Partnership petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 1d. Bancorp m oved to suspend the autom atic stay ofits foreclosure,which m otion the bankruptcy courtgranted.1d.at20.The United StatesD istrictCourtforthe Districtofldaho reversed the bankruptcy court,and the United States Courtof Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirm ed.1d.A fter the United States Supreme Courtgranted Bancorp's petition fora writofcertiorari,the parties stipulated to a consensual plan of reorganization, which the bankruptcy court approved. 1d. The S'confirm ation of the plan constituted a settlem entthatm ooted the case,''butBancorp was notcompletely satistied.ltasked the Supreme Courtto vacatethejudgmentofthe Courtof Appealspursuantto28U.S.C.j2106. Theresultwasaunanimousopinion in which theSupremeCourtstrongly rejected the idea that ilcoul' ts should vacate where m ootness results from a settlem ent.''1d.at23.The Coul' t reviewed and described its then-leading case on vacatur, United States M unsingwear,Inc.,340U.S.36(1950): W e stated thatiigtjhe established practice oftheCourtin dealing with a civil case from a courtin the federalsystem which has becom e m ootwhile on its way here or pending our decision on the m erits is to reverse or vacate the judgmentbelow and remand with a direction to dismiss.''...W e ksexplained thatvacatur ltclears the path for future relitigation of the issues betw een the parties and eliminates a judgment,review ofwhich was prevented through happenstance.'' 1d.at22-23 (quoting M unsingwear,340 U.S.at39,40).The Courtthen surveyed post- M unsingwearprecedent,and concluded thatitgtjheprinciplesthathave alwaysbeen implicit 4 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 5 of 14 in ourtreatm entofm ootcases counselagainstextending M unsingwearto settlem ent.''1d.at 24.The Courtreasoned that,in considering whether to grant vacatur based on m ootness, Ssgtqheprincipalcondition to which wehave looked iswhethertheparty seeking relieffrom thejudgmentbelow causedthemootnessbyvoluntary action.''f#. A party who seeks review ofthe merits of an adverse ruling,butis frustrated by the vagariesofcircum stance,oughtnotin fairnessbe forced to acquiesce in thejudgment.SeeHamburg-Amerikanische,supra,239 U.S.,at477-478,36 S.Ct., at 216-217.The sam e is true when m ootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below .See Walling,321 U .S.,at 675,64 S.Ct., at 828; H eitmuller, supra, 256 U .S., at 362, 41 S.Ct., at 523-524. W here m ootness results from settlem ent, however, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legalrem edy by the ordinary processes of appealor certiorari,thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy ofvacatur. Thejudgmentisnotunreviewable,butsimplyunreviewedby hisown choice. Id at25 (emphasisadded)(footnote om itted).The Supreme Courtconcluded thatbecause the losing party below bears the burden of proving içequitable entitlem ent to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur,''thatparty's Ssvoluntary forfeiture of review constitutes a failure ofequity thatm akesthe burden decisive''againstvacatur.1d.at26. ln reaching its decision,the Bancorp Courtalso took account ofthe public interest. The Courtfirstemphasized the presumptive correctnessand value ofjudicialprecedentsto the legalcom munity asa whole.1d.Itthen concluded thatthepublic interestwasbestserved by honoring the dem ands oforderly procedure- i.e.the ordinary appellate process- rather than by allowing diaparty who stepsoffthe statutory path to employ the secondary rem edy of vacaturasarefsned form ofcollateralattack onthejudgment.''1d.at27.TheCourtheld that iûmootnessby reason ofsettlementdoesnotjustitk vacaturofajudgmentunderreview.''1d. at29. Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 6 of 14 Nearthe end ofthe Bancolp Opinion,however,the Courtallowed foran undetsned exception' . Thisisnotto say thatvacaturcan neverbe granted when m ootnessisproduced in thatfashion.A s we have described,the determ ination is an equitable one, and exceptional circum stances m ay conceivably counsel in favor of such a course.ltshould be clearfrom ourdiscussion,however,thatthose exceptional circum stances do not include the mere fact that the settlem ent agreem ent provides for vacatur- which neither diminishes the voluntariness of the abandonm ent of review nor alters any ofthe policy considerations w e have discussed. This statem ent has lef' t lower courts with the am bitious task of determ ining what circum stancesare 'kexceptional''enough to counterm and the presumptive value ofprecedent, the imperative to honor the dem ands of orderly procedure, and the failure of equity that ordinarily resultsfrom an appellant'svoluntary forteiture ofreview . K PosL-Bancorp'theCircuitsFind idExceptionalCircumstances'' By allowing forthepossibility ofûkexceptionalcircum stances,''the Suprem e Courtdid notcom pletely close the doorto vacatur based on m ootness by reason of settlem ent.Itleft the doorajar,and some tbderalappellate courtshave walked rightthrough it.The parties urge this Courtto follow the examples of two opinions fkom the Firstand Second Circuit CourtsofAppeal. Thefirstopinionthatthepartiesrelyon isM ottav.DistrictDirectorqf. J.M uv.,61F.3d 117 (1stCir.1995).There,in ahabeascorpusaction,theUnited StatesDistrictCourtforthe District of M assachusetts itstayed gM otta'sl deportation untilthe Board of lmmigration Appeals(i$BlA'')could issueadecisiononM otta'spending motion toreopenhisdeportation proceeding,and forninety daysthereafterto perm itreview ofthatdecision,ifnecessary,''by Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 7 of 14 the First Circuit.f#. at 118.The IN S appealed the district court's ruling before the BIA issued a decision./#.D uring oralargum ent,the FirstCircuitproposed thatthe partiessettle, and directed counselfor both sides to discuss itwith their clients.As a result,the parties agreed thatthe 1N S would grantM otta a tem porary stay of deportation com parable to that granted him by the districtcourt,on the condition thatthe districtcourt'sopinion,which the 1NS viewed asiia dangerousand erroneousprecedent''were vacated.f#. The FirstCircuitconcluded thatthe controversy betw een the partieshad ended,that the appealwas moot,and thatthe districtcourt's opinicm should be vacated.1d.The court took itpains to consider whether this appealfblls within the Suprem e Court's prohibition against vacatur in''Bancorp.1d. The courtconcluded that kiit does not'' for tw o principal reasons.First,the appellate court,rather than the parties,initiated settlem ent discussions. Thus,k'galstheINS hasnotinitiatedtherelinquishmentofitsrighttotheremedy (ofappeall, the same equitable calculus underlying Bancorp is not present.'' Id. The First Circuit's initiativealso negatedBancolp'sconcernsk'aboutgiving partiesunduecontroloverjudicial precedents.''ld.In thatrespectthe courtsaw ikno appreciable harm to the orderly functioning ofthefederaljudicialsystem byvacatingjudgment.''1d.Second, the First Circuit was persuaded thatthe lkharm''worked 'tby depriving the public and the judicialsystem ofthe precedentialvalue ofthe districtcourt's opinion''should notSitake priority over the parties' bestinterests.''1d.Itmattered to the courtthati'the IN S,asa repeatplayerbefbre the courts, isprimarily concerned with the precedentialeffectof the decision below.If that decision stands,a1lpossibility ofa settlem entis elim inated.Ifitis vacated,the appellee acquires the absolute certainty ofnotbeing deported,while the governm ent saves the costs and risk of 7 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 8 of 14 litigation a w in for both sides.''f#.The First Circuitconcluded that bfthe equities plainly favorvacatur''based on mootnessby reason ofsettlem ent.f#.at118. The second opinion thatthepartiesrely on isM qjorLeagueBaseballProps.,Inc.v. Pacfc Trading Cards,Inc.,150 F.3d 149(2dCir.1998).Thatcase wasatrademark dispute by MajorIseague Baseball(k'M LB'')againstPacifscTrading Cards,lnc.(':Pacif5c''),on the theol' y that Pacitsc w as w rongfully m anufacturing and distributing k'trading cards that depicted mqior-league baseball players in M tzB-tradem arked unifonns.''f#, at 150. The United StatesD istrictCourtforthe Southern D istrictofN ew York denied M LB'Sm otion for a preliminary injunction.f#.M LB then moved in the Second Circuit for an injunction pending an appeal of the district court's order.1d.At oral argum ent,the Second Circuit expressed its idintention to grantM LB'S m otion unless Pacit'ic posted a bond sufficientto secure M laB's claim s.''f#.at l50-5l.'rhe coul't also i'suggested to the parties that they attemptto negotiate a settlem ent.'Fo aid discussionr''the court Siassigned staff counselto mediatethematter.''1d.at151.Afterdiscussions,thepartiesjointlyreported that%itheycould settlethe dispute butonly ifthe districtcourt'sorderand opinion werevacated.''Id. The Second Circuit obliged.lt vacated the district court's order and opinion and dism issed M LB'Sm otionsasm ootin lightoftheparties'settlem ent.The courtfollowed the FirstCircuit's M otta decision,concluding thatthe principles expressed therein counseled in fàvorofvacatur.First,justlikein Mbtta,'IM LB Sdid notby itsown initiativerelinquish its rightto vacatur-'''ld.at152 (quoting sfotta v.DistrictDirectorof I.N.S.,61F.3d 117,118 (lstCir.1995). 8 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 9 of 14 Rather, Pacific strongly desired a settlem ent to avoid the fsnancial consequences of either posting the bond or not shipping the cards,the only optionsbefore it.Pacitsc could nottestthe merits ofthe favorable lower-court opinion withoutrisking the severe financialconsequencesofour gthe Second Circuit'slintendedruling onM LB'Smotion. M IwB w asagreeableto asettlem entbutneeded avacaturbecause,in the course ofdetknding itsmarks,it,like the INS in M otta,had to be concelmed aboutthe effectofthe districtcourt'sdecision in future litigation with alleged intkingers. Id.The courtconcluded that,unlike in Bancorp,lithe victor in the district courtwanted a settlem entasmuch as,orm ore than,the loserdid....The only dam ageto thepublic interest from such a vacatur would be that the validity of M LB'S m arks would be left to future litigation.''1d.Therefore,içthese facts m etthe texceptionalcircum stances'testofBancorp.b' Id.J The partieshave notcited any instances oî-the Eleventh Circuitfsnding 'lexceptional circum stances'' under Bancorp.This Court has found only one such instance, in a oneparagraph,percuriam,unpublished opinion.SeeBlue Cross d:Blue Shield Ass'n v.Cox,403 F.Appfx417 (11th Cir.2010).Theopinion'sonelbotnoteonly hintsatwhattheexceptional circum stanceswere;idunexpected developmentsm ake itunlikely'thatfullcounseling w ould be available to the courtiflitigation continues in this case.The possible preclusive effectif 3The Second Circuitfound û'exceptionalcircum stances''in one otheropinion thatthe parties cite,butthe factsofthatcaseareinapposite.SeeM icrosojtCorp.v.BristolTech.,Inc.,250 F.3d l52,155-56 (2d Cir.2001)(vacating the districtcourt's opinion based in parton a suspicion thatthe districtcourtawarded punitive dam ages in contravention ofthe Seventh Amendment).See also In re Gczlcp-l/M otors Corp.,No.94-2435,1995 W L 940063,at*1 (4th Cir.Feb.l7,1995)(snding Sbexceptionalcircum stances''where,among otherthings,a district court's order could, if left standing, result in the disclosure of privileged communications). 9 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 10 of 14 the case rem ains isundesirable underthese circum stances.''Id.at417 n.1.The Cox opinion offersno guidancehere. The Courtalso notesthatthe Eleventh Circuit,sitting en banc,recently dism issed an appealas m oot due to settlem ent,which the parties achieved after briefing,oralargum ent, and areferralto m ediation by the en bancpanel.Berry v.Orange Cr//y'.,N o.13-14092,2015 W 1x2165892 (11th Cir.M ay 8,20l5).'Fhecourtalso remanded thecaseto thedistrictcourt with instructions to vacate the judgmentand dismiss the lawsuit.Id.The district court's opinion had been aftirm ed by the three-m em berpaneldecision thatwasvacated pending en- g banc review .See Scrr.pv.Leslie,767 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir.2014),opinion vacated on reh' en bancsub nom.Berry v.Orange fk/.1' .,771F.3d 1316(11th Cir.2014).Theen bancorder ofdism issaland rem and doesnotm ention Bancorp. C. The InstantCase l'he parties contend thatiûexceptionalcircum stances''existin this case,analogous to those found in the Firstand Second Circuits'M otta and MajorLeagueBaseballdecisions, Pursuant to which this Courtoughtto vacate certain judgments and orders to eflkctthe exceptional circumstances'':(1) the parties parties' settlelnent. These are the proffered ti entered into settlem entnegotiations only upon the urging ofthe Eleventh Circuit,ilbut itis im possible for the Appellantto enter into any settlem ent that is notconditioned upon the decision on review being vacated based on potential harm the decision may cause the Appellantin futurelitigationi''and(2)ûtthedistrictcourt'sdecision ison appealand isbased 10 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 11 of 14 on an interpretation of state law ,thus having lim ited precedential value to the public.'' D E 242, at8.4 The Courtagreesthatthese circum stances are analogous to those found in the M otta and M ajor League Baseball decisions. The Court disagrees that they are sufficiently Vtexceptional''to escapeBancolp'sstrong disfavorofvacaturbased on mootnessby reason of settlem ent. First,this Coul' t diffkrs w ith the First and Second Circuits as to the parties' tsrst Proposed Stexceptional circum stance.'' ln Bancolp,the i'principal condition''to which the Supreme Coul't looked was Siwhether the party seeking relief from the judgmentbelow caused the m ootness by voluntary action.''U S.Bancorp M ortg.Co.v.BonnerM allP ' ship, 513 U.S.18,24 (1994).The Supreme Courtreasoned that,asthe losing party below bears the burden ofproving ûlequitable entitlementto the extraordinary rem edy of vacatur,''that party's ivvoluntary forfeiture ofreview constitutesa failure of equity thatm akes the burden decisive''againstvacatur.1d at26.In thisCourt'sview,the factthatthe partiesentered into settlem ent negotiations only upcm the urging of the appellate court,and the fàct that the appellantherewantsvacaturasmuch astheappellee(in orderto eflkctuatesettlement)inno way alters the voluntariness of appellant's t-orfeiture of appellate review .The parties may have discussed settlem ent only upon the insistence ofthe Eleventh Circuit,butthe parties' inclusion of vacatur as a condition of their settlem entwas entirely their own prerogative. 4 The factsofthe underlying action- consolidated suits fordeclaratol' y relief and breach of contract- are set forth in thisCourt's two OrdersofFinalSummary Judgment(DE 194; DE 195).Thespecificsarenotmaterialtotheparties'argumentsforvacatur. 11 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 12 of 14 Having made thatchoice,appellantsuflkrs fi-om that iblack of equity ofa litigantwho has voluntarily abandoned review .''1(1.at28. Second,the Courtis notpersuaded by the parties'insistence thatthe com paratively limited precedential value ofthis Court'sjudgments--based on state 1aw as they areconstitutesan -'exceptionaleircunastance,''sAlthough the Bancorp Courtconsidered am otion tovacatethejudgmentofa coul'tofappeals,theCoul'tdiscussedtherelevanceofitsholding t'to motions atthe court-of-appeals Ievelforvacatur ofdistrict-courtjudgments.''f#.The Courtrejected someopinions'suggestionsthatèûmotionsgforvacaturlatthatlevelshouldbe more fkeely granted,since district-courtjudgmentsaresubjecttoreview asofright,''and are therefore idm ore likely to be ovel-turned and presumptively lessvalid.''1d.To this the Court ûiagain assertredj the inappropriateness of disposing of cases, whose merits are beyond judicialpowertoconsider,on thebasisofjudicialestimatesregardingtheirmerits.''ld. lfitis inappropriateto disposeofcases,whose meritsare beyondjudicialpowerto consider,on thebasisofjudicialestimatesregarding theirmerits,then how much more so is itinappropriateto dispose ofcases,whosemeritsare beyond judicialpowerto consider,on thebasisofjudicialestimatesregarding theirvalue.Thisconclusion isparticularlywarranted in the face ofBancorp's strong statementon the value ofjudicialprecedents' .Sisludicial precedents are presum ptively correct and valuable to the legal com m unity as a whole. 'l-hey are not m erely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludesthatthepublicinterestwouldbeservedby avacatur.'''1d.at26-27(quoting Izumi 5In this respectthe parties'argum entis somewhatcontradictory:they sim ultaneously argue thattheordersandjudgmentsthey wantvacated (1)areofnegligibleprecedentialvalue and (2)will,ifnotvacated,standasonerousprecedents,valuabletoPlaintifpsfutureadversaries. 12 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 13 of 14 Seimitsu. &-4). 0 )0 KabushlkiKaisha v.U S.Phill psCorp.'510U.S.27,40 (1993)(Stevens,J., dissentingl)(emphasisadded). ltis upon consideration ofthisstatem ent,and ofthe sound policy behind it,thatthis Coul't perceives a basic tlaw in the M otta and Major Zctzp/c Baseball opinions.Those decisionsin partturn on the courts'determ inationsthatlittleorno harm would be worked by avacatur.SeeMotta v.DistrictDirectorOfI.NS.,61F.3d 117,118 (1stCir.1995)(i$W esee no appreciable harm to the orderly functioning ofthe federaljtldicialsystem by vacating judglnent.'');Major League st7-vt?!?l# Props.,Inc.v.rltn#7c Trading Cards,Inc.,l50 F.3d 149,152 (2d Cir.1998)(kk-f' heonly damageto thepublic interestfrom such avacaturwould be thatthe validity of M LB'S marks would be leftt) o future litigation.'').The parties' argumentto thisCourtissimilarly focused.SeeDE 242,at14 (klthepublic's interestin the developm entof1aw w ould notbe harm ed by granting vacaturofthe Ordersbecausethe legal issuespresentedtherein can beaddressedwith moret'inality by Florida'sstatecou1'ts.''). However,thisisthe wrong focus.TheBancorp Courtdid notstatethatvacaturshould be granted where doing so would work only a little harm ,or none atall.Rather,the Court stated thatvacaturshould be granted only where the public interestwould affinnatively Sisbe servedby avacatur.'''SeeBancorp,513 U.S.at26-27 (quotation omitted);c/ id.at27(sdwe think...that the public interest requires those demands (of orderly procedure) to be honored when they can'') (emphasis added). The parties' required showing under Rule 6()(b)(6),pursuantto which they bring theirinstantmotion,isalso an affirmative one;the courtmayrelieveaparty from afinaljudgmentororderforany reason ilthatjustifiesrelief'' ltisnotenough forthepartiesto show m erely thatavacaturw illnotcauseharm . 13 Case 1:10-cv-24590-JLK Document 246 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/27/2015 Page 14 of 14 On thatfinalnote,this Courtrejects the parties'low estimation ofthe harm that would result from the requested vacatur.Bancorp makes clear that a species of harm necessarily resultsfrom depriving thepublicandthelegalcommunity ofjudicialprecedents, which are Siipresum ptively conrect and valuable.''' See Bancorp, at 26-27 (quotation omitted).6Underthe ordinary circumstancesofthis case,the parties'desire to settledoesnotjustify theextraordinaryreliefofvacatur. 111. CONCLUSION Therefore,it is O RDERED,ADJUDG ED,and DECREED that the parties'Joint M otion to VacateCertain OrdersandFinalJudgments(DE 242)be,andthesameis,hereby DENIED. DONE and O RDER ED in Cham bers atthe Jam es Lawrence King FederalJustice Building and United StatesCourthouse,M iam i,Florida,this27th day ofM ay,2015. JAM ES LAW N CE K IN G UN ITED STATES DISTRICT J SOU THERN DISTRICT OF FL E DA A 1lCounselofRecord 6The CourtnotesthatitsFinalSum m ary Judgm entOrderin favorofD efendantW estchester SurplusLines(DE 194)hasbeen cited in W ILLIAM SCHWARTZKOPF,PRACTICALGUIDETO Coxserfttycrlnlox CoxTltAc-sSURETVCLAIMSj 18.02n.34 (Aspen Publishers2015). 14